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introduction.  Trash Matters
Over the last twenty- five years, Senegal’s capital city Dakar has been period-
ically submerged in garbage. In 2007, seven years after winning a landmark 
election hailed as a signal of deepening democracy in Senegal, President 
Abdoulaye Wade was reelected to little fanfare. Widespread dissatisfaction 
was brewing over elite politics and the uneven distribution of the fruits of the 
city’s development. Two months after the elections, the city was plunged into 
one of its greatest garbage crises yet, as its municipal trash workers went on 
strike and ordinary Dakarois, in solidarity, staged dramatic neighborhood- 
wide trash “revolts” through dumping their household waste into the public 
space. Across the city, mountains of trash choked the capital’s grand boule-
vards and paralyzed many of the city’s functions. As the hours, sometimes 
days passed before the garbage was cleaned up, the quiet process of putrefac-
tion slowly gripped the city in a noxious haze of filth and disgust.
The trash revolts in the working- class, central Dakar neighborhood of 
hlm Fass were particularly impassioned. Fed up with the state’s inability 
to resolve the trash workers’ labor dispute and with the burdens of man-
aging their festering garbage, the neighborhood’s youth and women were 
determined to publicly demand the resolution of the material inequalities of 
urban infrastructure. Under cover of darkness, they quietly evacuated their 
household trash into the Boulevard Dial Diop, blocking one of the main 
thoroughfares leading downtown. For weeks, garbage littered the streets 
alongside the remnant electoral- campaign messages (see figure i.1), provid-
ing potent testimony to the messy state of urban development and the pow-
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erful role played by the city’s residents in the function — or dysfunction — of 
this key urban infrastructure.
Those events contrasted markedly with a different trash crisis that trans-
pired in Dakar almost twenty years prior. In 1988 – 89, a now- famous social 
movement germinated in the streets of Dakar as youth ambushed the city’s 
trash- clogged public spaces with brooms and buckets (see figure i.2). Known 
as Set/Setal (“Be Clean/Make Clean” in Wolof), young men and women 
throughout the city set out to clean the city, buttress the failing urban waste 
infrastructure, and purify a polluted political sphere in a frenzied explosion 
of what came to be billed as participatory citizenship (enda 1991). The move-
ment looms large in the popular imagination and has gone down in scholarly 
literature on Senegalese democratic politics as a pivotal juncture in germi-
nating youth political consciousness (M. Diouf 1996). Its messages can still 
F I G U R E  I . 1 .  Remnants of the trash revolts spearheaded by Dakar residents in May 2007. 
Note the campaign message for Abdoulaye Wade, left over from the February 2007 
presidential elections. Author’s photo, 2007.
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be glimpsed peeking out from faded murals in unexpected corners of the city 
and in periodic cleanup events bearing the movement’s name. 
Juxtaposed, these two tales of dirt and disorder in Dakar — the Set/Setal 
movement and the 2007 strike — are of enormous significance. Surprisingly, 
most of the striking workers were actually the same young people who had 
spearheaded the legendary social movement years before. In a culture where 
cleanliness of body and soul is of deep spiritual import, their acts of dirtying 
or ordering public space are profoundly meaningful.
This book examines contestation surrounding Dakar’s household waste 
infrastructure as a lens into questions of urban citizenship. Dakar’s city 
streets have oscillated between remarkably tidy and dangerously insalubri-
ous as the city’s garbage infrastructure has become the stage for struggles 
over government, the value of labor, and the dignity of the working poor in 
Senegal’s neoliberal era. As a key feature of new urban  development agendas 
unleashed in the wake of structural adjustment, a volatile series of institu-
tional reorganizations have reconfigured the responsibilities and rewards for 
F I G U R E  I . 2 .  Activists from the Set/Setal movement painting neighborhood murals  
in 1989. enda, Set Setal, des murs qui parlent. Reprinted with permission from  
enda Tiers Monde.
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doing the city’s dirty work through various formulas of community participa-
tion. Differentially disciplining people through the burdens of waste disposal 
has become a primary mode of state power. Governing- through- disposability 
devolves infrastructure onto labor, reconfiguring the relations of social re-
production and mobilizing invisible burdens of stigma and disease onto 
specific geographies and laboring bodies. At the same time, these ordering 
projects have been intensely fraught. Through clogging streets with the city’s 
rejectamenta, garbage activists have met attempts to govern through garbage 
with a visceral “refusal to be refuse.”1 Often framed through discourses of 
Islamic piety, their struggles have provided a potent language with which to 
critique Senegal’s neoliberal trajectory and assert rights to fair labor.
This analysis bridges a cultural politics of labor with a materialist under-
standing of infrastructure, through an ethnography of everyday infrastruc-
tures of disposal. In doing so, it recalibrates how we understand urban infra-
structure through emphasizing its material, social, and affective elements. A 
central contention is that infrastructure and materiality debates often miss 
the social and embodied parts of infrastructure, and thus fall short of fully 
grappling with the political implications of how lives and bodies get caught 
up in urban restructuring. Through focusing on labor, the analysis illumi-
nates how urban infrastructures are composed of human as much as techni-
cal elements, and how these living elements can help make infrastructures 
into a vital means of political action and a tool for the formation of collective 
identities. On the other hand, materialist insights offer an important correc-
tive to studies of labor and culture that elide the ways in which “things” are 
consequential and how bodies and things intersect. New labor arrangements 
for trash collection discipline specific bodies through the material power of 
waste. The material practice of cleaning, in turn, conditions the subjectiv-
ities and communities of affect that strive to realign the material and the 
moral. Waste makes clear how governing regimes and the messy possibili-
ties for their disruption are constituted in the particularities of the matter 
at hand — here, discard and filth, and their obverse, cleanliness and purity.
Through fleshing out the material and social life of infrastructure in the 
era of austerity, the analysis bridges “old” and “new” materialist debates in 
order to grapple with infrastructure’s political address. It brings Africanist, 
postcolonial, and feminist- materialist insights to bear on urban and infra-
structure theory through an analysis that is at once grounded in situated 
knowledge and politics, and attuned to wider circuits of capital, ideas, and 
power. Ostensibly neutral everyday infrastructural systems are revealed 
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to contain complex socio- technical and spiritual worlds stitched together 
through expert labors of salvage bricolage. These material practices of ne-
gotiation become the stage for citizenship struggles. A focus on the labors 
constituting these bricolage infrastructures foregrounds the ways that “peo-
ple as infrastructure” render the city their laboratory through tinkering and 
maintenance.2 At the same time, it reveals the corporeal and spiritual bur-
dens of fragmented infrastructures devolved onto laboring bodies. Garbage 
grounds the practice of politics in the pungent, gritty material of the city. 
The book challenges the notion that Southern cities, especially African cit-
ies, represent exceptions to urban theories, and draws insight from Dakar’s 
everyday urbanism toward recalibrating how we think of infrastructure, la-
bor, and citizenship in cities anywhere.
Neoliberalism, Labor, and African Cities
Most broadly, a key contribution of the book involves reconfiguring under-
standings of neoliberalism. It is well recognized that urban public services 
have been crucibles of struggle surrounding structural adjustment and other 
neoliberal logics. And yet, much writing about neoliberal urban reform in 
the Global South privileges singular scripts of urban change viewed on a 
planetary scale (e.g., Davis 2004). Critiques of neoliberalism have become 
hegemonic in studies of African cities over the last decade, and many of 
these studies imagine a sort of teleological “impact model” of neoliberal glo-
balization as a global bulldozer wreaking havoc on a passive local victim 
(G. Hart 2001; Parnell and Robinson 2012). Though neoliberal logics have 
recrafted postcolonial development trajectories in Africa in powerful ways, 
it is important not to portray those dynamics in reductive terms. A growing 
body of research emphasizes the different, often hybrid variants of processes 
of neoliberalization as well as “the multiple and contradictory aspects of neo-
liberal spaces, techniques, and subjects,” especially in their situated expres-
sion in Southern cities (Larner 2003, 5). Building on those insights, I provide 
a detailed examination of the ways that such reforms get hashed out in one 
of the last bastions of Senegal’s urban civil service. Through grappling with 
everyday negotiations in homes, streets, and municipal offices, my analysis 
rejects simplistic narratives of urban change to instead reveal the complex 
mix of politics unleashed by neoliberal reform, the often hybridized nature 
of institutional forms, and the way that people’s lives and political subjectiv-
ities are restructured with important consequences.
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Senegal is a rich case through which to examine the processes and con-
sequences of neoliberal reform, as one of the first African countries to un-
dergo structural adjustment but also a key locus around which theories of 
structural adjustment and critiques of the African state were articulated 
(Berg 1981, 1990; Van de Walle 2001). This research examines the way that 
logics of urban reform have manifested in political struggles around garbage 
infrastructure — or, more broadly, through relations of disposability, over the 
last three decades. It responds to the gap between the abundant literature 
on “the state in Africa” and the dearth of ethnographic research into new 
governance agendas, the ways that state power is materialized in everyday 
infrastructures, and how life is experienced daily by civil servants and cit-
izens alike.3 Recognizing that the state is an important site of neoliberal 
reason and that many of the recent contestations around neoliberalism in 
Africa have been directed at state power, this study returns state bodies to 
the center of political ethnography. Overall, this is a decidedly Senegalese 
story that is particular to the play of neoliberal ideas in the context of Dakar’s 
urban politics. The story assembles a rich history of democratic politics, a 
specific political ecology of order, a fabric of religious identities and affilia-
tions, and a complex field of globalizing relations.
In Senegal, we shall see that municipal and national state politics remain 
key arenas through which citizenship battles are fought. As the country’s 
capital and the engine of the country in demographic, economic, and ad-
ministrative terms, Dakar has been the heartland of postcolonial electoral 
politics and contestations around the nation’s development. Much as the city 
was the seat of the French colonial administration in West Africa, today it 
operates as an influential center of development administration and as a key 
mover and shaker in regional and international politics.4 Given that most 
visitors and tourists fly into Dakar, the garbage crises over the last decades 
have been a key challenge to aspirations of modernity. Garbage crises take 
on larger- than- life significance in this small country; the trashing of Dakar 
represents the trashing of the nation.
Examining urban labor as a grounding of citizenship is a powerful lens 
through which to make “theory from the South” about the neoliberal era 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). Specifically, the book details the transfor-
mation of trash labor in contemporary Dakar. In doing so, it builds on a 
rich tradition of research in African studies that explores ethnographically 
the transformation of work and urban citizenship in the context of political 
economic change. Both the labor question and the city have loomed large 
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in Africanist scholarship. An important tradition of Africanist social his-
tory and ethnography has long grappled with the ways that work in diverse 
contexts across the continent has transformed with the tectonic changes 
unleashed in African societies, as they have been integrated into global cir-
cuits of trade, development agendas, and, more recently, neoliberal global-
ization.5 Foundational Africanist research in political ecology has exposed 
the particular ways that new political economic agendas are rooted in socio- 
environmental power relations and the important connections between 
material- environmental knowledge, labor, and landscape transformation.6 
Building on this long tradition of inquiry into contestations surrounding 
people’s socio- natural relationships, this study focuses on urban waste infra-
structure as a distinctive ecology that incorporates human labor. In so doing, 
it opens up new frontiers for probing intersecting material precarities and 
politics in the urban sphere.7
Though there has been a strong agenda of Africanist urban studies over 
the last few decades,8 little research has explored ethnographically the way 
that neoliberal reforms since the 1980s have transformed labor in specific 
African cities. An exception is research looking at work and labor mobili-
zation in South Africa’s postapartheid neoliberal era.9 A small but highly 
relevant group of geographical studies specifically examine how trash work 
(municipal collection and informal trash picking) has been reconfigured in 
South Africa over the last two decades. Like this book, these studies show 
how cleaning work magnifies contestations surrounding austerity, and em-
phasize the important role of social difference in structuring degraded labor 
(Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2000; Miraftab 2004a, 2004b; M. Samson 
2007, 2009, 2015). Faranak Miraftab, for example, details how neoliberal 
governance agendas forwarded in the postapartheid era were consolidated 
in the casualization of urban waste labor in Cape Town (Miraftab 2004a, 
2004b). Her analysis of the deployment of discourses of empowerment, par-
ticipation, and social capital to justify the exploitation of, especially, poor 
black women’s labor resonates deeply with what I’ve observed in Dakar. My 
research goes a step further, however, in examining the infrastructural im-
plications of a mode of governing- through- disposability and its grounding in 
the corporeal and spiritual burdens of the materiality of waste.
Beyond specific studies of urban labor, this book is deeply informed by 
a broader recent literature on African cities examining practices of urban 
citizenship. Africanist literature has driven some of the most innovative 
and provocative recent scholarly debates considering the urban condition.10 
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This research captures the creative innovations deployed by urban Africans 
while also conjuring the artifice that may be entailed in innovative forms 
of governing and rebellion. It has been especially generative toward recon-
ceptualizing the spaces of belonging through which urban residents grapple 
with custom, imagine new rules of association, and perform civility in the 
city. Gender, generation, and religious affiliation come to the fore as par-
ticularly consequential shapers of sociopolitical community and citizenship 
practices. In the Senegalese setting, urban scholars challenge the preoccu-
pation within Senegalese religious studies on formal religious institutions, 
through revealing the role of quotidian modes of religiosity in forging urban 
publics (Babou 2007; Diouf and Leichtman 2009). New work on gender 
and generation, moreover, demonstrates the complex ways that young men 
and women negotiate daily life and politics in Dakar (M. Diouf 2003; Foley and 
Drame 2013; Fouquet 2013; Fredericks 2014; Honwana 2012; Nyamnjoh 
2005; Rabine 2013; Ralph 2008; Scheld 2007).
Building on this foundational Africanist research exploring the cultural 
politics of labor and urban practice, this book examines the communities 
of affect that have been animated by new material relations of disposal, fo-
cusing specifically on gender, generation, and religion. The analysis brings 
attention to both labor and infrastructure in a novel interrogation of urban 
transformation in the neoliberal era. Its concern is to cross- fertilize the Afri-
canist research on labor and the city with the materialist literature, through 
attending more deeply to the materiality of labor and the city’s infrastruc-
tural realm while not losing sight of the cultural references and identities 
through which people’s labor and struggles gain meaning. It builds on a 
small but pioneering literature on urban infrastructural politics that brings 
new materialist concepts to bear on studies of urban change in Africa’s con-
temporary era.11 However, discussions of labor have been conspicuously ab-
sent from most of this work on political infrastructures. Through thinking 
about vital labors of waste infrastructure, this analysis resists the unmooring 
of cultural politics from the substrate on which it operates, and emphasizes 
the full register of meaning and material practice surrounding garbage as 
waste. This will allow for a deeper understanding of the full gamut of po-
litical violences, struggles, and possibilities that shape the urban condition. 
Before delving more deeply into this theoretical framework, the next section 
will overview the specific history of trash politics in Dakar.
Trash Matters 9
Reforming Trash in Dakar
In 1988 – 89, groaning under the strains of harsh structural adjustment- induced 
austerity measures and disappointment in the nationalist development proj-
ect, especially among the nation’s youth, Dakar became the epicenter of 
the country’s worst political crisis yet. The elections of 1988, won by the in-
cumbent president amid widespread controversy, precipitated massive youth 
riots and the cancellation of a whole academic school year, including at the 
Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. Forming the material expression of 
political disorder, garbage accumulated in the public space. As the municipal 
garbage system collapsed under the budgetary constraints of austerity, Set/
Setal youth set out to clean the city on their own terms.
As I detail in chapter 1, Set/Setal was the founding moment in an era 
when cleanliness and the labor of urban garbage management would take 
center stage as a primary language of control and contestation surround-
ing urban citizenship. At the height of Set/Setal, Dakar’s then mayor made 
a shrewd political calculus to mastermind the recruitment of youth activ-
ists into a citywide participatory trash- collection system. A feature of the 
country’s new neoliberal course, the participatory trash sector brought in 
these young men and women as new political clients, thereby co- opting their 
threat to state authority through the symbolic position they were to take on 
as the new face of the nation and its orderly development. Their incorpo-
ration into the trash sector was facilitated by a discourse of responsibility 
through active participation in the cleanliness of the city and thus “a moral 
urban politics based on the enrolment of subjects into ‘civilized’ behavior” 
(McFarlane and Rutherford 2008, 367). They became the backbone of the 
municipal waste management system and remain the sector’s labor force 
today.
Since Set/Setal, Dakar’s garbagescape has become a central terrain over 
which the cultural and moral legitimacy of the Senegalese state has been 
fought. A saga of institutional reorganizations in the trash sector over the last 
twenty- five years manifests tumultuous struggles for power between the na-
tional and municipal state over ordering Dakar. Far from a linear trajectory 
of neoliberal reform, unexpected hybrid institutions were forged out of this 
power struggle against the backdrop of an impetus to privatize, decentralize, 
and shrink the public sector. Even under the banner of expressly neoliberal 
politics, implemented by socialists and liberals alike, formulas for managing 
the city have emerged that seek to centralize and nationalize control. This 
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sheds light on the real political stakes of implementing reform in practice 
given the important patronage functions and performative dimensions of 
urban public services in Dakar. During the liberal party president Abdoulaye 
Wade’s twelve years in office (2000 – 2012), the garbage sector epitomized 
the national government’s often schizophrenic approach to managing public 
services and assembling urban infrastructure. Radically uneven, sporadic, 
and performative investments in urban infrastructure left parts of the city 
to rot, rust, and slowly crumble with the passage of time while others were 
spiffed up with elite, world- class urban aesthetics.
Spatially limited in its expansion due to its location on the Cape Verde 
Peninsula, and facing rapid growth rates, Dakar has sprawled out from its 
original colonial confines (today’s downtown or Plateau commune d’arrondisse-
ment [district]) into its rapidly expanding banlieue (outskirts) (see map i.1). 
Plateau is the most formally planned and serviced district, while the sprawl-
ing banlieue of Pikine and Guédiawaye represent the least formally planned 
and often most disfavored areas for infrastructure investments. This periph-
ery now houses much of Dakar’s population (Collignon 1984). Flooding in 
these neighborhoods is a perennial problem and urban public services are in-
creasingly stretched thin as the city’s population continues to climb. Though 
the Plateau district still hosts most of the federal government agencies as 
well as banking, international development, and corporate offices, much of 
the city’s economic activity is decentralizing into more localized markets 
and economic hubs dispersed throughout the city. With the pull of the new 
industrial park and urban “pole” of Diamniadio just east of Dakar, moreover, 
the city’s banlieue is becoming increasingly important compared with the 
central districts (Cohen 2007, 148). Despite this fact, these areas are still 
deeply disadvantaged for government services and planned infrastructure.
Though real estate values generally fall the farther one travels from down-
town, historical factors and patronage politics mean that certain neighbor-
hoods that are still quite central (for example, hlm Fass) remain disadvan-
taged for receiving the fruits of urban public services. Garbage regularly 
collects in these neighborhoods and the city’s poor outskirts, and during 
trash strikes and collection crises they are inundated with their own waste. 
Elite enclaves scattered throughout the peninsula (e.g., Les Almadies), on 
the other hand, may take garbage management into their own hands or ne-
gotiate special privileges with the state. Shrinking funding for urban public 

























M A P  I . 1 .  Contemporary map of Dakar, 2017. The population of Dakar  
was estimated at 3.5 million of Senegal’s 14 million inhabitants in 2015.  
cia, “The World Factbook: Senegal.”
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governing bodies and politicians have clashed over diminishing budgets. In 
Dakar’s garbage sector, this profoundly contested agenda evolved in fits and 
starts through an often confusing medley of hybridized institutional forms. 
Over the course of Wade’s tenure in office, the garbage sector was reorga-
nized at least ten separate times, ranging from full privatization, to nation-
alization, to various power- sharing arrangements between government, pri-
vate, and other institutions. This instability defies quick characterization 
within simplistic neoliberal paradigms but has had far- reaching implications 
for how the burdens of waste and its disposal are shouldered in Dakar.
Chapter 2 details how these reconfigurations turned on manipulating 
trash labor and its remuneration through various formulas of participation. 
Community participation and associated empowerment discourses are a 
key tenet of “soft neoliberalism” (Peck 2010, xvi) — new “kinder, gentler” 
modes of governing austerity in the face of widespread critique and social 
dislocation (Mohan and Stokke 2000). In Dakar, this involved more than 
just participation being imposed from on high into the lexicon of Senega-
lese development. Originally a radical approach by Set/Setal youth to as-
sert rights to a healthy city, the discourse of participation was transformed 
by key political actors into a very different set of projects concerned with 
disciplining certain elements of the social body through material means. 
Participation served as a mode of governing through reconfiguring relations 
of social reproduction. The greatest burdens of the municipal trash system 
were devolved onto labor: workers were furnished with little equipment for 
collection, if any at all, and existing materials were allowed to degrade. The 
onus of disposal work shifted onto laboring bodies as the city expanded and 
consumption levels rose.
Meanwhile, the periphery of the city witnessed another development that 
further displaced waste infrastructure onto labor, as explored in chapter 3. 
Linking up with participation in the “formal” municipal sector, in hard- to- 
access parts of the city’s periphery, “informal” community- based nongovern-
mental organization (ngo) projects were spearheaded in the early 2000s to 
bring unpaid women in as “municipal housekeepers” to collect their neigh-
borhood trash. Consistent with the wider discourse on participation and 
associated notions of appropriate technology and empowerment, these proj-
ects involved door- to- door horse- drawn- cart collection projects centered on 
the voluntary labor of neighborhood women. Across these transformations 
in the city and its periphery, it is possible to identify a number of different 
infrastructural formulas for managing the city’s garbage collection that turn 
Trash Matters 13
on flexibilizing the formal labor force and mobilizing community- based la-
bors of collection.
In a keen demonstration of the “unruliness of infrastructure” (Larkin 
2008), workers and residents in Dakar have exerted their rights to urban citi-
zenship through tactics aimed at unsettling the “proper” function and signif-
icance of trash infrastructures. In chapter 4, I show how from 2000 to 2009, 
the municipal trash workers went from being disorganized, invisible, and 
stigmatized to being one of the most mobilized and respected labor unions 
in contemporary Senegal. Since the mid- 2000s, the trash workers have pe-
riodically disturbed the ordering processes of governing- through- garbage by 
staging a series of multiday, havoc- wreaking, general trash strikes. During 
this time, ordinary Dakarois in neighborhoods like hlm Fass have joined in 
the chorus of rebellion through disorder by the concerted dumping of house-
hold garbage into public streets, squares, even in front of government build-
ings. Strikes by workers and public dumping by residents deploy the power 
of dirt to creatively subvert ordering paradigms and contest the stigma and 
abjection implied by living and working in filth.
The trash workers personally and publicly frame their labor as an act 
of Muslim piety rooted in the spiritual value of cleanliness. This refusal of 
disposability turns the stigma of trash work on its head. Through accompa-
nying their strikes with a savvy public relations campaign, the trash work-
ers have redefined their profession, earned widespread public support, and 
played a key role in critiquing the country’s neoliberal development trajec-
tory. With the signing of the trash union’s collective bargaining agreement 
in 2014 — which conferred formal contracts, higher salaries, and health care 
benefits — the garbage sector pioneered the reversal of neoliberal trends flex-
ibilizing urban labor and signaled the possibility of a new era of urban gov-
ernance in Dakar.
As can be seen from this brief history, trash in the public space in Dakar 
signals more than just technical failure or inadequate funding. Wrapped 
up with the question of trash is the negotiation of citizenship in the space 
of urban infrastructure. Violent neoliberal political economies congeal in 
the city’s wastescape and are made manifest in crisis moments. I take the 
major trash crises of Senegal’s neoliberal moment — especially 1988 – 89 and 
2007 — as key points of rupture, when political economic turmoil became 
materially visceral in the public space and different actors negotiated a new 
configuration of socio- material relations. The trash crises are thus the man-
ifestation of the disorder of development (see Beall 2006). They are produc-
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tive moments of revelation and reflection on larger political questions, when 
citizens renegotiate their roles in the urban labor force and, more broadly, 
in the orderly processes of city making. The next sections will detail the 
book’s theoretical orientation toward a materialist ethnography of waste 
infrastructure.
Vital Infrastructures
In contrast to technocratic representations of solid- waste management (swm), 
this book treats trash infrastructures as political matter (Braun and What-
more 2010). It builds on a long tradition of geographical research examining 
the production of urban space in processes of uneven development.12 New 
political economic agendas are crystallized in the space of urban infrastruc-
ture. But urban infrastructures, including housing, water, waste, and trans-
port, are not stable edifices of power or technologies of rule. They are key 
sites of performative government practice as well as claim making by elite 
and disenfranchised citizens alike. This study is part of a growing body of 
ethnographic research examining urban infrastructures as key forums for 
negotiated processes of political contestation.13 It builds on a recent empha-
sis on the urban scale as the key locus of citizenship and on everyday ne-
gotiations around access to public space and goods in the city as central to 
claiming citizenship.14 It advances these discussions through emphasizing 
the material basis of contestations around citizenship, especially focusing 
on the materiality of labor.
As part of a broader field of ethnographic research on infrastructure pol-
itics, Africanist research has been particularly innovative in showing how 
material infrastructures such as roads, sewers, and electricity grids serve as a 
“political terrain for the negotiation of central ethical and political questions 
concerning civic virtue and the shape of citizenship.”15 Antina von Schnit-
zler’s (2013, 2016) research on prepaid water- meter technologies in South 
Africa, for instance, shows how in bypassing, destroying, and tinkering with 
this neoliberal layer of infrastructure, township residents wage a micro- 
politics of innovation and subversion which contests ethical regimes of in-
dividuation and incentivization. Of particular relevance to this research, 
Brenda Chalfin (2014, 2016) examines citizenship practices rooted in daily 
engagements with sewer infrastructures in the context of modernist failure 
in urban Ghana. She pays special attention to how the embodied material 
practices through which urban residents adapt, maintain, and forge waste 
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infrastructures renegotiate the urban social contract. Similarly, this study 
focuses on the embodied practices of trash collection in Senegal’s neoliberal 
era but also on the cultural modes through which that infrastructure is or-
ganized and valued.
Waste in Dakar urges an understanding of infrastructure not as a sim-
ple, inert, technical supporting structure, but as a relational articulation of 
material, social, and affective elements. Infrastructures are ecologies that 
assemble a range of spatialized relationships between political economic im-
peratives, technologies, natural processes, forms of sociality, social mean-
ings, and modes of ritual action (see Murphy 2013; Star 1999). This allows 
for a much broader understanding of infrastructures that can include bio-
physical processes, technologies of government, experiences of abjection, 
embodied precarities, the force of matter and machines, and aesthetic or 
spiritual systems of order. These relationships get articulated in and through 
the material form of the city, and negotiated in everyday politics specific 
to different urban arrangements and their attendant sociohistorical com-
plexes. Infrastructures are not static; they are composed of fluid relations 
between technologies and forms of sociality. Their development, operation, 
maintenance, and breakdown, moreover, are imbricated with other discur-
sive, symbolic, and religious realms. Considering these socio- technical ecol-
ogies relationally allows us to probe the intersections between human and 
nonhuman agencies, the concrete burdens placed on laboring bodies and 
communities, and the everyday meanings and practices through which in-
frastructures become political.
The matter at stake in infrastructures — or the materiality of relationships 
among people and the urban ecologies they manage — is an active agent in 
the political negotiations they engender. This research is informed by new 
materialist debates, especially the recent resurgence of materialist thinking 
in geography.16 It is concerned with the force of things or, drawing on Bruce 
Braun and Sarah J. Whatmore’s (2010, ix) important intervention, “the way 
that things of every imaginable kind — material objects, informed materi-
als, bodies, machines, even media ecologies — help constitute the common 
worlds we share and the dense fabric of relations with others in and through 
which we live.” This vitalist perspective emphasizes the relational nature of 
material and social worlds. Like other managed objects and commodities — 
for instance, oil, water, sewage, carbon, electricity, lead, and asbestos (Anand 
2011; Fennell 2016; Gregson, Watkins, and Calestani 2010; McFarlane 2008; 
von Schnitzler 2016; Watts 2009; Whitington 2016) — household trash has 
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its own unique, context- specific materiality and spatiality that conditions the 
social and political life of waste infrastructure. A key element of this analysis 
is disentangling the way that “different matters matter differently” (Greg-
son and Crang 2010, 1027) — or the special force of household waste in this 
story. We shall see how the specific materiality of Dakar’s garbage, waste’s 
connection to impurity in Islam, and the power of cleaning as a process of 
purification are key features of the political valence of trash in Dakar.
Extending geographical insights on materiality, this research departs 
from some of the new materialist thinking in how it defines and locates 
the political. Although the conception of vital infrastructures here shares 
an interest with Jane Bennett (2010, 6) in “thing- power” as “the curious 
ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic 
and subtle,” it diverges from Bennett’s approach to evaluating the agency 
of things. Bennett’s conception of politics floats in an abstract, philosoph-
ical mode that does not recognize the asymmetries of power represented 
by the assemblages she considers, and offers limited insight into the actual 
political work that nonhuman actants do in specific settings (see Braun et 
al. 2011). Through ethnography, this analysis goes beyond the philosophical 
to show how waste exerts very different power within divergent contexts, 
with far- reaching implications for different people in Dakar. By centering the 
analysis on the materiality of labor, it unpacks “the complexities, frictions, 
intractabilities, and conundrums of ‘matter in relation’ ” (Abrahamsson, Ber-
toni, and Mol 2015, 13) to interrogate what kinds of politics matter has and 
the strategic alliances people forge with things. Reconsidering labor and 
infrastructure is, thus, a way to recuperate a vital politics of material infra-
structures. Through drawing attention to people as infrastructure, bricolage 
as material work, and the material moralities of value and meaning making, 
I show how material geographies of trash matter to how government and 
citizenship are practiced.
Attention to waste in Dakar foregrounds that urban infrastructures are 
composed of social as much as technical elements and that waste matters in 
its encounter with and animation by/of human bodies. In contrast to defi-
nitions of infrastructure in much of the recent critical literature that elide 
the social life of infrastructure, this analysis is centered on the way that new 
infrastructural assemblages are situated in human labor and the crucial in-
tersections of human and nonhuman agencies. It thus urges for a “fleshing 
out” of infrastructures’ literal vitality (living parts) through advancing an 
understanding of the key role of labor and community in infrastructural 
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systems. In this way, it builds on and extends AbdouMaliq Simone’s (2004b) 
notion of people as infrastructure to examine how “infrastructure exerts a 
force — not simply in the materials and energies it avails, but also the way 
it attracts people, draws them in, coalesces and expends their capacities” 
(Simone 2012). Vital infrastructures are alive in all sorts of ways with the 
materials that compose them — including the trash and its active biologi-
cal processes but also, crucially, the human labor through which they take 
form. This liveliness illuminates the relational precarities of infrastructure 
and labor — or how they are precarious in different ways that intersect in 
key moments.
Although there is growing attention within urban studies to how net-
worked infrastructures are fragmenting in ways that exacerbate urban in-
equality all over the world, attention to human labor is especially relevant in 
the nonnetworked, often informal, fragmented infrastructural systems that 
dominate in Dakar and across the Global South.17 Austerity and economic 
stagnation in recent decades have magnified the historical fragmentation of 
African urban infrastructures, dashing the aspirations of the nationalist era 
and amplifying uneven development. As we’ll see in Dakar, this has bred 
infrastructures of salvage bricolage, even within the core of urban public ser-
vices. These systems underscore that infrastructures are processual — they 
are constantly undergoing innovative processes of care and (re)fabrication 
by the bodies and systems of sociality they are built upon. On the other 
hand, an emphasis on labor highlights how devolved, participatory waste 
infrastructures have come to be a central pillar of governing practices in 
Senegal and of the material processes of abjection through which certain 
bodies become constituted as waste. Infrastructures can be seen to expend 
human capacities in two senses — both through disbursing them, and also 
through using them up. This allows for a more robust conception of the ways 
that people are infrastructure, which is attentive to the violences that may 
consolidate in the silences of infrastructure’s concrete and the daily material 
negotiations through which those violences may be fractured.18 Dakar’s bri-
colage infrastructures highlight both how infrastructures may predate their 
human elements and the important ways that infrastructures’ people may 
upend these systems.
Finally, infrastructures are affective worlds that give rise to a range of 
structures of feeling. This story draws attention to the intersections of ma-
teriality and social systems of meaning — or the generative capacity of non-
human actants “to move us and shape our collective attachments” (Braun 
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and Whatmore 2010, xxiv; drawing on Connolly 2010). Dakar’s trash infra-
structures reveal not just the social labor processes through which people 
stitch together livelihoods out of the fragments of stagnant economies, but 
also the bricolage modes of meaning making they inspire. The piety of re-
fusal can be seen as a sort of bricolage of the self in a landscape of disrepair 
and pollution that serves as both a mode of piety and a collective resource. 
Infrastructures require belonging; they are embedded in social relations 
and are erected upon moral architectures. “ ‘Modes of religiosity’ forge new 
spaces of affiliation, movements, civic culture, and communities” (Diouf and 
Leichtman 2009, 3 – 4), but also alternative infrastructures through which 
new moral geographies are crafted. The focus on salvage here grounds bri-
colage in the material practice of dealing with ruins and waste. The qualities 
of waste are central not just to how these infrastructures operate, but to how 
they are understood and felt. As we shall see in the next section, waste’s pow-
ers to disrupt and the salience of cleaning as a practice of order and piety are 
key features of the political valence of trash as vital matter in Dakar.
Waste Matters
Waste has special salience as vital matter on multiple registers owing to the 
particularities of its material properties and its role as an index of value.19 
Waste has a “gritty,” coarse materiality that helps to “ground” understand-
ings of materialism (Kirsch 2013). The high organic content, stench, and 
propensity for quick putrefaction in the Senegalese heat makes household 
trash in Dakar visceral, lively matter. Far from inert, it is a material in tran-
sition. The internal processes of decomposition endow Dakar’s trash with 
a “toxic vitality” (P. Harvey 2016) that is a central feature of trash politics. 
These properties and the socio- spatial geographies of its management have 
important implications for a consideration of the role of discard infrastruc-
tures in formulas of governing and claims to urban citizenship.
Waste plays a key role in the cultural work of coding value. In her semi-
nal work on pollution and taboo, Mary Douglas (1966) illustrates how sym-
bolic associations around impurity maintain social structures. Dirt should 
be seen, she argues, as simply “matter out of place” or “disorder”; there is a 
social function behind rites and rituals defining what — and who, for that 
matter — is considered pure versus what is labeled a contagion. In her words, 
“As we know it, dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as abso-
lute dirt: it exists in the eye of the beholder. If we shun dirt, it is not because 
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of craven fear, still less dread of holy terror. Nor do our ideas about disease 
account for the range of our behaviour in cleaning or avoiding dirt. Dirt of-
fends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive 
effort to organise the environment” (Douglas 1966, 2). Douglas exposes the 
powerful ways that discourses around the dangers of dirt and pollution pro-
duce social boundaries and thereby structure and spatialize social relations. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the meaning and thus political 
import of waste is not a transhistorical, - cultural, or - geographical given. 
Waste should be understood as a “mobile description of that which has been 
cast out or judged superfluous in a particular space – time. It is a technical 
and political artifact that gathers force in its performativity” within certain 
contexts (Gidwani and Reddy 2011, 1649; italics in original). Douglas’s focus 
on semiotics and denial of the material force of matter beyond the cultural 
realm, moreover, is insufficient.20 The power that trash comes to perform 
in certain contexts is constituted through its material- semiotic properties as 
they intersect with particular bodies. Trash matters, in other words, because 
its dirty associations and messy properties govern the practice of managing it 
and its sociopolitical power. Through pushing beyond the symbolic to grap-
ple with the full force of waste in its material and performative dimensions, 
this research traces the powerful ways that government officials, municipal 
workers, and ordinary Dakarois harness the power of waste to different ends 
in specific conjunctures.
Attention to the full discursive and material import of waste draws into 
relief the way that “purification impulses” (Sennett 1970) have long gov-
erned modernizing missions through rigorous urban boundary making.21 
Urban space in the colonies was produced and regulated along racial lines 
through ideas of dirt and disease, crystallized through pivotal moments of 
socio- spatial reorganization like disease outbreaks. Just as urban space and 
its infrastructures were produced unevenly along segregationist logics in the 
colonial period, so do infrastructures in postcolonial cities codify govern-
ment prerogatives and unequal citizenship across the urban landscape. As in 
the colony, the uneven provision of infrastructure for urban public services 
like water, sanitation, and waste management is a mechanism of abjection 
through which access to the rewards of the city may be extended or de-
nied. Drawing on Julia Kristeva’s formulation of how processes of abjection 
repel/expel the other who is deemed polluting, Nikhil Anand shows how 
governmental practices render abject certain residents of Mumbai through 
the active denial of water infrastructures.22 Exerting control over urban de-
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velopment and governing urban subjects depends upon the maintenance of 
an aesthetic order in the city that keeps people in their proper place. Gov-
ernmental techniques, which render unruly slum space unlawful, define 
and enforce aesthetic norms to produce specific images of modernity and 
legitimize the displacement of those deemed “polluting,” or lacking a proper 
“citizen- culture,” as unfit to belong in the city.23 In this light, Vinay Gidwani 
(2013, 176) describes India’s exclusionary urbanisms as a “century- long class 
war against waste.”
At the base of state legitimacy, therefore, is the government’s performa-
tive role in cleaning the city through managing urban waste. Waste manage-
ment — or the process by which waste is rendered a “public secret” (Hawkins 
2003) — is a primary vehicle of modernizing missions through ordering 
spaces and disciplining bodies (see Doherty, 2018; McFarlane 2008; Moore 
2009; Gidwani 2013; Brownell 2014). Yet urban waste and its management is 
a contradictory indicator of progress and modernity. As the outcome of con-
sumption and production, waste represents the excess of modernity (Moore 
2009). Thus the challenge of managing it escalates with the pursuit of devel-
opment. Because the movement of waste — its effective, proper disposal, out 
of sight — allows development to continue and urban order to be maintained, 
the blockage of that disposal process is the ultimate symbol of nonprogress 
and indicator of state delinquency. Without ritual practices of expulsion and 
elimination, the city risks being consumed by the very effluvium of its own 
advancement. The accumulation of urban waste in the public space exteri-
orizes that which is private, exposing the public secret of waste.
This book argues that practices of governing in Senegal have deployed 
the power of waste as impurity and disposability. This is not by any means 
the first consideration of the role of discourses of waste, excess, and excre-
ment in relation to African political discourse and governing logics. An in-
fluential body of francophone political theory places excremental politics at 
the center of postcolonial political discourse on the continent (Bayart 1989; 
Mbembe 2001). Drawing on often grotesque and scatological political dis-
course, Achille Mbembe argues that an “aesthetics of vulgarity” is central 
to the exertion and derision of authority.24 Though this analysis shares an 
interest in excremental languages involved in political displays of authority, 
it resists a tendency to characterize “the African state” in a way that ends 
up pathologizing African politics in blanket terms and sidestepping “the in-
sistent materiality” of waste (Chalfin 2014, 93). I am concerned here with 
examining how the material power of literal waste infrastructures serves the 
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consolidation of hegemony or its fracture in specific historical conjunctures 
in Senegal.
I show that governing- through- garbage is a material practice of power 
that works through two modes of precarity. The first involves the dirtying 
of specific places. The problem of trash management is a question of bound-
aries. Trash marks the boundary between inside and outside: the inside 
is constructed as protected and safe whereas the outside — which can be 
“rubbished” — is figured as potentially malevolent, disorderly, and danger-
ous.25 Uneven trash collection in Dakar differentiates urban space — rendering 
abject those spaces and people not deemed a priority for urban public ser-
vices through processes of neglect and its consequence, rubbishing. Waste 
and dirt collect in those zones, inevitably the poorer and less well connected 
city neighborhoods, thereby disproportionately saddling residents with filth 
and its associated stigmas and dangers. Processes of urban neoliberal reform 
are premised upon allocating precarity through assigning disposability.
Compounding the wasting of specific spaces, the second mode of precar-
ity is rooted in the way that particular bodies are actively enlisted into labors 
of disposal which render them abject through the corporeal and spiritual 
burdens of pollution. This second mode is especially relevant here because 
labor has been at the center of governing- through- garbage in Dakar. Precar-
ious labor demands attention to the materiality of bodies — their sensuous 
capacities, differentiated burdens, and embodied engagements with nature 
(Bakker and Bridge 2006; Jackson 2000). The labor of discard, as a process 
of positively organizing the environment, is central to the reproduction of 
the social order. Garbage disposal requires not just places that are discard-
able, but also disposable people to accomplish the task. The work entailed 
in trash management repels, yet the risk and danger inscribed in the pro-
cess render it a vital labor at the base of urban development. Though it is by 
definition dirty, polluted labor, trash work can be seen simultaneously as a 
process of cleaning and purification. In Senegal, cleaning takes on added 
meaning owing to the particular importance ascribed to purity and cleanli-
ness as an indispensable element of Islamic faith.
Labor- intensive, “participatory” waste infrastructures have come to be a 
central pillar of governing practices in Senegal. By respatializing the rela-
tions of social reproduction, these new infrastructural formulas devolve the 
burdens of garbage infrastructure onto bodies and social systems with pro-
foundly uneven effects.26 Feminist insights on the gendered nature of ma-
terial life bring into view questions of embodiment, corporeality, and per-
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formativity which help to explain how certain bodies become constituted as 
waste through the full force of the burdens they bear. As Katie Meehan and 
Kendra Strauss (2015) point out in their reformulation of social reproduction 
drawing on a tradition of feminist posthumanism, attention to embodiment 
illuminates the material body as a “force that shapes knowledge, but also as 
the material site in which value, politics, and meaning is produced.” This 
underscores the importance of the “fleshy, messy” aspects of the crisis of 
social reproduction or the way it operates through labor’s materiality (Katz 
2001; Meehan and Strauss 2015). The force of waste is animated through its 
intersection with human labor — as it literally emplaces burdens of dirt and 
disease onto specific bodies through differentiated experiences of precarity 
and discipline.27
By focusing on the material precarities of trash work and the infrastruc-
ture it builds, I show that the power of trash has conditioned specific knowl-
edges, subjectivities, and practices that threaten the hegemonic power of 
governing- through- disposability. The matter at stake in infrastructure — 
here, the flows of waste and filth — shapes political possibilities, because the 
meanings associated with such matter (and not just the technical vulnera-
bilities) can be the source of its usefulness for political mobilization. Trash 
strikes are effective because they demonstrate the value of workers’ labor as 
it is withdrawn, but also because the material- semiotic resonance of trash as 
waste makes it a particularly powerful matter of rebellion. The public secret 
of waste and its associated risks rely on a multitude of everyday intersect-
ing forms of vigilance to keep it in its proper place. Years of tinkering have 
evolved the collection process toward a system premised upon intimate, daily 
intersections between women household garbage managers and municipal 
garbage collectors who share a commitment to ridding the city of its collec-
tive effluvium.28 Once those labors have been withdrawn and garbage has 
been discharged into the public space, the natural forces of decomposition 
take hold and the richly organic material begins to putrefy. With time, the 
resolution of the crisis becomes even more pressing as the residents’ mes-
sage takes on a life of its own in the waste’s increasingly hazardous stench 
and rot.
The counterhegemonic force of trash rebellion in Dakar was thus forged 
out of the specific subjectivities conditioned by the material practice of dis-
card and cleaning, and manifested in the creative deployment of the mate-
rial itself in rebellion. Precarious bodies, abject and empowered by waste, 
are always there to trouble delicate political orders. As in other settings, 
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waste workers in Dakar harness the power of discourses of cleaning and 
purity as a primary weapon in the fight for better wages and respect (see 
Millar 2012; Moore 2009). They unsettle the ordering paradigms implied by 
participatory labor arrangements to argue for a sort of “garbage citizenship” 
premised upon fair remuneration and benefits for garbage labor, and afford-
able, accessible garbage services. Their appeals to Islamic morality deploy 
an ethical and spiritual critique of the state’s erosion of labor and establish 
a new language through which to value a vital infrastructure. Dakar trash 
workers’ battle to make their labor manifest and to sculpt a vernacular un-
derstanding of its worth is thus a claim for a more ethical infrastructure. In 
this way, an examination of the human life of Dakar’s infrastructure can 
lend new insight into processes of urban citizenship and related questions of 
justice in cities anywhere.
Making “Theory from the South”
Cities in the Global South are more often than not characterized in patholog-
ical terms, through a lexicon charged with descriptions of what they lack and 
how their histories diverge from that of the rest of the world. Representations 
of African cities are often particularly gloomy and reductionist. Essentialist 
understandings of the continent as rural by nature and of African urbanism 
as necessarily dysfunctional were foundational to the constructions of dif-
ference that have historically haunted ideas of Africa. Despite the fact that a 
near majority of Africans now forge their lives in cities, racialized narratives 
of African alterity stubbornly persist. These join with theories of “proper” ur-
ban development patterned after Western urbanism to render African cities 
perverted, incomplete, and dysfunctional. Now yoked to a developmentalist 
ethos, framings of African urbanism are all too often limited to invectives 
of perverse growth, crumbling infrastructure, and flagging economies that 
demand a series of international interventions.
Garbage often stands in as the quintessential symbol of what’s wrong in 
African cities: the material expression of the failures of development and the 
chaos taking over the African continent. The challenge of managing trash, 
in other words, acts as a potent metaphor for the African “crisis” writ large. 
Indeed, Dakar’s trash “crisis” is almost always rendered either a technical- 
financial problem or a product of corruption, plain and simple. As such, 
it becomes part of the depressingly familiar narrative of the “failed” Afri-
can metropolis, a symbol of “the coming anarchy” that influential journalist 
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Robert D. Kaplan predicted would soon envelop a continent ruled by chaos 
and decay, sliding farther and farther off the map of global connection.29
Narratives of African exception that paint a picture of African cities as 
degrading, unfinished, or unworkable are not new or imaginative. They are 
consistent with a long legacy of discourse, deeply tied up with other rounds 
of globalization, which places Africa as the primordial other, a perverted and 
incomplete version of the Western whole (Mudimbe 1994). But, if waste is 
an index of difference — of that which should be cast out — then blanket dis-
courses of “trashing” should be roundly suspect. Describing African cities 
through discourses of waste and disorder profoundly ignores the “gutted in-
frastructures of segregated cityscapes” inherited through sedimented layers of 
imperial debris (Stoler 2008, 194). In the dilapidated, salvaged garbage trucks 
that arrive into Dakar from distant European shores we can trace ruins of em-
pire and their role in producing and upholding violent environments. Dakar’s 
trash collectors, like e- waste workers, pickers, recyclers, ship dismantlers, and 
so forth all over the world, signify geographies of dispossession, past and pres-
ent. They are potent symbols of “the colonial logic of (neo)liberal modernity” 
(Roy, Larner, and Peck 2012). Essentializing narratives of urbanism and waste 
are just some of the obstinate ruins of empire that dog Africa’s present.
Characterizations that pathologize African cities are surprisingly resilient, 
even within some current urban scholarship and policy writing on the con-
tinent. They are a central feature of what Jennifer Robinson importantly de-
lineated as a stark geographical division in urban theory: cities in the Global 
North (especially “global cities”) are designated as sources of theory, and 
Global South cities as repositories of poor people and problems that “do not 
contribute to expanding the definition of city- ness” but are, rather, “drawn on 
to signify its obverse, what cities are not” (2002, 540). In drawing attention to 
this uneven geography of urban theory, Robinson forces us to consider how 
theories of “global cities” reify their own categories and hierarchies and are, 
in fact, part of the production and regulation of those cities’ power through 
an othering of “ordinary cities” (Robinson 2006). She urges a recentering of 
new urban scholarship on those ordinary cities normally located “off the map.”
Precisely because of its presumed otherness, the African continent is es-
sential as a source of theory. Following Jean and John Comaroff (2012), this 
book uses ethnographic theorizing from Dakar as a way of making “theory 
from the South.” In addition to lending insight into the specifics of Senegal’s 
neoliberal present, its broader intention is to incorporate African political sys-
tems into more cosmopolitan urban and political theories. I take cities to be 
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sites of experimentation, and privilege the daily micropolitics through which 
new expressions of citizenship are negotiated, without neglecting the impo-
sition of global forces of neoliberal capitalism and development discourses or 
“the difficulties of putting new citizenships into practice” (Holston 2010, 9). 
Through a perspective ethnographically attentive to place and the sociohis-
torical contingency of power relations, this theorization resists one- size- fits- 
all models of political economy or colonial legacies and rejects essentialist 
framings that simplistically pathologize or celebrate African cities.30
By considering the continent’s connection to the rest of the world, my anal-
ysis works against the naturalizing and disabling effect of depictions of Africa 
that simply recite a series of failures, lacks, and absences (Ferguson 2006). 
Relational understandings of global connection elucidate the “embedded-
ness in multiple elsewheres of which the continent actually speaks,” and, cru-
cially, African cities’ key strategic role in empire, past and present (Mbembe 
and Nuttall 2004a, 348). Recognizing that “Africa” is in many ways a myth-
ical entity — fabricated as a coherent geographic object despite great internal 
diversity — and considering the many ways in which the continent has been 
injected into the neoliberal world order, I seek to ask some questions about 
the material and symbolic “trashing” of the continent. Digging beneath Da-
kar’s detritus denaturalizes representations of decay, and, in doing so, refash-
ions the very basis of how we understand cities and urban citizenship.
Outline of the Book
Chapter 1, “Governing Disposability,” intervenes in debates on infrastruc-
ture politics, Senegalese democracy, and neoliberal development through 
the lens of Dakar’s garbage politics over the last twenty- five years. Institu-
tional volatility in the garbage sector is the outcome of intensified competi-
tion between the national and municipal state over controlling Dakar’s infra-
structural order in the wake of economic and political liberalization. These 
forces accelerated a mode of governing- through- disposability premised upon 
performative, fragmented infrastructure investments and strategies to flexi-
bilize the urban workforce.
Chapter 2, “Vital Infrastructures of Labor,” takes a closer look at what 
the institutional transformations in the garbage sector have meant for the 
workers caught in their sway, through a materialist reading of the cultural 
politics of trash infrastructure. Tracing the sector’s history from the Set/ 
Setal youth movement, it illuminates how new formulas for garbage man-
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agement reconfigured everyday lives and embodied materialities of labor 
and, along the way, communities, political subjectivities, and relationships to 
the city. The turn to participatory infrastructural formulas for garbage col-
lection devolved technology onto labor, binding people to each other through 
their refuse and to machines through relations of salvage bricolage.
Chapter 3, “Technologies of Community,” links the highly contested bat-
tle to flexibilize the sphere of (“formal”) municipal trash labor and the 
turn to (“informal”) participatory garbage collection, through examining 
a community- based trash project in a peripheral neighborhood centered on 
voluntary women’s labor and horse- drawn carts. The chapter further ex-
amines the social and material components of fragmented infrastructure 
devolved onto labor, while contributing to critiques in development stud-
ies unpacking notions of community, participation, and empowerment in 
community- based development. The continued devolution of infrastructure 
onto labor extends the relations of social reproduction into the neighbor-
hood space, rendering neighborhood women municipal housekeepers and 
reinforcing customary authority over local development.
Chapter 4, “The Piety of Refusal,” examines the values and vernacular 
moralities through which these infrastructures are felt and understood by 
the people who make up the social systems they are built upon. It details the 
trash workers union movement and the waves of public dumping through 
which workers and ordinary Dakarois have refused conditions of precarity 
since the mid- 2000s. Through examining workers’ identities and strategies 
as a union, the chapter shows how the particular resonance of their labor as 
cleaning and their refusal to clean through striking have validated garbage 
work, earned them widespread public support, and, in turn, allowed them to 
stem the tide of labor flexibilization. The chapter engages with debates con-
sidering the relationship between citizenship and spiritual identity and high-
lights the intimate communities of affect that forge infrastructures, through 
examining the architectures of faith undergirding the workers’ movement.
The conclusion, “Garbage Citizenship,” brings together the key argu-
ments of the book and draws insight for understanding urban infrastruc-
tural citizenship in the wake of neoliberal development. Drawing on Dakar’s 
trash politics, it argues for bridging new and old materialist debates through 
considering the material labors of infrastructure. Values are coded in urban 
infrastructures but especially in the vital, living parts of the urban land-
scape. The provocations of Dakar’s garbage citizens are used to reflect on the 
possibilities for building more just urban infrastructures.
one.   Governing Disposability
From March 8 to 14, 2008, Dakar hosted the 11th Organisation de la con-
férence islamique (Organization of the Islamic Conference; oic) summit of 
global leaders from the Islamic world.1 As chairman of the summit, President 
Abdoulaye Wade aimed to showcase Dakar as a world- class city and Senegal 
as an emerging leader on the global stage (see figure 1.1). He named his son 
Karim Wade president of the national agency created to organize the event, 
l’Agence Nationale de l’organisation de la conférence islamique (National 
Agency for the Organization of the Islamic Conference; anoci). The image 
of Dakar that greeted the foreign dignitaries was of paramount importance. 
In the months leading up to the summit, which had already been delayed a 
number of times, construction ran at breakneck speed on President Wade’s 
urban infrastructure projects — especially his signature roadworks and the 
forty- nine- meter- tall Monument de la Renaissance africaine (African Re-
naissance Monument) that now towers over the city (see figure 1.2).2 Thou-
sands of street vendors were forcibly removed from the city to keep them 
from “encumbering” urban space. But perhaps the most vexing challenge 
was ensuring that the capital was spotless for the duration of the summit, 
and, importantly, free of unsightly protests that might mar Dakar’s order and 
Senegal’s reputation.
The previous two years had been rife with garbage strikes and neigh-
borhood dumping revolts, after Wade’s ejection of the international com-
pany responsible for the city’s garbage had left the system in institutional 
limbo and the workers without contracts. In the months leading up to the 
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summit, Wade endeavored to enlist the workers in his ordering project. He 
emphasized that it would be “un- Islamic” to dirty the capital before such 
an important event and that strikes would not be tolerated. In a deeply reli-
gious country, where 95 percent of the population identifies as Muslim (cia 
2016), Islam has long been an important feature of Senegal’s public sphere. 
The trash workers rose to the occasion, working overtime to ensure that 
Dakar’s downtown and tourist districts, as well as any other routes that the 
visitors were expected to see, would be clean and orderly. In the days be-
fore the summit, Wade hired an additional fifteen hundred day laborers to 
aid in the herculean task of cleaning Dakar. During the conference, central 
districts of the city were indeed the cleanest that many had ever seen them, 
but a different story was evident in the poor outskirts. With the beleaguered 
garbage workers dedicating their energies to the city’s most central and elite 
F I G U R E  1 . 1. A welcome sign featuring President Wade’s image for the 11th Organisation de 
la conférence islamique (Organization of the Islamic Conference; oic) summit, held 
from March 8 to 14, 2008, in Dakar. Author’s photo, 2008.
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areas and the infrastructure budget directed at prestige projects, the poor, 
off- the- beaten- track periphery of the city was left to fend for itself. In these 
areas, garbage piled up in streets and public spaces.
The summit went off smoothly but the rest of Abdoulaye Wade’s term did 
not. When Karim Wade was later tried and jailed in corruption scandals, his 
mismanagement of funds as head of anoci was front and center. President 
Wade’s prestige infrastructure projects and institutional tinkering with key 
urban public services came to represent a potent symbol of his disconnect 
from the majority of the working Senegalese population. His politicking 
within the garbage sector was a particularly dramatic example: under Wade’s 
thumb, the sector saw eight major institutional shake- ups (see table 1.1). Al-
though the wake of structural adjustment in Senegal has seen intense volatil-
ity in the infrastructural formulas for managing the city’s garbage, the tenor 
of that volatility reached an unprecedented pitch during Wade’s presidency.
It’s no accident that when the new president of Senegal, Macky Sall, took 
power after the highly contested elections of 2012, one of his very first acts in 
F I G U R E  1 . 2 .  Le Monument de la Renaissance africaine (the African Renaissance 
Monument) in Dakar. One of Abdoulaye Wade’s prestige projects, the monument  
was completed in 2010. Photo courtesy of J.W., 2016.
TA B L E  1 . 1 .  The institutions responsible for managing Dakar’s garbage from 1960 to 2017
 Institution managing  
Year Dakar’s garbage Institution type
1960 – 1971 Municipal Services Local government 
 (Commune de Dakar) 
1971 – 1984 soadip Private company
1984 – 1986 Municipal Services Local government and the military 
  (Commune de Dakar);  
Army Corps of Engineers
1986 – 1989 sias Parastatal company
1989 – 1992 Set/Setal; sias  Parastatal company, youth groups, 
coordination by local government
1993 – 1995 cud; sias  Local government with youth group 
associations, parastatal company, 
private local contractors
1995 – 2000 cud; agetip  Local government with youth group 
associations, private local contractors
2000 hapd; aprodak  National agency with private local 
contractors
2001 – 2002 aprodak  National agency with private local 
contractors
2002 Alcyon  Private international company 
(Switzerland)
2002 – 2006 ama Private international company (Italy)
2006 – 2009 Entente cadak- car;  Power- sharing agreement between  
 Ministry of the Environment   local and national state; private 
contractors (local and Veolia, France)
2009 – 2011 Entente cadak- car;   Power- sharing agreement between  
 Ministry of the Environment;  local and national state; private  
 aprosen  contractors (local and Veolia, France)
2011 soprosen  National agency with private local 
contractors
2012 – 2015 Entente cadak- car  Local government with private local 
contractors
2015 – 2017 ucg  National agency with private local 
contractors




Agence d’exécution des travaux d’intérêt public contre le sous- emploi  
(Public Works and Employment Agency)
ama 
Azienda Municipalizzata per l’Ambiente  
(Municipal Environment Agency)
aprodak 
Agence pour la propreté de Dakar  
(Agency for the Cleanliness of Dakar)
aprosen 
Agence pour la propreté du Sénégal  
(Agency for the Cleanliness of Senegal)
Entente Agreement of cadak- car 
Communauté d’agglomérations de Dakar – Communauté d’agglomérations  
de Rufisque (The Urban Agglomerations of Dakar and Rufisque)
cud 
Communauté Urbaine de Dakar (Dakar Urban Community)
hapd 
Haute autorité pour la propreté de Dakar  
(High Authority for the Cleanliness of Dakar)
sias 
Société industrielle d’aménagement urbain du Sénégal  
(Industrial Urban Planning Company of Senegal)
soadip 
Société africaine de diffusion et de promotion  
(African Distribution and Promotion Company)
soprosen 
Société pour la propreté du Sénégal  
(Company for the Cleanliness of Senegal)
ucg 
Unité de coordination et de gestion des déchets  
(Garbage Coordination and Management Unit)
Source: Author’s chart
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office was to again reform the institutions responsible for managing Dakar’s 
garbage. As just the latest chapter in this long saga of garbage politics, Sall’s 
dissolution of Wade’s garbage management system was a highly symbolic 
act aimed at purging the previous administration’s failings and charting the 
country’s new course. This chapter traces Dakar’s dynamic garbage struggles 
from the late 1980s to the present day in order to delineate the acceleration of 
a mode of governing- through- disposability as a primary form of state power. 
As a material practice of power, governing- through- disposability devolves 
the burdens of infrastructure onto precarious laboring bodies — those of or-
dinary neighborhood women and the formal trash workers themselves. And 
yet, in April 2016, decades of labor flexibilization were reversed when the 
workers won formal contracts and higher salaries. In tracing out that history, 
this chapter reveals the tumultuous consolidation and contestation of state 
power in the neoliberal era and reconfigures how we understand the politics 
of infrastructure.
As one of the first African countries to undertake structural adjustment 
and one of the continent’s oldest and most respected democracies, Senegal 
is a fertile case through which to examine how formulas of governing are 
transformed in the context of austerity and democratic competition. This 
chapter considers the bundle of technical, institutional, social, and political 
factors that constitute the garbage collection infrastructure as a lens into 
state power and politics. In doing so, it builds on a rich tradition of academic 
inquiry into the relationship between infrastructure and state power, or 
what Michael Mann (1984) termed infrastructural power in his foundational 
inquiry into how infrastructure territorializes social life. Whether viewed 
through its rollout as a symbolic manifestation of modern development, ana-
lyzed at the point of breakdown, or understood through spaces and processes 
of abjection, disconnection, or disrepair, infrastructure is a key site for the 
ordering of society by the state.3 Infrastructure assembles political econ-
omies, processes and discourses of development, and vernacular political 
histories in urban space and material practice. As a public collective good, 
moreover, it crystallizes social- power relations and patterns of injustice in 
the urban landscape.
The power of infrastructure becomes keenly apparent when considering 
not just its technical and institutional elements, but also its social compo-
nents and affective dimensions. Of key importance here are the aesthetic, 
material, and sensuous qualities that are central not just to how infrastruc-
tures operate, but to the structures of feeling to which they may give rise — or 
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what Brian Larkin has called the poetics of infrastructure.4 Infrastructure has 
a performative dimension — its political address is often conjured through 
event and spectacle. For instance, research into projects of eviction, dem-
olition, or redevelopment, whether justified through singular international 
events or in the staging of world- class city making and bourgeois environ-
mentalisms, starkly reveal the political content of infrastructural innova-
tions.5 Infrastructures have a representational logic; they are the means “by 
which a state proffers . . . representations to its citizens and asks them to 
take those representations as social facts” (Larkin 2013, 335). Their devel-
opment, maintenance, or breakdown can inspire awe, fear, desire, and obe-
dience as much as they can incite rebellion or spark imaginative practice. 
What Dakar’s garbage saga makes clear is that it is the embodied material 
force of these representations that gives them power. Governing- through- 
disposability entails the uneven provision of trash infrastructures and the 
flexibilization of garbage labor — effectively bringing people more firmly into 
the management of their own waste.
In this chapter, I unpack the implications of different infrastructural 
arrangements around garbage in Dakar and their associated performative 
practices for state power and politics. Research on postcolonial politics, es-
pecially African politics, emphasizes the reliance on spectacle in expressions 
of authority (Bayart 1989; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Mbembe 2001). The 
theatrical mode of politics is well recognized in Senegal (Cruise O’Brien 
2007; Foucher 2007), but what has not previously been explored is how 
performed power is material, spatial, and embodied. Weaving together an 
analysis of Senegalese politics, the political economy of development, and 
institutional transformations in the garbage sector, the chapter details how 
garbage labor has become a focal point of performative urban politics in the 
context of economic and political liberalization. Emphasizing the materi-
ality of struggles over hegemony, the analysis shows how governing works 
through the way that infrastructures organize laboring bodies. In the wake 
of structural adjustment, performances of governing garbage infrastructures 
have hollowed out infrastructure’s function and value, focusing instead on 
the display of toiling bodies in public space and the spectacle of big insti-
tutional shake- ups with little substance.6 Reading infrastructure through 
waste labor politics brings the crucially important urban labor question to 
bear on infrastructure politics, illuminating the risks, precarities, and bur-
dens of new systems for organizing the city. The material power of waste 
renders garbage management systems particularly important performative 
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vehicles for disciplining the urban public as well as privileged loci for dem-
ocratic contestation.
Specifically, I focus on garbage politics during two key moments: the im-
plementation of structural adjustment in the late socialist period from 1988 
to 2000, and the reign of self- described liberal president Abdoulaye Wade 
from 2000 to 2012. The first moment is characterized by the dissolution of 
a more comprehensive, modernist collection system and its replacement by 
a cheap, participatory infrastructure based on youth labor that slashed the 
municipal budget, extended patronage networks to new social groups, and 
deployed neoliberal discourses of participatory citizenship in highly visible 
performances of ordering. The second period is characterized by escalating 
tension between the president and the mayor of Dakar, the intensification 
of institutional instability in the attempt to consolidate power, and the in-
creasingly uneven distribution of order throughout the city. Across these two 
very different modes of governing garbage, we see three key dynamics: (1) 
desperate political maneuvering that reinforces patronage modes of govern-
ing in the context of scarce resources through attempts to consolidate power 
and outcompete political rivals; (2) the manifestation of these political re-
sponses in episodic, performative, and increasingly fragmented investments 
that leave the city’s infrastructures highly uneven and, for most, degrading; 
and, most importantly, (3) the differentiated devolution of the burdens of in-
frastructure’s politicization onto residents, laborers, and social systems — or 
the uneven distribution of disposability across the city. Together, this analy-
sis provides a crucial history of the democratic politics of neoliberal reform. 
Before I begin the analysis of governing disposability in the neoliberal era, 
I will first provide a brief historical contextualization of urban politics in 
Senegal’s colonial and nationalist periods.
Colonial Legacies of Infrastructural Politics
An analysis of contemporary politics in Dakar must necessarily be situ-
ated within Senegal’s unique colonial political history and the patterns 
of governing- through- disposability that were introduced during that time. 
Senegal’s coastal cities have long been theaters of democratic contestation. 
Founded by the French, Dakar and three other coastal settlements (Saint- 
Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque) grew to prominence in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and were organized into communes (municipalities) in the nineteenth 
century.7 These Quatre Communes (Four Communes), as they came to be 
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known, represented France’s oldest colonial holdings in tropical Africa as 
well as the clearest expression of France’s policy of assimilation.8 Dakar was 
organized as a fully empowered municipal institution in 1887 and became 
the capital of the Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa) fed-
eration in 1902, and it has grown in importance, size, and reputation since 
that time. Colonial authorities spearheaded major infrastructure projects — 
 including the port facilities as well as the Dakar – Saint- Louis and Dakar – 
Niger railways — which consolidated Dakar’s role as a major West African 
trading and administrative center. The city has a long history of “extraver-
sion” on a global stage (Bayart 1999) and has served as a key locus of debate 
and contestation around questions of citizenship. Though the basis of the 
economy has shifted along with the successive “globalization projects” (M. 
Diouf 1998) — from the export of slaves, to peanuts, to tourism today — the 
city has dominated politics and power in the region for some time.
The originaires (the original inhabitants of the Quatre Communes) are 
widely recognized to have enjoyed the most political expression of the French 
colonies in tropical Africa during the colonial period.9 The Quatre Com-
munes were the locus of a unique and contradictory colonial experiment: 
the extension of colonial “citizenship” to the originaires.10 This gave them 
special rights under French colonial code, which amounted to special legal 
status and participation in local as well as French elections (Conklin 1997; 
M. Diouf 1998; Johnson 1971). It also laid the groundwork for municipal 
politics in Senegal as well as Dakar’s role as the country’s political center. At 
the turn of the century, black Africans began to dominate Dakar’s municipal 
administration, and in 1914, originaire Blaise Diagne was famously elected 
to serve as a deputy in the French National Assembly in Paris (Johnson 1971). 
Thirty- two years later, Léopold Sédar Senghor would serve as one of the last 
deputies to France’s National Assembly, before becoming the first president 
of independent Senegal.
Dakar’s colonial history emphasizes the roots of contemporary uneven 
development planted in the colonial era and the long history of discourses 
rendering specific populations disposable. Inequality was central to plan-
ning and infrastructure development in colonial urbanism in Senegal and 
elsewhere (Rabinow 1989; G. Wright 1987) but also governed the distinction 
made between urban and rural development.11 In Dakar, key logics of man-
aging urban space and infrastructure during the colonial era were spatial 
segregation along racial lines through cyclical patterns of displacement, and 
the distribution of infrastructure in “native” and “colonist” areas according 
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to privilege. As in other colonial contexts, ideas surrounding the control of 
wastes were central to the way colonizers fashioned themselves and defined 
modernity through judging the “backwardness” of natives (Chakrabarty 
1991).
Senegal’s bubonic plague of 1914 illuminates a key early expression of the 
imperative to order public space, infrastructure, and development in the 
city through discourses and practices of sanitation and public hygiene — or 
what Maynard W. Swanson termed the sanitation syndrome.12 In the context 
of the plague, an effort was made to move native populations — including 
dispossessing many from their land — from what had previously been a 
mixed downtown area to a sort of ghetto quarantine on the outskirts of the 
city called the Médina (Betts 1971; Bigon 2009; Echenberg 2002; Petrocelli 
2011). The immediate justification behind the project was to upgrade what 
were seen as dirty, substandard living conditions and to protect the Plateau 
district from contagion. In practice, the resettlement project was only par-
tially completed, stemming from the special engagement of originaires in 
municipal politics. Blaise Diagne played a key role in critiquing the Médina 
project, and lack of native compliance frustrated resettlement plans (Betts 
1971). The episode highlights the long legacy of urban popular resistance to 
projects of social engineering employing narratives of dirt and disorder in 
Dakar. It also foreshadowed a much larger- scale urban resettlement and ex-
pansion into the sprawling, largely unplanned département (department) of 
Pikine (founded in 1952) and Guédiawaye (founded in 1972) in the outskirts 
of the city. The next sections will zero in on the context for the city’s garbage 
crisis and detail its political stakes.
1960 – 1980: Governing Garbage in the Nationalist Era
In the first two decades after Independence in 1960, Senegal’s development 
was tightly controlled by the state in its grand plan to modernize and build 
the nation. The nationalist era was dominated by the Parti Socialiste (So-
cialist Party)13 and its strategies to steer the country’s economic, social, and 
cultural course under the strong leadership of Léopold Sédar Senghor, who 
served as president from 1960 to 1980. Although the country was more open 
to democratic competition than many of its neighbors, the political opposi-
tion was tightly controlled until reforms began in 1976. Senghor’s vision was 
a total reconstruction of Senegal’s economy, society, and geography after 
colonization. His approach was rooted in a developmentalist ideology, as 
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articulated in key plans and institutions aimed at setting the country on 
a modernization path that was consistent with ideas of African Socialism 
(M. Diouf 1997). Economic development was to be steered by long- term de-
velopment planning centered on a large job- creating public sector.
During these “20 glorious years of employment” after Independence 
(B. Fall 2002, 50), the state was the main employer, the public sector was 
highly subsidized, and most urban graduates were privileged with comfort-
able jobs.14 The public sector grew to serve the ideological purpose of demon-
strating state legitimacy and asserting a socialist legacy. In an attempt to 
create a middle class and keep the social peace, public sector workers earned 
rates that were incommensurate with revenues and the cost of basic neces-
sities was subsidized (Bellitto 2001). In addition to the development of the 
peasantry, urban infrastructure was imagined as a key tool of state- led de-
velopment to bring about a modern Senegal and unleash a more equitable 
vision of development. Significant investments were made in such sectors as 
road construction, housing, industry, and the building of monuments to the 
new nation, but resources were extremely constrained due to the country’s 
lack of natural resources and reliance on the rural peanut economy which 
began to falter with droughts in the late 1960s and 1970s. The modernist, 
Socialist rhetoric of development and social justice was tempered by the pa-
tronage politics honed in the colonial era, which gained steam in the hiring 
practices and uneven infrastructural investment of the “providential state” 
(M.Diouf 1997). 
Following on colonial trends, in the late 1960s the postcolonial state sub-
sidized housing programs for civil servants while systematically evicting and 
resettling “squatters” and other “illegal” occupants farther and farther out 
of the peninsula to areas with little infrastructure (Vernière 1977). As René 
Collignon has argued, the periodic expulsion of undesirable populations — 
or déchets humains (human garbage) — seen as “encumbering” urban space 
ramped up in the 1960s and 1970s.15 Real estate investment and housing con-
struction have continued to be “key components of a strategy to project the 
image of a modern Dakar as the national capital,” but have been overwhelm-
ing concentrated in central districts and woefully insufficient in keeping up 
with urban growth.16
In the immediate period after Independence, from 1960 to 1971, the man-
agement of household waste in the city of Dakar was a small- scale affair 
directly ensured by the municipal services.17 Horse- drawn carts were used 
to transport the garbage to a dump located in an old quarry in Hann, not 
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far from downtown Dakar, until the dry lakebed, Mbeubeuss (forty kilo-
meters from Dakar), was transformed into a new dump in the late 1960s. 
This municipal service ran relatively smoothly until its first crisis in 1968 — 
paralleling a political crisis that took place that year — which extended until 
1971 (Benrabia 2002, 261). The city had become filthy and garbage a point 
of political contention, so the municipal authorities decided to privatize the 
waste- management system. In 1971, the city of Dakar signed a five- year con-
tract with the local private company la Société Africaine de diffusion et de 
promotion (African Distribution and Promotion Company; soadip) for Da-
kar’s household trash management. The company built two transfer stations, 
introduced a fleet of modern collection vehicles, and hired more than eleven 
hundred people (bceom 1986). It assured the fairly regular management 
of garbage until the early 1980s. Faced with defaults in payments from the 
municipality, however, the company was unable to maintain its equipment 
and service and ceased all activities in 1984 (bceom 1986; M. Diouf, n.d.).
Public events were staged in the 1960s to enlist Socialist Party youth in 
cleaning the city and ridding it of undesirable elements encumbering the 
public space (including prostitutes and vagabonds). This precedent was to 
lead to other initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s, including Operation Augias, 
through which the state tried to tap local energies in the city’s management. 
Mamadou Diouf (2002, 268) describes Operation Augias as “the occasion, 
for the ruling class, to affirm its munificence, its incontestable power and 
authority over populations locked into the grid of political containment.” It 
was a way for the ruling party to assert its nationalist project. Not surpris-
ingly, as that nationalist project began to splinter in the 1970s, these events 
were characterized by disillusionment and even violence.
1979 – 1988: The Messy Onset of Structural Adjustment
Senegal’s state- led, nationalist development period was to be short lived. By 
the end of the 1970s, it was clear that the Senegalese economy was enter-
ing into a serious economic crisis. Rural exodus and a stagnant industrial 
sector were hastening rapid urbanization and the explosion of the informal 
economy. The providential state — which had become the country’s main 
employer — was deeply indebted and inefficient.18 Having borrowed signifi-
cantly from private banks in the 1970s, Senegal received its first structural 
 adjustment loan from the World Bank in 1979. As such, it became one of 
the first African countries to undertake adjustment policies and pioneered 
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a massive wave of adjustment programs across the continent and the world. 
Structural Adjustment Programs (saps) were the primary mode through 
which neoliberal reforms were exported to the Global South. In Africa, saps 
were the Bretton Woods institutions’ solution to a reading of the African 
economic crisis epitomized by the Berg Report (Berg 1981). This hugely in-
fluential paper, and the saps that were built around its prescriptions, offered 
a highly internalist reading of African economic woes. The Senegalese state 
and its “political management of the economy” were rendered the source of 
the country’s problems, demanding intervention and assistance from inter-
national institutions (M. Diouf 1997, 311). It was hoped that Senegal, a long-
time darling of the international community, would become a model of eco-
nomic liberalization through adjustment. The neoliberal reforms promoted 
through saps rendered development technical and apolitical and chased 
out the “nationalist dream of economic development and social equality . . . 
in the name of economic efficiency” (M. Diouf 1997, 314).
Senghor’s handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf, led the charge for struc-
tural adjustment with his arrival onto the political stage in 1981. Diouf’s 
presidency ushered in the period of “technocracy,” where the old barons of 
the Socialist Party were replaced with younger technocrats. Fashioned more 
as managers than as politicians, the technocrats favored administrative ex-
pertise over the mass- movement politics associated with the nationalist era. 
Diouf and the technocrats endeavored to use structural adjustment as a strat-
egy to defuse the economic crisis and reestablish financial equilibrium. In 
the 1980s, Senegal received a total of fifteen different stabilization and ad-
justment loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(imf) (Van de Walle 2001). During this period, the country fell deeper into 
economic crisis.19 Rapidly losing the ability to keep up with the pace of pop-
ulation growth as financial resources flagged, the government made mini-
mal new investments in urban infrastructure and existing infrastructures 
crumbled under poor maintenance.
Garbage infrastructure began to emerge as a central issue in urban pol-
itics with structural adjustment. With the bankruptcy of soadip, in 1984 
the city became clogged again with its own waste. The new Socialist mayor 
of Dakar, Mamadou Diop, took charge of garbage management, resorting 
to personally organizing periodic waste management activities with the as-
sistance of the Army Corps of Engineers. Despite these efforts, immense 
piles of garbage built up in Dakar. A special event, Set Wecc (“Very Clean” 
in Wolof), was organized in February of 1985 by the army with the help of 
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the local residents, enabling the evacuation of tons of garbage to the dump 
at Mbeubeuss. A new parastatal enterprise with the state as majority share-
holder was then created to manage garbage through which, it was hoped, 
the state could exercise more control over the system than it had with the 
private company. The new garbage company, sias, was given the exclusive 
management of Dakar’s trash in 1985 under the oversight of the new munic-
ipal entity federating the region of Dakar, la Communauté Urbaine de Dakar 
(Dakar Urban Community; cud).20
In many ways, sias was emblematic of the Socialist state’s vision of a 
modern public sector in the nationalist era: it was well paid, well equipped, 
and the workers were unionized and rewarded with the full privileges ac-
corded civil servants who were understood to be the breadwinners of their 
families. Given the wider agenda to privatize and shrink the state, it was an 
example of foot dragging in the public sector, an ambitious approach to post-
pone real adjustment that was to prove untenable in the face of pressures to 
scale back public expenditures and urban public services. All of this was to 
shift with the crisis of 1988, which both signaled a profound reckoning with 
the vicissitudes of structural adjustment and ushered in a more intensive 
implementation of economic reforms in the face of economic stagnation and 
pressures for compliance.
Worsening economic conditions combined with the rollback of state ser-
vices to unleash calamitous social consequences, including a dramatic back-
tracking on progress made in health and education in the 1960s and 1970s 
and an employment crisis. By the late 1980s, structural adjustment had 
brought the golden years of state employment to an end, deeply restructured 
the urban workforce, and unleashed major changes in organized labor in Da-
kar. As a bedrock element of adjustment, a central aim of reform packages in 
Senegal was the shrinking of the public sector through the withdrawal of the 
state from employment and the flexibilization of the labor force in order to 
cut the public wage bill.21 Privatization and the withdrawal of the state from 
public employment joined with the decline of private Senegalese industry 
to precipitate the collapse of formal employment in the 1980s and 1990s.22 
Rapid rates of urban migration flooded the cities, particularly the country’s 
sprawling macrocephalic capital, Dakar, even as formal jobs there became 
increasingly rare. The decline of formal labor was met with the mushroom-
ing of the informal sector, which began to dominate the Senegalese economy 
in the late 1980s.
The city’s young people, who comprised an increasingly large segment of 
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the population owing to demographic trends, experienced unemployment 
most dramatically. Stemming from their marginality in social networks and 
the declining efficacy of educational degrees in securing employment, youth 
swamped the informal markets and became a central element of the masses 
of out- of- work people occupying the public space. During this time, the job 
crisis seriously diminished the purchasing power of the Dakarois just as food 
prices skyrocketed. These factors and reforms aimed at scaling back health 
care, education, and other social service sectors all contributed to the gen-
eral impoverishment of the Dakarois and their widespread dissatisfaction 
with the government.
Paralleling these processes of economic liberalization were processes of 
political liberalization that responded to increasing demands for democratic 
representation from the public and opposition groups, as well as pressures 
from the international community through sap conditionalities. Though 
President Diouf deepened political reforms in the 1980s, challenges to state 
legitimacy would continue to plague the Socialist Party in the devastating 
wake of structural adjustment.23 The growing informalization of the Senega-
lese economy, furthermore, had broad impacts for state power and patronage 
resources. Far from the intended goal of neoliberal reforms — namely, to foster 
the growth of a dynamic, efficient, and productive independent bourgeoisie — 
 Ibrahima Thioub et al. argue that a merchant- capital logic continued to 
dominate. What changed was the state’s ability to capitalize, structure, and 
regulate it (Thioub, Diop, and Boone 1998). Reform eroded the capacity of 
the state to sustain patterns of economic activity established under colonial 
rule (see Boone 1990) and changed the expression of patronage away from a 
system that assured stability (Coulon and Cruise O’Brien 1990). As the 1980s 
progressed, the diminished capacity of the state brought increasing pressure 
to control shrinking state coffers and, thus, heightened competition between 
political rivals and different levels of government.
The eroding social contract with the country’s marabouts (religious leaders) 
was to further challenge the state’s hold on power and legitimacy during this 
time. Senegalese Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi, with the Tijani and Mouride 
orders (brotherhoods) dominating the country’s Islamic tradition. In Senega-
lese Sufi tradition, marabouts play a central role in mediating state- society re-
lations and, as a result, a key feature of Senegalese politics has long been the 
relationship between government and the Sufi brotherhoods. A social con-
tract between the brotherhoods — particularly the Mouride brotherhood — 
 and the colonial administration provided a source of stability and legiti-
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macy for the colonial regime. Senghor then built the political basis of his 
regime on these same ties, actively seeking and obtaining the cooperation 
and support of the powerful Mouride leadership and its disciples (Copans 
1980; Cruise O’Brien 1971, 1975). State concessions to the religious author-
ities were reciprocated with political support. Through the use of formal 
ndigals (religious injunctions), religious leaders mobilized their disciples to 
vote for the Socialist Party in the elections throughout this period. This tight 
interrelationship between the state and the Muslim brotherhoods was a key 
buttress in the face of a challenging economic environment and political 
instability in neighboring countries.24
The 1980s, however, saw key shifts in the politics of religion, involving es-
sential reorganizations in the fundamental relationship between the brother-
hoods and the state and between the marabouts and their talibés (disciples). 
A number of factors joined during this period to “liberalize” the religious 
playing field, including the general liberalization of the economy and poli-
tics, the diversification and informalization of the economy, and the educa-
tion, urbanization, and autonomization of the citizen, as well as a weakening 
of the hierarchical authority of the brotherhoods.25 Perhaps the greatest illus-
tration of this democratization was the crumbling of the ndigal as a formula 
for delivering disciples’ votes to the Socialist regime, starting in the 1980s.26 
All of these forces would come together to politicize Dakar’s municipal gar-
bage sector in unprecedented ways.
1988 – 2000: A Crisis of Order  
and Mayor Mamadou Diop’s Battle for Dakar
Together, the forces of economic and political liberalization crystallized in a 
full- fledged crisis surrounding the 1988 presidential elections. The political 
crisis manifested in the worst garbage crisis the city had ever experienced. 
Widespread social unrest and mobilization by a disgruntled populace in Da-
kar, particularly the city’s youth, met with the Socialist Party state’s scram-
ble to retain its legitimacy, hold on to power, and control the social peace. 
The reconfiguration of the state’s role in the economy, the reformulation of 
the relationship between religion and politics, and the liberalization of the 
political playing field had politicians courting voters like never before. As 
the dire social consequences of structural adjustment and overall economic 
crisis deepened and unemployment skyrocketed, young Dakarois took to 
the streets in record numbers. Massive student strikes in 1985 and 1987 par-
Governing Disposability 43
alyzed the education system, leading to an année blanche (white year) in 
1987 – 88, where students’ work was annulled (M. Diouf 1996). The workers 
union of the trash company sias joined in the conflictual spirit of labor or-
ganizing during this period and began to strike in the late 1980s to demand 
better working conditions.
The shifting bases of the state- brotherhood and the talibé- marabout rela-
tionships, moreover, were dramatically expressed in the controversial 1988 
elections. Despite a blunt ndigal from the Khalifa- General of the Mouride 
brotherhood to vote for Abdou Diouf, the opposition received a significant 
proportion of the vote. Not since 1988 has a top brotherhood leader pro-
nounced a political ndigal in favor of a presidential candidate, indicating 
the deep “cracks in the edifice” of the mutualism provided by the original 
social contract between the marabouts and the ruling party (Villalon 1999, 
2004). Huge numbers of Dakarois rallied their support for opposition can-
didate Abdoulaye Wade’s electoral campaign — whose slogan promised sopi 
(change) — leading up to the elections of 1988 (Diaw and Diouf 1998; Diop 
and Diouf 1990; Young and Kante 1992).
Youth mobilizations turned violent with the highly contested election re-
sults, which placed incumbent Abdou Diouf as the winner. The government 
responded to youth riots in Dakar by declaring a state of emergency, impos-
ing a curfew, and arresting and convicting the opposition leaders for their 
role in inciting the violence. The city’s streets then turned violent again in 
the spring of 1989 with a spate of ethnically motivated murders in broad day-
light during the country’s diplomatic crisis with Mauritania.27 Though the 
Socialist Party had retained power, the integrity of the party- state appeared 
threatened, as acutely symbolized in the sinister vision of the young urban 
rioters. The crisis ushered in, moreover, a new era of urban protest that was 
centered on a descent into the streets and mobilization around the man-
agement of urban order. The government’s formula for hegemony was be-
ing renegotiated in the material spaces of the city. New constituencies were 
raising their heads, new formulas of power were emerging, and garbage was 
taking center stage as both a symbol of state crisis and an important terrain 
on which to battle for control of the city.
A social movement blossomed in the wake of the crisis of 1988 that would 
herald a new chapter in the city’s infrastructural politics. As I consider in 
detail in chapter 2, the youth movement Set/Setal offered a constructive 
response to the general population’s disillusionment with the country’s eco-
nomic and political state of affairs through neighborhood cleaning activities. 
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In both an indictment of the state’s failings and a call for the citizens of Da-
kar to take local development into their own hands after the disappointing 
elections, youth set out to cleanse the city — physically and morally. These 
labors came to the attention of Dakar’s Socialist mayor, Mamadou Diop, as 
he reeled from the threat to his party’s hold on power and schemed to design 
a new vision of city politics and infrastructure in the face of austerity. The 
failures of the trash- management system had become an enormous liability 
for Diop’s office. His response was to seize the fervor for cleaning among the 
city’s youth and channel it into a wholly new garbage collection infrastruc-
ture. Dissolving the last system of municipal garbage collection and firing its 
employees, he instead built a new system that looked altogether different: a 
scaled- back, low- tech, participatory garbage sector that required not much 
more than the simple toil of the city’s youth.
Although the state’s modernist development vision had never been fully 
realized, Diop’s new garbage sector signaled a foundational shift in the 
ideological and material basis of the Socialist state’s approach to urban de-
velopment. The exigencies of neoliberal austerity and the intensification of 
multiparty democratic competition ushered forth a new logic of govern-
ing through infrastructure. These forces justified, indeed required, a shift 
from the modernist, state- planned, comprehensive infrastructure models — 
however aspirational — to a community- based, participatory system that 
was unapologetic in its fragmentation. The transition to the more piecemeal 
public service turned on the construction of the citizen- laborer: it absolved 
the state of responsibility for providing employment in the manner of an 
adult male patriarch and instead conceived of youth as the primary workers 
of the nation — conveniently extricated from their familial obligations. In 
other words, the new participatory waste infrastructure allowed Diop and 
his compatriots in the Socialist Party to instrumentalize neoliberal discourse 
in their favor. Taking charge of the city’s order became the responsibility 
of the city’s communities; a clean neighborhood became one in which the 
people were clean. This acted to patch the cracks in the state’s hegemonic 
project that were apparent in the physical manifestation of disorder.
Steeped in the now all- too- familiar language of participation, empower-
ment, and entrepreneurialism, the backbone and connective tissues of the 
city’s new garbage infrastructure were now young people and their commu-
nitarian ties, respectively. In place of state performances of monumental 
infrastructural achievements, there were instead the highly visible neighbor-
hood performances of “participatory citizenship” by those doing the state’s 
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bidding through cleaning Dakar’s city spaces. Though it had been attempted 
before, in the form of Operation Augias and various attempts by the army to 
coerce the Dakarois into public cleaning, Diop’s Journées de Propreté (Days of 
Cleanliness) were unprecedented. The events were characterized by bright 
T- shirts, dust clouds rising from the now unclogged streets, and the gyrat-
ing exhortations by Senegal’s national hero, musician Youssou N’Dour, for 
cleanliness blaring over distorted mobile speaker systems. In these scenes, 
a whole new citizen was born and a whole new infrastructure for managing 
the city was soldered. This new infrastructure spoke to an entirely different 
aesthetic regime of ordering. The city’s business was aired and evacuated, 
not by a quiet and invisible army of well- paid but anonymous professionals, 
but by noisy, youthful, and familiar young men and women.
Channeling Set/Setal activists into the trash system — and thereby chang-
ing the institutional form of the sector as well as the composition of its labor 
force — offered a financial fix to a budgetary crisis, but was also a calculated 
political maneuver on the part of Mayor Diop. Diop’s position as mayor was, 
in a number of respects, highly untenable. Consistent with a long tradition of 
state centralization in the postcolonial period, the central state tightly con-
trolled resources away from the municipality. Diop was, like his predeces-
sors in the post, a “prisoner” of his dependence on the central state. Though 
he lacked sufficient resources to run the city and conduct politics, he was 
charged with the enormous challenge of managing the social peace and cul-
tivating support for the party in the urban areas that were the base of the 
opposition.28 Fashioning himself and the new recruits in his administration 
as urban technocrats, he aimed to distance himself from the classic patron-
age politics that were crippling his fellow socialists (Diop and Diouf 1992).
At the same time, however, Mamadou Diop had no choice but to develop 
a new approach to patronage. An accomplished politician who had his own 
ambitions,29 Diop was keen to find some financial independence, shore up 
electoral support, and quiet the foreboding youth agitations that had taken 
his city hostage. The new trash sector reduced the trash bill and provided 
him with more control over the budget through the involvement of interna-
tional funders. Moreover, it served as a direct recruitment tool for political 
clients in two emerging social groups — youth and women — at a moment 
when he was considering a bid for the presidency. Offering the trash- sector 
jobs to the Set/Setal activists thus represented one of the state’s key strate-
gies to deal with its shrinking capacity and legitimacy and to quiet social 
mobilizations through a more inclusive patronage system. The garbage sys-
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tem that was to last for the next ten years was small scale, heavily reliant on 
labor, little capitalized, and progressively more fragmented. The turn to fully 
off- grid community- based garbage  collection projects in the city’s periphery, 
furthermore, hastened the displacement of the responsibility for the city’s 
order away from public services and onto the bodies of the laboring poor, and 
further splintered the city’s waste infrastructure (see chapter 3).
As the 1990s progressed, structural adjustment moved full speed ahead 
and the state accelerated its withdrawal from the public sector, with no 
choice but to appease funders. In 1994, under pressure from international 
lenders, Senegal devalued its currency, the West African franc (cfa), precip-
itating a short- term economic crisis.30 With the devaluation of the currency, 
a new package of reforms was launched that would signal a more neoliberal 
turn and an era of even more marked state disengagement. Whereas deregu-
lation had occurred on a limited, sectoral basis in the 1980s, massive swaths 
of the public sector were privatized in the 1990s, including the electricity, 
telecommunications, and water sectors. As a last remaining slice of public 
sector jobs, the trash sector continued to represent an important pot to con-
trol through a range of institutional experiments.
2000 – 2006: Alternance and Abdoulaye Wade’s  
Infrastructural Dream
The progressing decade was again to bring a tenuous state of political affairs. 
Although the Socialist Party’s efforts to gain the support of the urban youth 
had at least worked to quiet youth mobilization for a while, this was just a 
postponement of a general reckoning with what was to come. Abdou Diouf 
won reelection in 1993 with an overwhelming victory, largely attributed to 
the successful mobilization of rural voters in contrast to an incredibly high 
abstention vote, particularly among the urban youth (Diop and Diouf 1992). 
Whereas early in the decade the state had undertaken significant political 
reforms aimed at power sharing with members of the opposition, subse-
quent years saw a striking pullback of the political reforms achieved in the 
early 1990s (Diop, Diouf, and Diaw 2000). As precipitous declines in public 
spending devastated indicators of social welfare, managing the social peace 
was made the state’s top priority in order to ensure the proper implemen-
tation of saps and neutralize social resistance. At the end of the decade, 
despite some economic improvements at a macro scale, Senegal found itself 
in a situation characterized by deepening inequality, the degradation of in-
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frastructure, the decline of the educational system, and the rising cost of 
living. The Socialist Party could no longer keep a lid on the grievances and 
social mobilizations that had been bubbling up for years.
On March 19, 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was elected to the presidency. 
Monitored extensively by the Senegalese media as well as foreign observers, 
the Alternance (turnover) elections were widely considered to be the most 
free and fair elections to date in Senegal. After hearing of his defeat, Ab-
dou Diouf graciously stepped down in a smooth and peaceful turnover of 
power. Despite the Socialist Party’s preelection efforts to quell social unrest 
and exercise its remaining patronage capacities to retain the support of the 
growing urban electorate, desperation on the part of a population unable 
to envision its future, let alone its daily survival, found voice in Wade’s call 
for sopi (change). The development promises of the Socialist Party appeared 
bankrupt, especially to the exploding youth population born after Indepen-
dence, for whom the nationalist project held little or no meaning. Wade, 
who had been a stalwart character on the Senegalese political scene since 
Senghor through his Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic 
Party, pds), deftly targeted those disenfranchised and frustrated urban 
dwellers through dramatic theatrics of public support called marches bleues 
(blue marches) (Foucher 2007), and finally convinced the Senegalese people 
that he would represent a new direction in Senegalese politics and right the 
wrongs of the last difficult decades.
Alternance indicated to many the advent of true, substantive, multiparty 
democracy in Senegal. Many observers also highlighted how Wade’s victory 
represented a dramatic collapse of the ndigal as a political tool (Audrain 
2004; F. Samson 2000). Although the Mouride leader did not pronounce 
a formal electoral ndigal to vote for the incumbent party, there was wide-
spread rejection of the lower- ranking marabouts’ ndigals, leading many in-
tellectuals to applaud the election as a “victory of citizenship” (Mbow 2003, 
quoted in Villalon 2004, 66). Ironically, these youth sought change through 
voting for one of the last great Independence- era politicians — and a self- 
declared liberal (neoliberal in the English parlance), at that.
The political economy of development under Abdoulaye Wade was to sig-
nal a departure from the previous era in a number of important respects, 
particularly with regard to infrastructure. When Wade arrived into office, 
he set out, first and foremost, to consolidate the economic base of his polit-
ical power (M.- C. Diop 2013a). To his favor, he faced an economic context 
that was slightly improved from that facing his predecessor. From a macro-
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economic perspective, the second half of the 1990s had shown considerable 
improvement owing to the benefits of deregulation and of debt relief.31 With 
the Bretton Woods funders loosening some of their control over spending, 
Wade set out to exert as much autonomy as possible in crafting the country’s 
new development trajectory. Through restructuring diplomatic relations, he 
sought to mobilize new sources of international finance through courting 
South- South investment partnerships with countries such as China, Brazil, 
India, and South Africa, as well as nations from the Middle East. Armed with 
this diversified finance portfolio, he embarked upon a number of Grands 
Projets du chef de l’état (Major Projects of the Head of State), centered on 
infrastructural modernization in telecommunications, a new airport for 
Dakar, development of the port, new national monuments, and, especially, 
huge investments in road construction in and around Dakar. It was a prom-
ising period in which the great hope that people had carried for Alternance 
seemed to be materializing in the infrastructural transformations Wade was 
charting across the city. As Caroline Melly (2013, 399) argues, the personal 
hardship faced by Dakarois during the construction stage appeared a sacri-
fice worth the wait for “spectacular expectations for the future.”
Wade’s transformation of the garbage sector was an element of his ambi-
tions to make his mark through infrastructure as well as to centralize con-
trol over his infrastructural visions. Just months after the 2000 elections, 
he set out to eviscerate the fief of Mayor Mamadou Diop through dissolving 
his municipal organization (the cud) and its most important element, the 
participatory trash sector. After serving eighteen years as mayor, Mamadou 
Diop lost in the local elections on May 12, 2002, to liberal candidate Pape 
Diop, a close ally of Abdoulaye Wade. A new national government agency 
was created in 2000 to take over the management of the trash sector,32 and 
a call for bids was put out on the international market for a major private 
waste management company. A private subsidiary of an Italian waste man-
agement company, Azienda Municipalizzata per l’Ambiente (Municipal En-
vironment Agency; ama), was awarded the contract for managing Dakar’s 
household garbage from 2002 until 2006.33 The trash workers who had en-
tered the system with Set/Setal were officially hired by ama with formal 
contracts, set salaries (65,000 cfa, or about us$120 per month), and regular 
benefits, temporarily closing out the insecure and informal institutional ar-
rangements under which they had labored for more than ten years in Mayor 
Mamadou Diop’s participatory system. The workers had new uniforms, new 
collection equipment, and finally felt that their labor was being valued. They 
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had formed a union in 2000, in anticipation of the need to defend their jobs 
and working conditions in the turbulent restructuring that was to come, and 
the union was formally integrated into the company’s operations.
Though at first Wade’s attempts to modernize Dakar’s infrastructure 
seemed reminiscent of the state- led modernization approach of the Senghor 
era and its grand aspirations for stimulating broad- based development and 
social equity, it was soon clear that Wade’s infrastructural visions were 
more volatile and less principled than originally hoped. In the garbage 
sector, the dream of stable, protected labor began to slip within a couple 
of years of the new system. After some severe scandals — most notably that 
the company had been found to supply used trucks from Europe instead 
of new ones — ama’s deficiencies were apparent by 2003 and the system 
appeared in crisis again by 2005.34 Garbage piled up across the city and 
outraged residents voiced their critiques. The first cases of cholera in many 
years were registered in Dakar that rainy season. President Wade definitively 
cancelled the contract in July of 2006, plunging Dakar into a garbage crisis 
characterized by nebulous institutional arrangements, frequent mobilization 
by the union, and extensive public dumping.35 In the lead- up to the elections 
of 2006, Dakar was drowning in its refuse as workers and residents protested 
the institutional vacuum. Though Wade was reelected that year, instability 
in the garbage sector served as the material manifestation of his governing 
challenges. In the second half of his presidency, the garbage sector would 
foreground the downward slide of his legitimacy and his increasingly 
desperate attempts to consolidate power.
2006 – 2012: Infrastructural Fragmentation and Elitism
The institutional arrangements for waste management following the cancel-
lation of ama’s contract can be inscribed within an intensification of com-
petition between the national and local state and Wade’s attempt to mitigate 
the power of the local state. The dissolution of the cud as one of Wade’s first 
actions as president represented a strategy not only to disembowel the pow-
erbase of one of his main rivals from the Socialist Party (Mamadou Diop), 
but also to recentralize political power away from a powerful local govern-
ment entity and into the national executive. After severing ama’s contract, 
he founded an intermunicipal organization federating the Dakar region, the 
cadak- car.36 Though seemingly patterned after the cud, the cadak- car 
was described as being “less political” and more “technocratic” than its prec-
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edent organization and was, in practice, just a skeleton of the cud’s power 
and capacity.37 It can be seen as a thinly veiled attempt to mask centraliza-
tion efforts within a façade of decentralization. After the departure of ama, 
a “transitional” power- sharing agreement was set up between the national 
Ministry of the Environment and cadak- car. Though garbage is a compé-
tence transférée (responsibility of the local state), as consistent with Senegal’s 
1996 decentralization laws, the special arrangement with the Ministry of the 
Environment rests on an addendum to the law on decentralization passed in 
2002 under Wade’s thumb.38 Citing Dakar’s exceptionalism, this addendum 
specifies that decisions regarding Dakar’s trash be determined by central 
state decree.
In this power- sharing agreement, the Ministry of the Environment con-
tracted with the eighteen private concessionaires (contractors) who supplied 
the collection trucks and managed the collection and the dump, while the 
mayor of Dakar, via cadak- car, managed the funds coming in from the 
state and oversaw the paychecks. During this time, the main problems 
stemmed from controversy surrounding the one international concession-
aire (the rest were local), Veolia Propreté, and the increasingly fierce labor 
disputes between the state and the trash workers (see chapter 4). A sub-
sidiary of the French company Vivendi, Veolia was hired in late 2006 on a 
“test” period to coordinate all aspects of the collection for the two down-
town districts of Dakar: Plateau and Médina. The conditions under which 
the contract was awarded to Veolia were shady as they did not stem from 
a competitive public bid and were rumored to have emerged from personal 
connections with Wade’s son Karim.39 Even more significantly, for just these 
two central districts — out of the Dakar region’s forty- three — at the heart 
of the financial and administrative operations of the city, the company re-
ceived a wildly disproportionate share of the budget. In each year, at least 
25 percent of the total garbage budget was paid to Veolia to serve just 6.5 
percent of Dakar’s population and what were, in many respects, the easiest 
areas to service (Cissé and Wone 2013, 744). Although the Veolia workers 
received no special protections and were considered temp workers,40 this 
codified a sharp segregation between the poorer and more populous parts of 
the city — which were served by struggling, underpaid, and under- equipped 
contractors — and two of the richest downtown districts, serviced by state- 
of- the- art French equipment.
The power- sharing agreement ran relatively smoothly at the level of gov-
ernment owing to the fact that the mayor of Dakar, Pape Diop (head of 
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cadak- car), and the minister of the environment both hailed from Abdou-
laye Wade’s party. However, resistance to the arrangement escalated from 
2006 to 2009 as the trash workers mounted increasingly significant strikes 
and Dakarois voiced their discontent through public dumping. Garbage ac-
cumulating in Dakar’s public spaces in 2007 rivaled that of 1988. Trash crisis 
and disorder symbolized increasing public discontentment with Wade’s gov-
ernment and mobilization of disgruntled citizens as the decade progressed. 
Things were to change dramatically in 2009 as support for Wade and his 
party began to slip in the polls. In March 2009, in a turning of the polit-
ical tide that followed on the heels of a particularly acerbic spate of trash 
strikes, Socialist candidate Khalifa Sall was elected to be mayor of Dakar, 
signaling an end to pds control over the mayor’s office.41 From that moment 
until 2012, the institutional and labor arrangements in the trash sector took 
center stage in the political battle between Abdoulaye Wade’s central gov-
ernment and the City of Dakar.
Immediately after taking office in July 2009, Mayor Sall acted decisively 
on the part of the trash workers through formally hiring them on as employ-
ees of cadak- car, regularizing their payments, and providing them with 
social security and health services.42 Then, under firm pressure from the 
trash- workers union, Mayor Sall let the final short- term contract with Veolia 
expire in December 2009, declaring publicly that he intended to regular-
ize the sector for good by ending closed- door agreements and putting out a 
public call for bids for the company to replace Veolia. Sall aimed one more 
blow at Veolia in November 2010, in response to the trash workers’ planned 
strike during the Muslim holiday Tabaski, by ordering that union delegates 
who had been fired by Veolia be reinstated and that a section of the union 
be created within that enterprise. At the same time, Mayor Sall convened a 
commission to study the garbage sector, propose a strategic plan for its orga-
nization, and explore pay raises for the workers.43 Then, in January 2011, the 
mayor led the charge for an agreement signed between cadak- car and the 
bank bicis,44 to provide accounts for all Dakar public workers, most notably 
starting with the garbage sector. The union vociferously declared its support 
for the mayor and cadak- car.
In reaction to Mayor Sall’s efforts to consolidate authority over the gar-
bage sector, President Wade reshuffled Dakar’s trash management again just 
a few months later. By April 2011, the mayor and the president had all but 
declared war over the sector. In a heated set of newspaper interviews that 
month, the mayor is quoted as saying: “It’s a political battle that we will fight 
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until the end . . . The surface technicians [trash collectors] are right to refuse 
to be the sacrificial lamb” (quoted in Soleil 2011). For his part, the president 
declared: “We must tell the truth. Today’s Mayors are unable to manage gar-
bage” (quoted in Cissokho 2011). Wade retaliated by making plans to transfer 
the budget and authority for garbage management away from cadak- car, 
back to the newly resuscitated national garbage agency. A street cleanup op-
eration with fifteen hundred youth was organized, circumventing the formal 
trash workers and prompting them to go on strike. Wade continued to refuse 
to meet with the trash- workers union and community residents expressed 
their dismay at the situation through periodic public dumping. A few months 
later, the story heated up even more when Wade created yet another new 
national trash- management agency that would take garbage even further 
out of the hands of the city.45 Mayor Sall vociferously protested, contesting 
that it directly contradicted the decentralization laws of 1996 and pointing 
out the paradox of a (neo)liberal president who in fact seeks to centralize and 
nationalize, more than deregulate.
In the final months of Wade’s presidency, the garbage sector was again in 
legal limbo. Although the new agency was not yet in force, Wade transferred 
the trash budget into the hands of the Ministry of Culture, essentially gut-
ting cadak- car — an institution that he himself had created. The workers 
and mayor alike continued to protest the creation of the new agency, but es-
sentially hunkered down until the presidential elections of 2012 to see what 
the new political climate would hold for garbage. Wade’s government fell 
back on the now hackneyed performance of public cleaning in an attempt 
to shore up political support. Again sidelining the formal trash workers, the 
Ministry of Culture organized a series of highly visible Days of Cleanliness 
leading up to the elections in Dakar, where over a thousand young people 
were paid as day laborers to conduct periodic sweeps of the city.
From these performances of state power through garbage infrastructure, 
we can read a wider insight into Wade’s mode of governing. Volatility in the 
garbage sector exemplified the mismanagement of public funds and political 
manipulation of government agencies in the face of the flagging legitimacy 
that characterized the Wade era overall (Dahou and Foucher 2004; M.- C. 
Diop 2013b, 2013c; Mbow 2008). Wade endeavored to concentrate power in 
the executive, fashioning himself the supreme executor of his “major proj-
ects” across many sectors, and mutating government ministries at will in the 
periodic reorganization of the form and function of his patronage systems 
(see M.- C. Diop 2013a). This meant jealously guarding control from other po-
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litical figures, even in his own government, and, sometimes, battling tooth 
and nail against rival politicians to control specific turf. The institutions of 
government were often casualties of these political agendas and personalis-
tic logics (Mbow 2008).
Overall, Wade’s governance of trash and other sectors defied consistent 
political economic logics or development goals. The schizophrenic approach 
to liberalizing the public sector is a case in point. Though privatization was 
key on Wade’s agenda in principle, as we can see in the trash sector, Wade 
privatized in fits and starts. With the arrival of ama came a more forceful 
move toward privatization, but with the repeal of that contract and the long 
transitional phase to follow, the system languished in a hybrid arrangement 
that defied logic outside of the urge to exert control over the sector and its 
vast budget. The creation of a national trash management company in the 
twilight hours of his presidency further marked a final desperate effort to 
manipulate the sector for power and prestige. Intervening sporadically in 
diverse sectors, Wade’s style demonstrated a rationality of political maneu-
vering more than one of long- term development planning (see Ndoye 2013). 
Far from a classic reform agenda, his neoliberal experiment was a nonlinear, 
messy process anchored in an autocratic approach to combat his waning 
legitimacy.
The technical and institutional fragmentation and degradation of gar-
bage infrastructure, especially after 2006, was part and parcel of an overall 
pattern of infrastructure investment and development that was profoundly 
uneven and, at its base, elitist. Health and education suffered enormously 
during this period due to low investments, and Wade’s most famous invest-
ment, his roadworks, overwhelmingly benefited the rich, connecting elite 
parts of the city through fancy overpasses and the now famous Corniche 
coastal highway peppered with fancy shopping malls (M.- C. Diop 2013a; 
Foley 2010; Melly 2013). The mega- highway project linking the peninsula of 
Dakar to its sprawling suburbs is a toll road that has eased the commuting 
burdens for precious few working- class people. The systematic disinvest-
ment in garbage infrastructure after 2006, except in the two downtown 
zones serviced by Veolia, rendered street sweeping and access to disposal 
deeply unequal across the city. Garbage played a central role in Wade’s aes-
thetic dream to project a certain image of the city, especially to its elite 
visitors. The rich neighborhoods and fancy roads had to be clean, but a look 
inside the poor and working- class neighborhoods revealed an altogether dif-
ferent reality. This is consistent with wider trends toward splintering urban-
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ism that entail the differential development of city infrastructures charted 
by Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (2001), but emphasizes the political 
nature of such fragmentation and its deepening reliance on the body as in-
frastructure. Degradation of equipment (see figure 1.3) and the devaluation 
of trash labor worked to devolve the strains and burdens of cleaning — and 
thus filth and disposability — onto the bodies of the workers and the city’s 
poorest households.
In garbage and other sectors, including roadworks, Wade’s policies did 
not, on the whole, grow stable employment, but, rather, relied on flexibilized 
labor formulas (especially contract labor) which exacerbated the growing 
disparity between social classes and the strains of social dislocation in a city 
that was becoming evermore inaccessible to average working people (Ndiaye 
2010, 2013). Wade’s investment in work was about image and performance 
more than ensuring long- term stable employment. The armies of people he 
hired for his building projects seemed impressive, but in reality these were 
often day laborers making only meager salaries. Wearing tunics with slogans 
related to his various projects, these laboring bodies were the visible vital 
F I G U R E  1 . 3 .  A run- down garbage truck being repaired in Yoff.  
Author’s photo, 2006.
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infrastructure of Wade’s grand projects, allowing him to claim space and 
responsibility for the transformations taking place, to display the power and 
promise of the new city to come. But his forced removal of Dakar’s thousands 
of marchands ambulants (street vendors)46 and extensive efforts to ramp up 
street cleaning in order to cleanse and sanitize the city for the oic summit 
told a different story. Street vendors encumbered urban space in ways that 
were messy and unmodern, and striking garbage workers betrayed the ris-
ing tide of dissent bubbling up in Dakar. Both were contrary to the image of 
order that Wade was trying to project to the world. Although it wasn’t com-
pleted in time for the oic, the African Renaissance Monument (see figure 
1.2), on the other hand, perhaps most clearly represents Wade’s vision. As 
the most striking of Wade’s attempts to mark public space, the huge statue 
depicting an African nuclear family gesturing to the West sought to conjure 
Dakar’s emergence as a world- class city in the making. Instead, it has not 
ceased to be the butt of jokes, and served as the site of protests when it was 
unveiled and during his failed bid to retain power in 2012.47
Trash Politics after Abdoulaye Wade
On March 25, 2012, a new era of trash management was ushered in with 
the election of Macky Sall as president after what turned out to be Sen-
egal’s most violent and contentious elections yet. Upon taking office, Sall 
announced his intention to dissolve Abdoulaye Wade’s new national trash 
management agency and relocate Dakar’s garbage management back into 
the hands of local government.48 By summer 2012, Veolia had finally left 
Senegal and a number of steps were being taken toward regularizing the 
sector. Although the mayor of Dakar, Khalifa Sall, and the president, Macky 
Sall (no relation), hail from different parties, from 2012 to 2014 they demon-
strated their willingness to work together with regard to Dakar’s trash man-
agement. The cadak- car organization was officially resuscitated and gar-
bage was placed fully under its tutelage. At a trash conference hosted by 
the trash- workers union that took place in June 2012, representatives from 
both offices and other implicated institutions all indicated that they were 
committed to working together with the union to ensure that the sector’s 
perpetual “transitional” phase would come to an end with a final, effective, 
and just management system. After years of lobbying, the trash workers’ col-
lective bargaining agreement was finally signed by the trash- workers union, 
the mayor of Dakar, and the director general of cadak- car on June 24, 
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2014 (République du Sénégal 2014). This signaled an important reversal of 
austerity- era management trends and a major gain by a prominent social 
movement. Although implementation was slow, the collective convention 
signaled a reversal of the flexibilization of labor in the sector and carried the 
trash workers’ hope for an end to a long period of instability and insecure 
legal protections.
Unfortunately, the workers’ hopes that the sector would be stabilized and 
depoliticized once and for all were dashed as garbage continues to be thrown 
back into the spotlight of political maneuvering. Further reconfigurations in 
the sector stemmed out of an escalation of tension between President Macky 
Sall and Mayor Khalifa Sall. In October 2015, the president reneged on previ-
ous commitments and removed garbage from under cadak- car to instead 
place it under the control of an agency titled l’Unité de coordination et de 
gestion des déchets (Garbage Coordination and Management Unit; ucg),49 
which is managed by the (national) Ministry of Local Governments. The 
trash- workers union, which was not consulted before this change, harshly 
critiqued the transfer, underlining that its key objective is safeguarding the 
gains it has worked so hard to obtain. Although there have been a few small 
issues of noncompliance with the collective bargaining agreement by ucg, 
most advances in the sector have been protected, and new equipment and 
uniforms were furnished to the workers in April 2016. The union continues 
to complain about salary levels and late payments, and periodically warns 
that it will do what it must to protect healthy working conditions in the sec-
tor.50 The continuing saga indicates that, though the sector has pioneered a 
reversal of austerity trends, ongoing competition over scarce resources and 
power will continue to politicize Dakar’s trash collection.
Conclusions
Dakar’s garbagescape has become a central terrain of contestation over the 
legitimacy of the Senegalese state. This chapter has analyzed modes of gov-
erning in Senegal in the wake of structural adjustment, through considering 
battles over Dakar’s garbage infrastructure at the end of the socialist era 
and throughout the liberal era to follow. Across both periods, we see the 
primary importance of infrastructure as a theater for political debate and 
shifting contours of state- society relations. Just as Mayor Mamadou Diop 
knew all too well that the garbage sector was of ultimate importance in his 
ability to manage the city, urban populations, and the rising tide of youth 
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dissent in that era, President Abdoulaye Wade and Mayor Khalifa Sall also 
found themselves entangled — like it or not — in the delicate task of govern-
ing trash. Controlling garbage infrastructure means controlling the image 
and ordering processes of the city. If dirt and disorder are metaphors for 
corruption and vice, then a clean and orderly city signifies the proper func-
tioning of government and the virtues of its leaders. Controlling garbage in-
frastructure, moreover, means capturing specific people to do the dirty work 
with different material burdens and rewards. As a highly visible and arduous 
labor, cleaning work functions as an important space for the performance of 
state legitimacy and a form of material power.
The first lesson to be drawn from governing garbage across these two 
moments concerns an anxious pattern of political maneuvering over limited 
resources. Politicking at the heart of the garbage sector reinforces patronage 
modes of governing and compromises state legitimacy, coherence, and ac-
countability. The exigencies of austerity in both periods precipitated desper-
ate attempts to consolidate power and outcompete political rivals, and the 
unraveling of a cohesive urban development vision. A long- term logic of doing 
politics by doling out favors through the public sector and increasingly con-
straining resources has bred incessant meddling and squeezing of the public 
sector for what little power can be gleaned. This history of institutional vol-
atility in the garbage sector illuminates, moreover, how the governing work 
of different infrastructural formulas has primarily turned on the question of 
labor. Courting the trash workers has become imperative given their role as 
one of the last remaining bastions of the civil service over which the state 
can exert direct control, and because of the extraordinary power they hold 
through the general trash strike and their close contact with the Dakarois. 
Across both periods, a central feature of garbage politicking has been the 
flexibilization of trash work in cheap infrastructural solutions that simulta-
neously curry favor while they discipline and control.
Second, the manifestation of these political responses in episodic, perfor-
mative, and increasingly fragmented investments leaves the city’s infrastruc-
tures highly uneven and dilapidated in many areas. In this way, this story 
highlights how neoliberal development works through the governance of 
disposability — determining which spaces and people can be discarded, de-
graded, and devalued. At the same time, it shows how governing infrastruc-
ture works through a hollow, performative mode centered on mobilizing 
and ordering bodies in public space. The continual reinvention of infrastruc-
ture’s institutional design frustrates its coherence, functional capacities, and 
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equal access across the urban landscape. Specifically, however, we can see 
very different approaches to grappling with waste and disposability, espe-
cially between Mayor Mamadou Diop and President Wade. Put simply, Diop 
seems to have understood garbage in a way that Wade simply never did. 
With few other resources at his disposal, Diop embraced garbage — despite 
its negative connotations — as a core feature of his new political approach, 
and he benefited in the long run from this savvy calculus. For his part, Wade 
never really got his hands dirty. He ignored or sidelined the trash workers 
for years, trying instead to manipulate the sector through high- level insti-
tutional changes, but underestimating the power of the trash workers and 
neglecting trash itself as a kind of political matter. The force of discard in 
Dakar politics depended upon the specificity of these distinct conjunctures 
and their associated personalities.
Third, and as we shall explore more fully in the next chapter, the conse-
quence of this politicization and fragmentation is that the social, material, 
and symbolic burdens of infrastructure are devolved onto ordinary people 
(residents and laborers) and social systems that are rendered disposable. 
New management regimes in both periods have reconfigured the relations of 
social reproduction, placing responsibility for cleaning the city more firmly 
onto the precarious laboring bodies of youth and women. In this way, gar-
bage illuminates the material and symbolic power of governing disposability. 
However, this devolution precipitated its own response in the rising tide of 
protests and social contestation witnessed after 2006 in Dakar. Garbage 
politics from Set/Setal to the union strikes in 2007 illuminate how formulas 
for hegemony are unstable and comprise a messy dialectic of contestation 
that threatens to bring about radical reconfigurations. Wade losing his grip 
on Dakar in the late 2000s and then definitively in the elections of 2012 
signaled a new era in Senegal’s garbage politics and stirred hopes for stem-
ming the practice of politicking through infrastructure. The full import of 
the shift to Macky Sall’s governing formula remains to be seen.
Overall, this history of governing through garbage offers insight into how 
neoliberal reform is negotiated and managed within the state in the context 
of a fiercely democratic urban landscape. Senegal is a revealing case through 
which to examine these processes, given its rich urban democratic history 
as well as its role as a test case of adjustment. From the implementation of 
structural adjustment by the Socialists to Wade’s pursuit of a new neoliberal 
formula to more recent battles between the mayor and the president, we see 
the different strategies employed by ambitious politicians to carve out their 
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political agendas within these political economic constraints. The result is a 
checkered history of institutional tinkering and dramatic performativity in 
the space of public infrastructure. In the face of limited resources and popu-
list demands for accountability, infrastructural labor comes to the fore as the 
key thing to be manipulated, often at the expense of a coherent development 
vision and eventually to these politicians’ own political demise. In this con-
text, austerity breeds political rationalities characterized by excessive com-
petition within the state, perpetual processes of political reinvention, and a 
confusing medley of experimental institutional forms. Far from a singular 
script of urban change, then, neoliberal reform is consolidated and contested 
through unruly negotiations around everyday infrastructures in place. 
two.  Vital Infrastructures of Labor
The mobilizations in Dakar leading up to and following the contentious elec-
tions of 1988 hurtled Senegalese youth onto the political radar as key losers 
in structural adjustment, as an important new electorate, and as the greatest 
potential threat to the urban peace. Although they had been a visible force in 
the Independence struggle and then in the crisis of 1968 (Zeilig and Ansell 
2008), youth had not previously been seen as the force for opposition poli-
tics that they became in 1988. The so- called casseurs (breakers) — Senegal’s 
version of the “lost boys” — who rioted after the 1988 elections inspired great 
fear amongst the Dakarois (Cruise O’Brien 1996). Overall, these events, and 
then the violence surrounding the Mauritanian crisis in 1989, served as po-
tent testimony to the sinister possibilities of youth agitation and contributed 
to the political crisis that closed out the difficult decade. The old social con-
tract between the state, religious authorities, and Senegalese citizens was 
crumbling and the problem of youth was front and center. Economic crisis 
and its disproportionate impacts combined with the impasse in the educa-
tion system to give young Dakarois a sense of hopelessness and abandon-
ment by the state. Students — who had formerly been special beneficiaries 
of the employer state — began to “face an astonishingly bleak set of circum-
stances” (Zeilig 2007, 2).
In this context, the now- famous Set/Setal social movement was spawned, 
inspiring a new chapter in the relationship between the Dakarois and their 
city. Part of a wave of grassroots movements across the continent aimed at 
taming and managing the urban decay from structural adjustment and its 
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uneven impacts (see Bond 2005), Set/Setal earned youth in Dakar a prom-
inent place in studies of African social movements and democratic change 
(see Mamdani and Wamba- dia- Wamba 1995). The movement retains a spe-
cial, almost fetishized place in the memories of the Dakarois — “rather in 
the way that Parisians remember May 1968” (Cruise O’Brien 1996, 62). A 
key missing piece of this legacy, however, is the way Set/Setal came to be 
instrumentalized by the state and international funders in the city’s new, 
more intimate, low- tech community- based trash infrastructure.
In the early 1990s, Dakar’s mayor replaced the city’s garbage sector with 
a participatory infrastructure built upon the Set/Setal movement and, in 
doing so, devolved infrastructure onto labor. Drawing on the analysis in 
chapter 1 of the institutional arrangements that have emerged out of the 
volatile politics of garbage since Set/Setal, this chapter takes a closer look at 
what these transformations have meant for the young people caught in their 
sway. The analysis is concerned with how new arrangements for garbage 
management reconfigure everyday lives and embodied materialities of labor 
and, along the way, communities, political subjectivities, and relationships 
to the city. Specifically, it unpacks how the turn to participatory infrastruc-
tural formulas for garbage collection resculpted the spaces, values, and ma-
terial burdens of labor for young men and women from the early 1990s up 
through the precarious Abdoulaye Wade years in the 2000s. In this way, the 
chief intervention of the chapter is in literally fleshing out the vital ecology of 
trash infrastructures through foregrounding social and bodily technologies 
in relation to the wider political- economic, discursive, and material worlds 
they compose. Vital infrastructures emphasize the junctions between ma-
terial technologies and human bodies and the intersecting precarities they 
engender.
Austerity works through reconfiguring the relationship between the body, 
infrastructure, and the city. The first section of the chapter chronicles the 
emergence of participatory trash infrastructures as a key element of urban 
reform in the first major wave of structural adjustment. New infrastructural 
formulas for trash collection, through the formalization of the youth move-
ment Set/Setal in the early 1990s, entailed novel configurations of socio- 
technical and material relations. As new relations of social reproduction, 
these participatory infrastructures subjected young men and women to new 
forms of state discipline. This analysis shares concerns with notions of “peo-
ple as infrastructure” (Simone 2004b), in conceptualizing infrastructure as 
a distinctive ecology that incorporates human labor. This places people at 
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the heart of infrastructural systems and foregrounds the everyday negoti-
ations and bonds that form the scaffolding for building the city. However, 
the analysis counters overly optimistic and immaterial portrayals of par-
ticipatory infrastructures with a more nuanced analysis that is attentive to 
the symbolic and material burdens invoked by infrastructures built upon 
precarious socio- technical relations of disposability. As AbdouMaliq Sim-
one (2012) points out, infrastructures expend people’s capacities. Drawing 
on the specific force of waste and decay, this analysis emphasizes how this 
works in two senses — both through disbursing human capacities, and also 
through using them up.
The second section delves deeper into the social technologies animated 
by the new participatory trash- collection system, through examining how 
infrastructure emerges from and reshapes urban social systems and relations 
of belonging and sociality. Youth and women were differentially enrolled in 
the displacement of social reproduction into the public sphere through par-
ticipatory cleaning. Gendered discourses of waste and cleaning in Senegal 
facilitated women’s entrance into the municipal cleaning sector for the first 
time and conditioned the particularity of men’s and women’s experiences of 
embodied precarity. Cheap waste work provided contradictory spaces that 
at once instrumentalized gendered stigmas in the service of disposable la-
bor, and also afforded strategic openings for political participation, new eco-
nomic roles, and claims to authority and expertise.
As a space of formalized bricolage, trash work requires incessant main-
tenance and improvisation that conditions creative but dangerous relation-
ships between workers and the decrepit machines they depend on. The third 
section of this chapter characterizes the precarity precipitated by continued 
flexibilization of labor and degradation in working conditions and equip-
ment, as the sector was brought into the fold of (neo)liberal president Wade’s 
institutional politicking in the mid- 2000s. Here I focus on the way that res-
idents’ and workers’ bodies are enrolled into new infrastructural formulas 
by considering questions of embodiment, corporeality, and performativity in 
the space of dirty labor. The devolvement of infrastructure onto labor works 
to constitute certain bodies as waste. Together, the sections of this chapter 
locate laboring bodies and the communities that bind them at the core of 
new infrastructural formulas, illuminating the ways that new political eco-
nomic conjunctures recompose socio- material relations, political subjectiv-
ities, and spaces of citizenship.
Told from the vantage point of my fieldwork in 2007 – 8, much of the 
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chapter takes on the feeling of that moment — both in a sense of nostalgia for 
Set/Setal and the hopeful period immediately following on its heels; and in 
the deep disappointment and insecurity felt by the Wade years.
People as Infrastructure
Set/Setal
In the late 1980s, garbage piled up and putrefied in city streets and public 
spaces, forming a barometer of political crisis. After the garbage workers’ 
strikes fell on deaf ears and the government stopped paying the bill, the para-
statal trash company sias ceased full operations in the late 1980s and was 
fully bankrupt and nonoperational by the early 1990s. Set/Setal emerged in 
sharp contrast to the violent events of 1988 – 89, as youth from many walks of 
life united to clean the city. Building on the cultural and sporting activities 
organized during the navétanes (summer vacation months), and incubated 
within the formal youth groups (ascs, gies, and gpfs)1 that were expanding 
beyond their original focus on sports, the movement involved an unprece-
dented level of popular mobilization. Young people began to organize their 
own systems for cleaning across diverse spaces of the city. In Mamadou Di-
ouf’s (1992, 42; my translation) words: “Since July 1990, the juvenile violence 
has transitioned into a kind of intense madness that remains an enigma. 
Under the dumbfounded gaze of the adults, these former hunters of Mauri-
tanians, groups of young people put into action their new creed: order and 
cleanliness.”
Through painting elaborate murals, organizing local events, and cleaning 
up their neighborhoods, youth aimed to cleanse the city in a literal sense — in 
terms of sanitation and hygiene — but also morally in a fight against corrup-
tion, prostitution, and general delinquency. They drew from both meanings of 
the Set/Setal expression: set, which means “clean,” “the state of being clean,” 
and setal, which is the act of rendering something clean. Stemming from its 
roots in the neighborhood youth groups, Set/Setal assembled a cosmopoli-
tan community of youngsters who were more or less representative of their 
own community demographics. Because young people generally participate 
in neighborhood associations regardless of their educational status, ethnic 
group, religion, class, or gender, the key feature of the movement was belong-
ing to a neighborhood, regardless of other societal divisions.2 Given the con-
tinuing educational crisis, students were key activists behind the movement.
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In the context of political paralysis and, for many, feelings of economic 
and social powerlessness, Set/Setal was defined by mobility, action, and po-
tency. Animated by popular music and bubbling into the streets in organic 
bursts of activity, the movement was generally fun, sometimes frenetic, and, 
more often than not, purposeful. As one participant explained, “It was ex-
citing to be busy, to know what we had to do and do it.”3 Often, whole neigh-
borhoods joined in. High unemployment, the growing informal economy, 
and school closures had only enhanced the vibrancy of Dakar’s already busy 
street life. Whether cooling off on a street bench in the shade, trying to make 
a buck selling food or wares on a street corner, or simply passing the day 
chatting and drinking tea with neighbors, Dakarois spend much of the day 
outside of their homes. Where the insides of homes are often stuffy and over-
crowded, and household courtyards get squeezed out by new construction 
for growing families, the street offers space, opportunity, and social connec-
tion. This vibrant public street life made for easy recruitment into Set/Setal.
Just like their brothers, young women left their houses on the days sched-
uled for cleanup events and set out to reorder space with their own hands. 
One key lacuna in the research on Set/Setal to date concerns the important 
role of young women as eager participants and, in some cases, leaders in the 
movement. Their participation stemmed from two major factors: women’s 
increasing involvement in neighborhood management, whether through “fe-
male” sections of youth groups or through their own associations (gies or 
gpfs), and their connection to the work of cleaning in the home. Sweeping, 
cleaning, and dealing with household wastes are key elements of women’s 
duties as managers of domestic space in Senegal.4 Waste work in the home is 
thus naturalized as intrinsically women’s work. Women at the lower end of the 
household social hierarchy — according to age, ethnicity, and marital status5 — 
are usually reserved the dirtiest and most onerous waste duties.6 For this 
reason, young women were not only well equipped to help with cleaning 
the neighborhood, but also keenly motivated to be part of the solution to the 
garbage crisis that precipitated Set/Setal. The fact that they were seen as the 
“cleaners” in their households legitimized their place out and about cleaning 
with their male compatriots (see figure 2.1).
The elaborate Set/Setal murals painted all over Dakar — of which rem-
nants can still be seen today — tell of a youth imaginary that strove to de-
construct the nationalist imaginary that had dominated since Independence 
(M. Diouf 1992; Roberts et al. 2003). Carefully documented in the book 
Set Setal, published by the ngo Environnement et développement du tiers 
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monde (Environment and Development Action in the Third World; enda),7 
and explored in probing detail by Mamadou Diouf (1992, 1996, 2003), the 
murals and other efforts of the movement’s youth drew from continuously 
reformulated ethnic, religious, regional, and national identities. Celebrat-
ing such diverse political and cultural icons as Bob Marley, Nelson Man-
dela, Amadou Bamba, and Martin Luther King Jr. — sometimes all on the 
same wall — the murals signaled a departure from the Afro- pessimism grip-
ping the times, and a move toward constructive aspirations for unity, peace, 
and a reorientation of values perceived as having gone astray. Through lit-
erally cleansing and writing over the space of the city — coloring it with 
faces, messages, and symbols, and even renaming city streets and neigh-
borhoods — youth tried to take possession of the city, to reorder it with their 
own references and values (M. Diouf 1996). Their political messages elided 
references to the current political context and politicians, proposing a dif-
ferent idea of politics from that of the 1988 mobilizations. In Set/Setal, the 
F I G U R E  2 . 1 .  A cartoon depicting the Set/Setal activists dumping “corruption,” “crisis,” 
“unemployment,” “scamming,” and “April 1989” into the garbage dump. Note the 
participating woman (left). The bubble reads: “It’s the ‘Set Setal’ of bad memories!” 
enda, Set Setal, des murs qui parlent. Reprinted with permission from enda Tiers 
Monde.
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neighborhood replaced the national territory as “the canvas for elaborating 
the symbolic and imaginary” (M. Diouf 1996, 248).
Youssou N’Dour’s famous theme song, “Set,” captures the movement’s 
fervor for cleanliness and spirit of self- improvement:
Set, set oy. Ni set, set ci sa xel lo, ni set ci sa jëff oy . . .
Set, set, set, set, set, set. Ni bës dina ñëw . . . Seetlu naa ko . . .
Xale yaangiy jooy, ëllëg di wóorulo. Lii moy ma tiis ye . . .
Cleanliness, oh cleanliness. Be clean, pure in your spirit, clean in 
your acts . . .
Cleanliness, cleanliness, cleanliness, cleanliness, cleanliness, 
cleanliness. This [new] day will come . . . I’m watching for it
The children are crying, the future is uncertain. This is what makes 
me sad . . .8
Purity was an especially prominent theme. In striving to achieve purity, Set/
Setal youth sought to cleanse their delinquent, even debauched reputations 
alongside those of their neighbors, families, and politicians. This new vision 
of moral urban citizenship was underpinned by a critique of the social and 
moral degradation that was perceived to be afflicting Dakarois society. To 
attack this head- on, the youth organized efforts intended to purify what 
they saw as a “sick” society, invaded by tobacco, alcohol, prostitution, and 
violence (enda 1991, 45). In addition to painting messages explicitly aimed 
at improving community behavior, they also organized activities through 
their associations such as school programs, vocational training, and sport-
ing events. They even set up “vigilance” committees like the so- called Mafia 
Boys of Niari Tali neighborhood (enda 1991). The Mafia Boys and the like 
were groups of young locals whose job was not only to help clean up the 
neighborhood, but also to provide a sort of neighborhood security force to 
counteract social dislocation and violence. Ideas of cleanliness in Set/Setal 
also often drew on values of faith and piety connected to Islamic traditions.
Set/Setal’s ordering efforts strove to clean up the local environment 
through education campaigns as well as operations aimed directly at trash 
and sanitation. Their educational activities were manifested in a prepon-
derance of murals dedicated to exposing populations to the dangers of pol-
lution and the origins of diseases like malaria and diarrhea, and outreach 
to sensibiliser (educate) local populations (see figure 2.2). Many groups also 
had explicitly environmental missions and framed their activities through 
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discourses of sustainability that were gaining traction internationally. Dirt 
and trash provided both a metaphor for the general filth and degradation 
that the movement saw in the city, and a practical way to combat those forces 
with clear results. The groups’ physical efforts to clean up their neighbor-
hoods constituted an increasingly essential element of local environmental 
management, especially in those hard- to- reach neighborhoods with severe 
sanitation issues. At the same time, their educational efforts allowed them to 
assert their authority and expertise around the operations of the city.
Living in a world of worthless diplomas and little available work, Set/ 
Setal youth repudiated their social impotence and rejected their superfluity 
in the urban labor force. In refusing their position at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, they departed from the gerontocratic traditions they were sup-
posed to have inherited from times past. No longer waiting for permission 
or direction from their elders, youth took ownership of their neighborhoods. 
“Our neighborhood is ours,” stated many murals in diverse neighborhoods 
across Dakar. Through inhabiting new spaces and reordering the urban en-
F I G U R E  2 . 2 .  A Set/Setal mural aiming to educate about poor hygiene and disease, with 
a caption that reads “How we get diarrhea.” enda, Set Setal, des murs qui parlent. 
Reprinted with permission from enda Tiers Monde.
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vironment, they exercised their power and creativity and transformed their 
relationship to the city. In the words of Makhtar, a former Set/Setal partici-
pant and present- day trash worker: “We woke up, and we wanted to change 
our lives. We were tired of just sitting around, drinking tea, and waiting for 
things to happen. Who were we waiting for? Set/Setal was a revolution — it 
was the youth growing up and deciding to clean up their lives. It changed us, 
Dakar, and this country forever.”
Reacting to the dearth of safe, unsullied, or uncorrupted public space, 
Set/Setal youth insisted on their rights to the city by claiming and rehabili-
tating public space, not just with their presence and visibility, but with their 
labor. Central to this message was an insistence on the value of work and a 
rejection of the laziness and boredom they saw as epidemic. They cleared out 
spaces of leisure like soccer fields and playgrounds, built monuments, and 
planted gardens — emphasizing not only their right to occupy the city but 
also their ability to mold it to their own desires. This imaginary signaled a 
departure from previous eras where work was something doled out by elders 
and politicians. For Set/Setal youth, the city became a do- it- yourself work-
place, where formal labor receded into history and opportunity presented 
itself around every corner (see figure 2.3).
Dakar’s New Trash Collectors
The participatory trash sector brought in these young men and women ac-
tivists as new political clients and the fresh face of the nation and its orderly 
development. In a broader sense, the system responded to the exigencies of 
austerity through reconfiguring the relationship between labor and infra-
structure. Prior to 1988, trash collection was fairly regularized. The trash 
workers of the parastatal company sias were mainly adult men from outside 
of Dakar who had decent salaries and were unionized. However, the system 
had collapsed under the financial and political constraints of austerity, and 
by the early 1990s Set/Setal youth’s cleaning activities had become indis-
pensable in filling the gaps. As previously mentioned, Dakar’s Socialist Party 
mayor, Mamadou Diop, fired the sector’s workers and incorporated Set/Setal 
volunteers (including many women) into a citywide participatory system 
in the early 1990s that lasted until 2001. This dramatic reconfiguration of 
the city’s trash infrastructure represented a shrewd political calculation by 
Mayor Diop that helped him to cope with shrinking budgets, flexibilize the 
labor force, and shore up political support in the face of intensified electoral 
competition — especially amongst the wildcard youth electorate.
Vital Infrastructures of Labor 69
A key function behind the new trash sector was the escape hatch it pro-
vided for the government in the face of the emerging labor movement of the 
sias workers. The previous system was not only much more expensive; it 
was also organized. Dissolving sias and replacing the workers with youth 
allowed Mayor Diop to remove the nuisance of union organizing in the trash 
sector. Although he offered to integrate former sias workers into the new 
system, in practice only a small minority made the transition (less than two 
hundred). Most preferred to leave the sector altogether given the pay cut 
and lack of benefits, or because they did not want to work with the youth.9 
Others chose to leave or were impeded from joining because they were con-
sidered rabble rousers or were not members of the Socialist Party. In the 
words of a sias union activist regarding the workers’ treatment by Mayor 
Diop: “Personally, I knew that [he] wanted to erase us!” The activist believed 
that his application to work in the new sector was rejected because he was 
not a socialist.
Diop wanted to use the system not only as a forum for mobilizing support 
for his party, but also as a reward for his political clients. As mayor of Dakar, 
F I G U R E  2 . 3 .  A Set/Setal mural depicting emploi (work). enda, Set Setal, des murs qui 
parlent. Reprinted with permission from enda Tiers Monde.
70 Chapter Two
he was keenly interested in shifting the trash sector jobs to the Dakarois. Al-
though most of the sias workers probably spent much of their lives in Dakar, 
many came from non- Dakarois families or had moved to the capital for these 
jobs. The sias director, moreover, had shown a preference for hiring from 
within his family, his region outside of Dakar (Saint- Louis), or his own eth-
nic group (Toucouleur). The switch to hiring youth was a way of redirecting 
this pattern in the interest of Diop’s urban constituents.
The decision to hire youth was explicitly targeted, moreover, at this newly 
visible constituency of Dakar youth, as illustrated in the workers’ recollec-
tions. One worker looked back, stating: “Yes, there were political motivations 
because this was the beginning of the revolt of the youth. Because the youth 
wanted change. The authorities felt that these youth wanted change . . . 
and they really wanted to convince them that the system was still good.” 
Similarly, the ex- president of the Coordination des associations et mouve-
ments de la communauté urbaine de Dakar (Federation of the Associations 
and Movements of the Dakar Urban Community; camcud) and current 
department chief stated, “In 1988, there were all those troubles . . . and 
Mamadou Diop, when he saw all those youth, he said to them: ‘Don’t throw 
those stones.’ He judged well to jump [at the opportunity]. It was he who said 
that if you don’t occupy yourselves with the youth, they will occupy them-
selves with you. He was right.” Urban youth had come to represent a threat 
that needed to be contained and brought into the state’s hegemonic fold. In 
the context of a growing awareness of the undue burden they bore and their 
resultant volatility in the face of structural adjustment, Set/Setal offered the 
state the opportunity to channel — and thus pacify — the youth mobilizations 
that had been its greatest nightmare just a few years earlier. Negative asso-
ciations with waste work served to discipline youth and, in so doing, diffuse 
the threat they might have posed to the nation. As restive, unemployed youth 
activists, they were dangerous, but as dirty workers on the state’s payroll, 
they could be more easily ordered and controlled.
Through orchestrating Journées de Propreté (Days of Cleanliness) across 
the city, Diop began to tap and scale up Set/Setal youth’s cleaning activities 
(M. Diop, n.d.). In addition to their neighborhood cleaning activities was 
added the job of collecting and loading garbage onto the dump truck and 
delivering it to the dump on the outskirts of the city. Initially volunteers, 
then paid day- labor rates (one to two U.S. dollars per day), the youth lacked 
all protections and benefits. Soon, Diop’s interest in the youth dovetailed 
with that of a powerful international actor: the World Bank. Besieged by 
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criticism of the dire social consequences of structural  adjustment condi-
tionalities, the World Bank was beginning to consider policies that comple-
mented reform with more attention to social safety nets. The Dakar riots 
of 1988 – 89 — a shocking event in a place considered a model of peace and 
development — had garnered the bank’s attention and led to this policy shift. 
Though initially composed of volunteers and self- organized, the youth trash 
sector was soon managed by a new World Bank – funded public works agency 
modeled after Bolivia’s Emergency Social Fund, centered in Dakar, and coor-
dinated by the municipality.10 The World Bank – funded Agence d’exécution 
des travaux d’intérêt public contre le sous- emploi (Public Works and Employ-
ment Agency; agetip) was formed in 1989 and rolled out in the 1990s in two 
phases, with the goal of generating a significant number of mainly manual 
and temporary jobs for unemployed youth.11 Part of a global paradigm shift to 
a kinder, gentler, “revisionist” neoliberalism in the face of widespread social 
dislocation (Mohan and Stokke 2000), the agency’s projects were officially 
aimed at improving living conditions in poor urban neighborhoods, in order 
to satisfy certain basic needs that had been eroded with adjustment policies 
and, in so doing, to keep the social peace (World Bank 1992, 1997). The con-
text and motivation behind the agetip projects are laid out clearly in the 
following excerpt from the World Bank’s Project Appraisal Report:
In 1988, Senegal faced serious economic and political problems. Despite 
a decade of structural adjustment, economic growth had remained weak 
throughout the 1980s (2.1 percent per year), and unemployment had in-
creased (official unemployment rates rose from 16 percent in 1976 to 
30 percent in 1989). Unemployment was most severe in urban areas, 
especially among the young (two- thirds of the officially unemployed 
were 25 or younger). The public blamed the structural adjustment pro-
gram imposed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and France for the situation, and Senegal’s political parties exploited 
public sentiment in order to build voter support. Then, in February 
1988, the young urban unemployed took to the streets in violent ri-
ots and protest. . . . It soon became clear that existing government 
agencies and public enterprises would not be able to deliver such pro-
grams speedily and efficiently. Another type of agency was needed. . . .  
The World Bank and the government of Senegal worked closely to-
gether to find the solution that ultimately became agetip’s trade-
mark: delegated contract management. (World Bank 1997, 7)
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The first in a wave of similar projects in Africa funded by the World Bank, 
agetip became a key partner in the youth- based trash sector in the early 
1990s. A formal convention was signed in October 1995, ushering in the 
trash system that would replace that of sias (Chagnon 1996), and agetip 
was hailed as a success by the World Bank for being “lean and efficient” 
(1997, 16). By February 1996, the agency had executed more than 1,250 sub-
projects and created more than 19,000 “person- years” of employment (World 
Bank 1997, 14 – 15). These estimates included the 1,500 trash jobs “created” 
by the new system. During this time, the unit of organization at the local 
level continued to be registered community organizations (gies) and youth 
received only temporary- contract benefits and day- labor pay rates.12 As com-
pared with the previous system, in which the salaries often made up half of 
the total trash budget, the amount paid to the gies accounted for less than 
20 percent of the new budget (M. Diop, n.d., 99). The ability to minimize 
state expenditure, tap youth labor, and independently manage World Bank 
funding at the municipal level were key features of the system for Mayor 
Diop as he fought to enhance his power vis- à- vis the national state through 
the trash sector (see chapter 1).
Through its official ngo- like organization, agetip was intended to avoid 
the politicization that was seen as running rampant in the public sector. 
And yet, doling out new jobs was explicitly based around a political calculus. 
Beyond the strategy to diffuse the increasingly mobilized youth and engage 
them as a low- cost, flexible labor force, formalizing Set/Setal provided a di-
rect forum for the mayor to rally political support. Participants remember 
the Journées de Propreté as overt Socialist Party political rallies. The youth 
understood that Diop was recruiting people directly for his political elector-
ate. One current zone controller from the Niari Tali neighborhood remem-
bered the period as follows:
You had to do politics, by force. I remember it very well, there were ce-
lebrities, I think it was a French senator, and we were required to go to 
the welcome event. If not, you’d be fired that day. Because the system 
had become purely political. . . . It was politically motivated because if 
you wanted to be a part of the system, you had to be a Socialist first. . . .  
They gave us Socialist Party T- shirts, or else you wouldn’t be paid at 
the end of the month. . . . So even if you were affiliated with another 
party, you had to follow this rule to stay in the system.
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Workers had their identification cards collected by their sector leaders, who 
had to show them to the politicians to prove that they were filling recruit-
ment quotas for the Socialist Party. The formalization of Set/Setal thus func-
tioned directly to reward and recruit new Socialist Party members from the 
ranks of the youth.
As the previous quote suggests, however, this political calculus was not 
just about votes; it was also about Mayor Diop’s philosophy and image, both 
at home and abroad. Diop was a celebrity politician who as mayor was very 
active in international development dialogues and networks. He mobilized 
the Set/Setal – based trash system as an important demonstration of his 
commitment to youth and to an ideal of participatory citizenship — two is-
sues that were taking center stage in debates about African development 
and democracy. When interviewed for this research, Diop went so far as 
to repudiate the idea that the movement was at all grassroots and claimed 
to have invented Set/Setal himself. He said, “No, it wasn’t spontaneous; it 
was generated, part of our plan. I was elected mayor and there was garbage 
everywhere in Dakar and we didn’t have the financial means. After some 
reflection, I said to myself, why not engage the population [of Dakar]? We 
went down to the neighborhoods and discussed it with the youth. They each 
started to clean their own neighborhood. It’s like that that it began. It was 
deliberate.” He went on to pronounce the participatory system as the ideal 
system through which to clean the city and engage its residents. He critiqued 
the formalized system that followed on its heels: “[Today’s workers are] sim-
ple employees! Whereas, the idea behind Set/Setal was voluntary participa-
tion. It was the people that came to participate. The new system makes it 
so that the workers are paid by the month and that’s the spirit now. You no 
longer feel the engagement of the people, but before, in the neighborhoods, 
the people got together on Saturday and Sunday to clean. The youth now are 
paid . . . formalized . . . it’s not good.”
Mayor Mamadou Diop won some acclaim in international development 
circles through the new trash system. In a “best practice” case study for a 
prominent international ngo, the system was credited with “beginning to 
restore healthy and sanitary conditions . . . It has already increased garbage 
collection coverage by 15 percent, created approximately fifteen hundred 
jobs, and proven to be more efficient than systems in the past” (iclei 1997). 
It was also celebrated for its remedy of a “major weakness” of the previous 
system: the lack of engagement by local people (M. Diop, n.d.). The system 
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even gained Diop and some of his most active youth notoriety in various in-
ternational conferences. One trash worker from Médina looked back fondly 
on his experience as part of a youth delegation at the Global Forum on the 
theme of “Cities and Sustainable Development,” held in Manchester in June 
1994: “[The system] even won us medals at the national and international 
levels! We were knighted with the National Merit Badge. Me, I remember, 
I did England — Manchester — with the Global Forum . . . just to talk about 
the [youth- based trash] system!”13
In his memoir written about his experience as mayor, My Combat for Da-
kar, Diop (n.d., 70) hails the Set/Setal trash system as one of the most “ex-
ceptional and exemplary” accomplishments of the city of Dakar under his 
leadership. He also describes it as a key strategy toward “the construction 
of democratic urbanism,” rooted in principles of decentralization, good gov-
ernance, and community participation. In my interviews with Diop in the 
late 2000s, he waxed nostalgic about the system, calling it his greatest pride 
as mayor and insisting that the issues of youth and environment were — and 
remain — concerns close to his heart. He compared his Set/Setal system with 
the more formalized system under Wade with dismay, emphasizing the more 
communal approach as not just more budget savvy, but also an opportunity 
to draw on and foster urban civility:
Well, now they [the Wade government] pay a lot [to clean the city]. For 
me, with 200 million [cfa] per month I managed to clean the city and 
the region [of Dakar]. And now they are almost to a billion [cfa] and 
it is not clean. Thus beyond even the system of management, there 
is the participation of the population and their cleanliness — cleaning 
[the city] starts there. People . . . have to do their share of cleaning, to 
be engaged in maintaining the communal areas. You clean your house 
but you throw your refuse in the street — that isn’t good! It should 
be understood that one must be clean but also that one must also 
take part in management of the street. It is a whole new behavior — 
 the education of the citizen. It is important because here it is said that 
the municipality has to deal with it. . . . That’s not the case.
Urban infrastructure was, for Diop, to be much more than just a technical 
system. It was to be a social system built on an entrepreneurial moral urban 
politics.
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Ordering Youth
Intimate Infrastructures
The advent of participation in the garbage sector was about more than bud-
getary constraints or a simple calculus for how to shore up party votes. The 
participatory trash sector aimed to foster a whole new ethic of citizenship 
through building a more intimate infrastructure. The intimacy of that new 
infrastructural system seized upon the moral urban politics that had ani-
mated Set/Setal and claimed those resources for the city. It forged a public 
service in which the resources previously supplied by the state were to be 
mobilized by workers, families, and communities. The rest of this chapter 
aims to flesh out how that transition was lived, experienced, and embodied 
by the young people caught up in that new infrastructural system — or how 
it was forged through social relations of belonging and their moral architec-
tures. It begins with the transition from Set/Setal to the participatory trash 
system, and carries through the precarious years that followed under Ab-
doulaye Wade before the workers were able to reverse these trends through 
labor organizing.
Transitioning from cleaning up their neighborhood trash voluntarily as 
part of an exciting youth- driven movement to being paid low wages as the 
city’s trash collectors was not automatic. As mentioned above, the Set/Se-
tal activists had mobilized their communities in an explicit rebuke of the 
state in the wake of the political crisis of 1988. Fed up with what they saw 
as the neglect by politicians of the real needs of their communities and dis-
appointed in the failure of the opposition party in the elections of 1988, these 
youth had rallied communal support in an exercise in self- management and 
autonomy from the state. Although most were relieved to have access to 
employment, even at day- labor rates, it took significant effort for them to 
reconcile the shift from activist to trash worker — especially for young men. 
This group of social juniors had to contend with not only poor salaries and 
dangerously precarious working conditions but also all of the negative asso-
ciations of dirty labor.
Because the new trash collection force was built upon the Set/Setal move-
ment, which was a cosmopolitan movement that drew from all sectors of 
Dakar’s social sphere, this cross section of upstanding, even educated youth 
had never dreamed of working in garbage as their profession. The trash 
workers before them had been considered outsiders, not true Dakarois. As 
a trash- sector leader put it: “Before us this work was often done by people 
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who were not Senegalese. In the beginning it was the Bambaras . . . then 
the Toukouleurs. . . . In the beginning, no one [in Dakar] wanted to do it be-
cause it was seen as unclean and unhealthy to work with trash.” In his view, 
the sias workers were not even Senegalese citizens, let alone Dakarois, by 
virtue of the fact that they came from other regions of the country. At that 
time, garbage work was extremely negatively viewed, with garbage collec-
tors described derogatorily as buujumaan14 and seen as crazy, dirty, or even 
criminals.
Most young men I interviewed talked about being embarrassed at first 
when they began to work in the sector. They covered their faces to avoid 
being recognized and some refused to work in their own neighborhoods. 
These were notable differences from the time of Set/Setal when, in a spirit 
of patriotic civic duty, anyone and everyone contributed to cleaning their 
own neighborhoods. Getting paid — however little — to be a trash worker 
was altogether different, as recalled by one trash worker in the Médina 
neighborhood:
It was not at all certain that the youth of Dakar would accept working 
in household garbage. That was the first challenge. When we signed 
the first contract, they asked everyone there to come work in the trash 
sector. Well, there were some who accepted and others who refused. 
Among those who accepted, there were those who hid their face in or-
der to be able to do trash work. Because this was not a job for a youth! 
At that time, for youth, this was really not an acceptable job. They had 
girlfriends, neighbors, and everyone . . . it was out of the question to 
collect trash where you lived. If you lived in the Médina, you would 
prefer to collect trash in Grand Dakar. If you lived in Grand Dakar, 
you went to Pikine. This was to protect these guys. But after some 
time, the youth saw that this was a job like any other job and there 
was nothing to hide. So, there was a revolution. At a certain point, all 
of the youth wanted to work in garbage.
The term youth, in this passage, refers to young men and the particular im-
plications of working in the new municipal trash system for the young men 
of Set/Setal. However, this stigma was different for women than men, due 
to cultural associations of domestic cleaning duties as women’s work, as will 
be discussed in the next section.
As much as youth were, at first, suspicious of the state’s involvement, it 
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lent legitimacy to their work from the perspective of community members, 
and they couldn’t help but be proud to be key players in the big production of 
the Journées de Propreté. The mayor himself made frequent personal visits 
to these events, and he often provided the youth with snacks, sound sys-
tems playing popular music, and T- shirts, in addition to brooms and wheel-
barrows. Competitions were held and rewards given for the cleanest neigh-
borhood at the end of the day. Mayor Diop constantly appealed to youth’s 
responsibility toward their city and the value of their entrepreneurial spirit. 
In the end, the excitement surrounding the events and the sheer pressure 
young men felt to exploit the opportunity for work to support their families 
amid conditions of economic crisis outweighed the work’s stigma. The op-
portunity to gain some political voice and connections through the sector, 
despite their fears from 1988, moreover, was a compelling reason to stay in 
the sector and watch what would unfold.
Wearing the Pants
“That day was one of my first days on the job. The mayor had brought in some 
trucks and we were doing the collection. I wore pants that day, so I could 
climb onto the truck. My family saw me leave the house and said, ‘What . . . ?’ 
But I just left. That day I rode on the top of that truck all the way to Mbeu-
beuss [the dump]. Was I scared? Yes, but I was also proud.” This quote is from 
a woman who was one of hundreds who, in the early 1990s, donned trousers 
and baseball caps and, in plain view of their shocked families and friends, 
climbed onto garbage trucks in order to collect their neighborhood trash. 
An integral element of Set/Setal, these women were transformed alongside 
young male activists into the city’s low- paid trash collection force.
In most zones, early on in the new system, women trash workers did ex-
actly the same tasks as men, including riding on the trash trucks for the col-
lection. At first, the trucks were open top, not the rear- opening conventional 
trucks we associate with the job today. Many women were wearing pants for 
the first time in public, a nontraditional style of female dress that enabled 
them to more easily conduct the work (especially mounting the trucks), but 
which could have been controversial at the time. Wearing pants, baseball 
caps, and gloves, armed with shovels, rakes, and whatever other scant mate-
rials were provided, these women were, according to my respondents, quite a 
sight to see out in the public space. The following account from another trash 
worker who eventually became a section manager is illustrative:
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At the beginning, people watched us and were surprised to see us work-
ing in the sector as women and exclaimed: “That one’s a woman!” It’s 
only because of my earrings that they recognized me, because I would 
wear sunglasses and a head wrap, then on top of it a baseball cap and 
all of that with the goal of protecting myself from the dust. With this 
outfit, it was difficult for people to distinguish the sex of the worker. 
Before, the men had a complex and were bothered about working in 
trash, but with the integration of women, that disappeared. Eventu-
ally, I felt proud when I climbed onto the trash- collecting truck with 
my work clothes on. Even more than all of that, there was a sort of 
unity and complicity between us, the workers of Parcelles Assainies. 
We didn’t have a complex about the work — that really was more of a 
problem for the men.
A pioneering group of women in the central Dakar neighborhood of 
Gueule Tapée earned the nickname Les Amazones (The Amazons) from their 
colleagues for their strength and fearless dedication to their new jobs. When 
I spoke with these women, they recalled with intense pride the new radical 
spaces they had occupied and their mastery of these material practices. Con-
trasting trash labor with another form of stigmatized, “dirty” labor outside 
of the home — prostitution — they emphasized on countless occasions the up-
standing moral qualities of “earning their bread with the sweat of their brow” 
and how much it meant to them to be able to work to support their fami-
lies. Les Amazones of Gueule Tapée were often invoked many years later as 
key personalities in the sector’s exceptional origin story. As such, women 
workers defended their foundational contributions toward building the new 
garbage system.
Despite the radical nature of some of their new labor practices, women’s 
participation in Set/Setal and transition into the participatory trash sector 
was facilitated by their connections to domestic waste management and 
the stigma associated with dirty work. In contrast to their male compatri-
ots, who had not previously borne the brunt of associations with waste, for 
women the job was not a new or mysterious one. They dealt with household 
garbage every day and were accustomed to the stigma of the work. In the 
words of a male section manager:
The people closest to this problem are women. These are the same 
women who sweep15 at home so they don’t have any complexes about 
trash. A man who sweeps, well, that’s rare. In general, it’s women. It 
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was difficult [to get the men to work], but we succeeded all the same 
in getting rid of their complexes to have them work in the system. Now 
each day there are people [including men] who come to see if they can 
work in the trash sector.
As can be seen in this and many similar accounts, in the beginning, 
women were much less ashamed of working in trash publicly than men. In 
contrast with men’s embarrassment about being recognized in their commu-
nities, women had no qualms — they were often the first to climb onto the 
trucks and refused to hide their identities.
One of my respondents in the Parcelles Assainies neighborhood, Aissatou, 
had started working in the new trash sector through her local youth group 
in 1992. With a small baby at home, she joined the sector in the hopes that it 
would help her to care for her family since she had quit school and couldn’t 
find work. Sixteen years later on the job, she recalled how proud she had 
been at the beginning. Aissatou and her female colleagues, moreover, had 
quickly understood how important their work was to the effectiveness of 
the overall system. She described how their participation, alongside men, in 
the formalized trash system actually encouraged the men, dampening their 
embarrassment and enhancing community acceptance:
At the beginning, we [women] were separated and placed as surveyors 
[on the ground]. . . . Then after a while, we noticed that the people 
acted differently toward women and men [collectors]. We decided that 
it was necessary to put a woman in each truck as a “security guard” 
to do the collection with the men. . . . Because if a woman who came 
to dump her garbage saw another woman in the truck, she would re- 
examine her behavior compared with how she would have acted with 
men. By this time male collectors were abused, tired. It was seen that 
integrating the women in the trucks was going to facilitate the work of 
the men. Thus, we became “security guards” and went with the trucks 
to Mbeubeuss [dump].
What’s interesting here is the sense of moral authority extended to Aissatou 
and her colleagues, owing to their perceived expertise around waste and 
cleaning. This expertise was called upon as an important resource for the 
new sector, to ensure its smooth running and forge the required intimacy 
with the communities served. Women’s “intrinsic” commitment to clean-
ing and authority over cleaning practices was thus constructed as a moral 
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architecture on which to build the participatory infrastructure. Their more 
intimate ties to their colleagues and to household women — the key interface 
between the home and street collection systems — would facilitate the com-
munity collaboration that was now at the heart of the new system. Drawing 
directly on the moral paradigms advanced by Set/Setal, the new trash system 
employed community policing and collaboration as the fundamental grease 
to lubricate the system’s gears.
Gendered subjectivities deeply shaped trash workers’ perceptions and ex-
periences of the new material labor practices and community spaces mobi-
lized by these jobs. For men, although their participation in Set/Setal clean-
ing activities was legitimized because it was seen as an altruistic deed for 
their communities, the implications of the work changed with its profession-
alization. Once they were paid, they faced the stigma attached to being a 
trash worker and doing the dirty work — in all of its feminized connotations. 
As we shall see in chapter 4, men have demanded respect for their trash la-
bors in the difficult years to follow through explicitly defending the work’s 
value in religious terms. For women, conversely, the professionalization of 
Set/Setal actually enhanced their standing because of its lack of gender dif-
ferentiation: they did all of the same tasks as men did and got paid for it. In 
this respect, their occupation of the same roles as men, and the relatively 
equal consideration of their labor in relation to men’s, can be seen to have 
appreciated the value of women’s cleaning labor in the period following Set/
Setal. The system acted as a platform for women to occupy new roles as fi-
nancial breadwinners, often for the first time, and to extend their domain 
of moral authority into the public sphere.
Women seized the trash jobs in order to expand their economic and po-
litical influence. By the 1990s, though there remained significant barriers 
to women’s participation and power in the political process, they had made 
important headway in gaining visibility and representation.16 In the con-
text of increased electoral competition in the 1990s, women were becom-
ing increasingly important as voters and political activists and their neigh-
borhood associations had become a dynamic forum for mobilizing voters 
and placing specific interests on the political agenda (Beck 2003; Callaway 
and Creevey 1994; Creevey 1996; Gellar 2005). Through funneling the early 
trash- collection activities into political rallies centered on neighborhood as-
sociations and offering the trash jobs as a form of political patronage, Mayor 
Diop aimed to transform women activists into political clients and thereby 
update the image of the local state. Though some described the recruitment 
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of women — and women’s organizations — at these rallies as more for their 
“applause” and votes than their leadership, in other areas they were key lead-
ers. In certain neighborhoods, women’s associations were the central body 
around which the trash collecting activities were managed and their leaders 
the new sector’s on- the- ground coordinators. The Set/Setal – based trash sys-
tem thus enhanced women’s visibility and provided them with what seemed 
to be a direct entrée into politics. In exchange for their participation in these 
political rallies, women received jobs in the shrinking public sector, a public 
forum for their activities, and, in theory, access to the mayor’s office.
The particular history of women’s emergence in the trash sector makes 
clear the paradoxical spaces that may be opened up by participatory infra-
structural systems. On the one hand, it shows that discourses naturalizing 
gendered responsibility for dirty work can be deployed to further entrench 
women into dirty forms of labor built upon naturalized connections to waste 
and impurity.17 At the same time, it shows how women’s connection to waste 
is reconstituted in different settings, allowing them to gain some political 
voice within this strategic essentialism. Women’s connection to cleaning in 
the home facilitated their role as key participants in a gender- radical move-
ment through which they seized on new modes of engaging with the city. 
This challenges the historical legacy of Set/Setal as a male youth movement 
and raises some key questions as to where young women fit into understand-
ings of youth politics in Senegal and beyond.18 The trash case thus illustrates 
the complex implications of the simultaneous liberalization of the economic 
and political fields during this time and the shifting terrain on which young 
men and women are constituted as political subjects. The gendered implica-
tions of the crisis of social reproduction and the extension of domestic “life’s 
work” (Meehan and Strauss 2015; Mitchell, Marston, and Katz 2004) into 
the public sphere through participatory labor can condition the production 
of new, sometimes surprising, political subjectivities.
The next section will examine what the advent of participatory waste 
infrastructure has meant for the bodies of laborers doing the dirty work over 
the long period of entrenched precarity that was to last into the mid- 2000s.
Salvage Bricolage
The participatory trash sector instituted by Mayor Mamadou Diop contin-
ued until the early 2000s, when a new mayor came to power with the wave 
of gains by the opposition party that brought Abdoulaye Wade into the presi-
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dency. The trash collection system at the heart of Mayor Diop’s municipal 
government was eliminated, beginning a long series of transformations in 
the institutional arrangements for garbage over the next decade. Though 
some improvements accrued for the workers in certain areas during this 
time, most continued to suffer under extremely precarious working condi-
tions that had become even more acute as the collection equipment finally 
faltered in the face of increased urban growth, consumption, and discard. 
This period of politicking and neglect solidified trash work as a space of 
formalized bricolage19 which conditioned new but often risky relationships 
between garbage bricoleurs (residents and workers), and the waste systems 
they managed.
Aside from a brief “golden era” from 2003 to 2005, when the workers 
were officially hired and extended benefits by the international company 
ama, their labor was again rendered temporary and insecure when Wade 
revoked the contract in July 2006. During the early to mid- 2000s, the trash 
workers began to organize through their union and vociferously demand bet-
ter working conditions through strikes and other measures to get the state’s 
attention. By the time I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork in 2007 – 8, the 
system’s dysfunction was acute and most people were characterizing the 
trash sector as in crisis. Though increasingly more organized and audacious 
with their striking, the workers found themselves in a state of limbo as their 
cries fell on deaf ears. No new equipment had been provisioned for some 
time and no new workers were hired, despite Dakar’s explosive growth. Ev-
eryone, including the workers and the residents, found themselves waiting 
for what would come next.
Neighborhood Disorder
Much of the burden of insufficient waste services fell onto household mem-
bers, as the relations of social reproduction were respatialized and the every-
day duties constituting life’s work were placed more firmly on neighborhoods 
and, especially, household women. I spent a lot of time during this period 
chatting with women about how they managed with spotty collection caused 
by the system’s insufficiencies and the workers’ strikes that were becoming 
increasingly frequent. I found household women across Dakar to be intensely 
preoccupied with the vexing daily question of where their waste would go. 
They were eager to talk to me about garbage and the elaborate systems they 
had developed to mitigate the risks it could pose to their families. Manag-
ing household garbage is a thorny task in Senegal that is exacerbated by its 
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composition, the warm Senegalese climate, and most households’ inability 
to afford or access adequate storage and disposal materials. In contrast to 
the garbage of more affluent countries, which is primarily composed of pa-
per, plastics, and other nonputrescent items, garbage in Senegal comprises a 
significant amount of organic matter such as fish guts, animal entrails, and 
plant refuse, which can get rank and dangerous fast.
The specific content of everyday garbage varies by neighborhood and by 
the socioeconomic profile of the community, but richer households in Da-
kar generally produce a greater volume of garbage overall and their garbage 
contains more paper and plastic. For poorer families, everything of possi-
ble value is reused. Plastic water bottles become containers in which to sell 
homemade juices like bissap and bouye.20 Newspapers can be used to wrap 
fattaya (fried fish or meat fritters) or as starter for old- fashioned cooking 
stoves. Organics may be separated out for domestic animals or urban live-
stock. The cost- conscious will choose glass soda bottles over cans and return 
them for a deposit. Most households struggle to dispose of a few problem 
items like used cooking oil and ash from charcoal stoves. Big families and 
those butchering their own chickens and goats have particular challenges. 
Meticulous sweeping practices — in the daily battle to keep the encroach-
ing Sahelian sand from dusting salons and messing neat courtyards — mean 
that a considerable amount of refuse is simply sand. Though sand can help 
to slow the stench and rate of decomposition when mixed with organics, 
garbage sacks can become heavy fast and damage compactors, frustrating 
the disposal process.
In times past, accumulating garbage could simply be kept at a distance 
from the house so as not to pose a nuisance, but Dakar’s increasing density 
and vertical growth have made this a less viable means of storing trash un-
til the next collection day. Most families cannot afford trash bags or cans 
and instead use materials such as baskets, rice sacks, plastic bins, or flimsy 
plastic grocery bags to transport the waste to its storage place or the arriv-
ing truck. In most neighborhoods, the custom is not to leave the garbage in 
anonymous piles for later collection by the trucks but involves the storage of 
garbage by households and a handoff between household members (usually 
young women) and collectors on pickup day (see figure 2.4). This is a key 
building block of the intimacy in the sector: collectors and residents know 
each other personally and often communicate at the moment of collection. 
Trucks signal their route with loud, rhythmic honking as they slowly move 
through the neighborhood. Breakdowns, traffic, and other unforeseen cir-
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cumstances make their arrival time unpredictable, and so “catching” the 
garbage truck on its rounds becomes a key challenge of accessing disposal 
services. If a household misses the horn for some reason, this could mean 
waiting a few more days before the truck comes again. In tough times with 
little service, it was not unusual to see young women chasing trucks out of 
desperation, with garbage in tow. After periods of trash crisis and striking, 
the rhythmic honking offered strange relief to exhausted residents at their 
wits’ end over what to do with their waste.
In theory, the garbage truck is supposed to make the collection rounds 
approximately five to six times a week. In practice, during the dysfunction of 
the Wade years, the truck would only pass through certain neighborhoods a 
couple of times a week and, in the case of workers’ strikes or vehicle break-
F I G U R E  2 . 4 .  The point of collection in sicap Liberté 1. Signaled by the honking of the 
garbage truck, household women hand over their household trash in reusable buckets 
or bags to collectors who deposit the waste into the truck. Photo courtesy J. W., 2017.
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down, sometimes not for a week or more. With reduced service, household 
women were forced to resort to less- than- optimal strategies to eliminate the 
waste and protect their families from pollution, including reducing, storing, 
burying, or dumping their garbage. A favorite solution from times past, bury-
ing had become less and less tenable as appropriate land diminished and, 
in many neighborhoods, as flooding became more frequent due to unusual 
rain and urban development patterns. In many cases, storing and burying 
in backyards precipitated intense friction between neighbors and argu-
ments over property lines. Dumping was often people’s only way to rid their 
homes of garbage. They had the option of finding dumping spots or paying 
private charette (horse- cart) operators to dump their garbage out of sight. 
Enterprising charette drivers flocked into Dakar from rural farming areas 
during garbage crises and charged sometimes 10,000 cfa (roughly twenty 
U.S. dollars) or more to a single household to cart away a load of garbage. 
During this time, empty lots, sewage canals, beaches, and roadsides were 
increasingly used as dumping grounds and the poorest neighborhoods be-
came the most encumbered by garbage and its insidious risks. Market spaces 
were particularly problematic. Street markets — whether for clothing, food, 
or other items — are high- density refuse- generating events. The trash from 
street peddling and intense pedestrian traffic builds up and, by the end of 
market day, clogs already- hard- to- navigate sidewalks and city streets. The pe-
riodic trash crises left many spaces of the city littered and foul- smelling, pe-
riodically subjecting certain residents to the noxious consequences of waste, 
pollution, and disease.21
The infrastructural solutions developed by households were highly cre-
ative and well calibrated to the “toxic vitality” of waste (P. Harvey 2016). 
One woman named Mariama with whom I spoke at length about her waste- 
management challenges in the neighborhood of hlm Fass described herself 
as “obsessed with trash! I’m constantly thinking about what we’ll do next, 
where it will go, and how we can stay clean.” A fifty- five- year- old mother 
who ran a small vegetable stand, Mariama had three daughters who helped 
her to manage the household garbage. Their humble, two- bedroom home 
had been built in 1962 as affordable housing for civil servants. Though they 
were lucky enough to own the property, she and her husband had never been 
in the financial position to expand the house, and lived there with their six 
grown children and occasional other relatives. Like most of the working- 
class families in their increasingly dense neighborhood, the living quarters 
were cramped. With this many mouths to feed and progressively less and less 
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outdoor space, trash management was a worrisome daily challenge. When I 
asked her what they did when the trash truck didn’t come, she didn’t hesitate 
before giving me a day- to- day rundown:
On the first day, we separate out the rice, vegetables, and banana peels 
and feed these to the goat. For the fish remains, we lay them out in the 
sun on plastic bags to dry out. The second day, we wrap up the old fish 
remains and bag it with the sand and plastics swept from the house. 
They sit out in the back, where there are no windows on the house. Day 
three gets harder because the bag begins to stink and we’ve already got 
many more remains piling up. Then we tie up the garbage again if we 
have enough plastic bags and move it out under the neighbor’s tree. 
Usually my neighbors are doing the same by that time but we have to 
make sure it’s OK. If we get to day four or five, then we’re really in trou-
ble and have to think about where to dump without making anyone 
mad. It’s hard work for my girls because sometimes they have to walk 
far and often people yell at them. The saga begins again the next day 
until, finally, word gets around that the truck is coming. Alhamdulillah 
[thanks be to God].
Mariama’s finely tuned strategies were aimed, in essence, at slowing, sti-
fling, or boxing the dangerous internal processes of waste’s decomposition. 
The longer the strike, the more unruly and difficult- to- control these ordinary 
waste materials became.
Neighborhood women were also well attuned to the challenges faced by 
the garbage workers. Since the system’s founding in Set/Setal, many trash 
workers still collected their own neighbors’ garbage. Years of dealing with 
insufficient materials, remuneration, and service had inspired detailed co-
ordinating systems between households and trash collectors in many neigh-
borhoods. Many workers would give their communities advance warning be-
fore the truck passed or warn them about breakdowns. To ease the struggle 
with collection delays, neighborhoods and workers would sometimes agree 
on collective dumping spots that the truck would pass as soon as it was up 
and running. Given the relationships between workers and their neighbor-
hoods and an awareness of the difficulties faced by the workers, residents 
were often keen to support the workers in whatever way they could. At the 
least, this meant coordinating with the workers so as to smooth the collec-
tion process; at the most, it meant expressing solidarity with the workers’ 
strike campaigns through coordinated dumping events (see chapter 4). The 
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respatialization and devolution of life’s work, in this way, can be seen to have 
precipitated more intimate management relations between households and 
their waste, as well as more intimate ties between waste workers and the 
families they served.
Formal Bricoleurs
The garbage workers faced profoundly precarious working conditions during 
this time. Years of institutional wrangling, poor salaries, and degrading equip-
ment quickly dashed the optimism and enthusiasm they had felt at the dawn 
of the new system. Those who found other opportunities quickly got out, but 
most workers had little choice but to continue to collect garbage for what 
little opportunity it still represented, a professed “love of garbage,” and an 
avowed commitment to keeping their communities clean. The period from 
2005 – 9 was particularly grueling. In the face of rapid urbanization and, 
with it, a massive expansion of the city and its garbage challenges, com-
bined with an institutional management vacuum that left the sector para-
lyzed, they found themselves laboring under increasingly difficult working 
conditions. Still without formal contracts or benefits (including health care, 
sick leave, and vacation), most workers cleaned streets and collected garbage 
with only minimal equipment, if any at all (see figure 2.5).
During the weeks in 2007 that I spent with the sweepers and collectors of 
the Niari Tali neighborhood, life’s normal challenges combined with delays 
in payment to make life extremely difficult for the sector’s twenty- odd work-
ers. Many workers lost their homes as a result of payment irregularities, and 
many spoke of strain and dislocation in their family lives due to the stresses 
on the job. One street sweeper, Ahmed, was evicted from his apartment be-
cause of late rent payments. With nowhere to live, his wife had moved back 
to the country with her parents while Ahmed slept on the floor of his cousin’s 
apartment. Unable to see his wife regularly and ridiculed by her family for 
not being a good provider, Ahmed’s marriage eventually failed and he found 
himself lonely and disgraced. When a gastric infection left him compro-
mised at work, he went further into debt, borrowing money from colleagues 
to see a doctor. He described his situation to me as “completely ordinary. We 
all live like this. What kind of existence is this?”
Workers’ basic pay had stagnated at around 60,000 cfa per month (about 
us$120 per month) in 2007. Combined with steadily increasing work bur-
dens, stigmatization, the rising cost of living in Dakar, and, for many, exten-
sive family obligations, they found themselves struggling to survive with no 
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means to envision their futures. Once celebrated as youth for their vitality, 
energy, and innovative citizenship practices, young men instead languished 
in their inability to graduate into adulthood. Unable to properly support their 
relatives and often powerless to establish their own homes and families, 
many felt trapped as social juniors, even though they may have been well 
into their thirties or forties.22 Ahmed and others believed, moreover, that 
the designation of youth had become a disciplinary ploy by the authorities 
to keep the sector informal and exploitative. He explained, with frustration: 
“Yes we are young and that makes us proud of our energy and ideas. But they 
use it as an excuse not to pay us normal wages!”
Many women also left the sector as soon as they got married or had 
children but a good proportion stayed in the system, with no other choice 
than to squeeze all the opportunity they could from these rare jobs (see 
figure 2.6). Though they had been transferred out of the more “physical” 
F I G U R E  2 . 5 .  A trash worker in Niari Tali during one of the long periods in 2007  
without pay. Author’s photo, 2007.
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duties — like collecting on the trucks — into street sweeping, women workers 
faced particular strains throughout this precarious period due to such chal-
lenges as lack of bathroom access and child care. Their positions, moreover, 
became increasingly insecure as the jobs became more sought after with 
the progressive deterioration of the job market in Dakar. Women workers’ 
perceived inferiority as household breadwinners was sometimes invoked to 
legitimize replacing them with men. Quite in contrast to the legend of Les 
Amazones, at these moments women were described as being poorly suited 
to the tough demands of the work. As we shall see in chapter 3, the firing of 
all of the female trash workers in the neighborhood of Yoff during a round of 
downsizing was justified as making room for the “real” breadwinners: male 
heads of household. Soon after, these women were conscripted into a purely 
voluntary, ngo- led, horse- drawn- cart trash- collection experiment that was 
framed through a discourse of empowerment.
F I G U R E  2 . 6 .  Women trash workers from the Niari Tali neighborhood at their usual 
hangout in the median. Author’s photo, 2007.
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The material practices of the degraded labor process mattered profoundly 
for the bodies of the workers doing the dirty work. They bore the brunt of 
this labor- intensive infrastructure through the onerous physical demands of 
the work itself, associated diseases (including injury, heat exhaustion, and 
illness from exposure to microbes), and the stigma of laboring in filth. Most 
wore tattered work clothes and open- toed shoes like plastic “jelly” sandals, 
and many gathered garbage with their bare hands. Generally lacking pro-
tective clothing like masks and gloves and provisioned only with minimal 
instruments of collection like brooms and wheelbarrows, the workers stood 
vulnerable to an array of harms. An outbreak of tuberculosis in 2007 was 
but one dramatic expression of their disproportionate burdens of disease.
Both male and female workers faced the challenges of poor, degrading 
equipment and the incessant maintenance activities they required. The ma-
terial intimacy between filth and labor actualized not just the relations be-
tween households and bodies, but also those between workers and the ma-
chines they depended on. The central pillar of the material technology was 
the garbage truck, but the trucks were a precariously weak link in the chain. 
Many, if not most, trucks arrived in Senegal from Europe used and already 
in disrepair, and once put to work in Senegal they faced the wear and tear 
caused by poor roads, lack of maintenance, and overcharged loads. One look 
at the collection fleet illuminated the serious challenges posed by this rick-
ety, dilapidated material scaffolding (see figure 2.7).23 At any point in time, at 
least a third of the collection fleet was broken down, and many of the trucks 
were used despite not being fully functional. The disintegration of the in-
frastructure’s steel precipitated incessant expert labors of salvage bricolage.
Like bricoleurs all over the continent, the workers had no choice but to 
transform someone else’s rubbish infrastructure into new utility. These 
material practices signaled the ingenuity required by incessant relations of 
maintenance, fixing, and making do — as well as their inherent dangers (see 
Graham and Thrift 2007; Mavhunga 2013b). From tinkering with or dis-
abling the mechanical arms and crushers to physically maneuvering broken 
mechanical parts, the collectors were infrastructure hackers, navigating and 
manipulating the system’s steel architecture through fastening their own 
bodies to the trucks’ dysfunctional steel plates. The bodies and the machines 
conformed to each other’s labor as the workers employed their own arms 
as artificial limbs for the ailing trucks. The dangers of such intimacy were 
cleanly written on the bodies of the collectors and their scars, bruises, even 
missing limbs.
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Amadou and Saliou had worked together as collectors in the Grand Yoff 
neighborhood for some time when I met them in 2007. They were experts 
in the particularities of the route, the “mentalities” of the people in the 
neighborhood, and they were no strangers to the strenuous and sometimes 
dangerous conditions of working with broken- down old trucks. They knew 
where people dumped, the homes with potentially the most- valuable ma-
terials, and the ever- present risks posed by the trash compactors. Amadou 
told a sobering story of one day when the compactor malfunctioned just as 
they had finished loading a large pile of garbage left from the weekly market. 
The machine jerked unexpectedly as it compressed a bag that apparently 
contained a broken lamp, shattering the glass and spraying it at Amadou. 
He turned away as soon as he could but not before a large shard embedded 
in his arm. The blood was everywhere. Not wanting to leave Saliou to finish 
the route on his own, he kept collecting but by the time the day was over, 
F I G U R E  2 . 7.  A trash worker in Niari Tali who detailed many of the challenges he faced 
working with rickety equipment. Author’s photo, 2007.
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his arm was throbbing and swollen. Amadou eventually had his uncle re-
move the shards and bandage the arm but he couldn’t afford to see a doctor. 
Though Amadou was back at work the next day, Saliou did all the heavy 
lifting and through teamwork they were able to get through the difficult pe-
riod. “I was lucky,” he said, when he showed me the scar. “God spared me.” 
These conditions of salvage bricolage illuminate the intersecting precarities 
of labor and infrastructure. Infrastructural systems devolved onto labor can 
be downright hazardous for workers’ bodies but can also be imperiled by 
their reliance on labor. The more advanced the state of decay of these steel 
technologies, the more precarious their intersections with working bodies. 
Though much of their lives were spent contending with the difficult ma-
terial practices of the actual collection, an even larger slice of workers’ daily 
lives was spent simply waiting. When I visited workers on the job during 
the tumultuous 2007 – 8 union battle for recognition by the state, they were 
stuck in a state of limbo. Having been again rendered temporary laborers 
under the management of a confusing set of institutional power- sharing 
agreements, they dreamt of any change that could improve their daily lot. 
But in the end, nothing had happened for years. So, they waited and waited. 
No equipment and often no pay meant little incentive and sometimes not 
even the means to work, but they needed to stick around to make sure their 
precarious jobs didn’t disappear.
When I interviewed the team in Niari Tali, the workers had not received 
their salary for several weeks. Each day, the team dutifully showed up for 
work, swept the streets, and did the household collection, but it was hard not 
to wonder if the work was futile. They bided their time sitting on benches 
and mats in the shade provided by trees in the large, sandy median between 
the parallel roads that are the center of the neighborhood (niari tali means 
“two roads”). Here, the workers blended in with the other human threads 
of this dense urban fabric. Many people walking by on their way to work, 
the market, or a family visit took no notice of the parked trash truck or the 
chatty workers as they debated the merits of union strategy or simply dis-
cussed the daily news. Other people accustomed to sharing the space with 
the workers — like the used- refrigerator salesman who waited patiently for 
someone to buy one of his old machines, the taxi drivers who washed their 
cars in the median, and the various vendors also taking advantage of the 
shade — were all too aware of the workers’ plight. They checked in here and 
there for updates on the situation, always keen to offer their opinion.
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The Yoff trash workers had been lent an old abandoned building by a 
neighborhood association, which they transformed into an imaginative head-
quarters where they bided time in between shifts and held union meetings 
(see figure 2.8). With all manner of reclaimed objects meticulously placed 
about — mats to lay on, an old radio, a fan that limped along, an old map of 
the United States — it struck me as a kind of secret fort, a hideaway for those 
who knew something mysterious and special. Making tea in the shade, they 
passed the time chatting about local gossip and waiting for word from the 
union. Other sectors had less glamorous hangouts, squeezed on the side of 
the road or in empty lots with little shade. And the patience at being stuck 
in this state of “waithood” (Honwana 2012) was not universal. Mbaye from 
Médina summed it up as follows: “I can’t stand it anymore. What am I doing 
here but waiting? All I want is to do my job — to clean this city for the people 
who live here. Where is my dignity?” His words are a prescient commentary 
F I G U R E  2 . 8 .  Trash workers in Yoff during a strike. Author’s photo, 2007.
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on the temporal violences of “killing time” (Ralph 2008), waiting for life to 
happen. Injury, illness, strain, and boredom are but a few of the corporeal 
expressions of the lived effects of disrepair.24
Conclusions
Labor and infrastructure have become powerfully conjoined through the 
turn to labor- intensive, participatory waste infrastructures as a central pillar 
of governing practices in Dakar. This chapter has shown how the incessant 
political maneuvering charted in chapter 1 worked to unevenly distribute 
precarious, dirty work through infrastructures devolved onto labor. A close 
look at the micropolitics of these infrastructures illuminates “the complex 
and contingent ‘constructed- ness’ of technological systems” (Ferguson 2012, 
558). The socio- material technology at play here — community participation 
grounded in a moral paradigm of purity and architectures of belonging — 
emerged as a radical alternative to politics as usual in Set/Setal. These ver-
nacular expressions of participatory development were then transformed 
and harnessed in the interest of cheap, neoliberal urban management solu-
tions with explicit political utility for ambitious Dakar politicians. Just as 
new, advanced technologies reconfigure social relations, this history shows 
how gaps in infrastructure and the devolution to low- tech solutions also op-
erate as means of discipline and control.
New infrastructural formulas interface with communal identities and 
spaces to mobilize political subjectivities in novel ways. The labor of par-
ticipatory trash management illuminates the way that neoliberal rational-
ities of community and individual responsibility produce highly gendered 
and generational political subjectivities. Both young men and young women 
found themselves operating in new political spheres through novel material 
labor practices that reconfigured their positions within their communities. 
The formalization of Set/Setal into a participatory trash collection system 
diffused and domesticated the threat these young people had posed and 
placed them as pawns in a political battle between different politicians and 
echelons of government jockeying to control the urban space. In harnessing 
youth labor at meager rates through a moral discourse of participatory citi-
zenship, it offloaded the burdens of austerity more firmly onto community 
systems. And yet, the very same reliance upon belonging and intimate com-
munity relations was what, in the end, would nurture workers’ power when 
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they were to raise their heads again in the form of the trash-workers union 
(see chapter 4). Participatory trash management was, thus, a contradictory 
infrastructural arrangement: it enabled new spaces of citizenship while pro-
ducing and reinforcing other inequalities and power relations.
Beyond just trucks and the city dump, infrastructures of disposal com-
prise a complex ecology of material objects and human labor, tethered to-
gether through their affective registers and political actualities. The things, 
living bodies, and values that make up trash infrastructures operate as per-
formative vehicles of emergent agendas of technology, discipline, and re-
bellion, gaining force through their animation and interaction. In this set-
ting, the symbolic associations and material force of garbage intersect with 
human labor to order specific bodies and geographies. The force of garbage 
derives from its associations with waste, disposability, the opposite of value, 
and the impure, as well as its sticky material properties which vex those 
charged with its orderly disposal. The vitality of the decomposition process 
makes household garbage management especially risky during times of crisis 
but gives waste its power as a matter of rebellion (see chapter 4). Decaying 
machines, furthermore, can wreak havoc on the bodies of the bricoleurs 
charged with managing and disposing of garbage. Garbage illuminates the 
ways that material matters in its encounter with human bodies and the in-
tersecting precarities that are bred when infrastructures rely increasingly 
on laboring bodies.
A materialist reading of garbage politics in Dakar lays bare the contradic-
tions ushered forth in the era of austerity that can be deciphered in the urban 
landscape. In so doing, it contributes to an updated formulation of emergent 
geographies of “life’s work in crisis” that is attentive to bodies, spaces, and 
material social practices (Meehan and Strauss 2015; Mitchell, Marston, and 
Katz 2004). Participatory garbage management represents a formula of gov-
erning the city that is premised on tapping and respatializing relations of 
social reproduction. A focus on waste exposes the dirty, messy burdens this 
imposes on workers and how different bodies come to disproportionately 
shoulder these burdens. It thus allows us to see how neoliberal assemblages 
work through disposability, highlighting the full range of their material vio-
lences. Decay in physical infrastructures has precipitated an intricate ecol-
ogy of improvisational social systems and material practices premised upon 
intimacy between households, workers, waste, and machines of collection. 
The burdens of bricolage are borne — invisibly and visibly — on workers’ and 
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residents’ bodies in the scars, impurities, and stigmas they carry along. Dis-
card labor, as the animation of trash’s matter, crystallizes the values mani-
fested in structures of vulnerability. The next chapter will explore the inten-
sification of participatory infrastructures in the city’s outskirts and how this 
further displaced the burdens of dirty work onto gendered laboring bodies. 
three.  Technologies of Community
In the spring of 2003, the clogged transfer station for the Yoff community- 
based trash collection project had transformed into an enormous, unruly 
dépôt sauvage (garbage pile). The station was designed to link the project’s 
horse- drawn- cart collection to the municipal garbage trucks, but the co-
ordination of these two systems had failed miserably. Under the uncom-
promising West African sun, the stinking edifice of waste provided visceral 
testimony to all that had gone wrong with the neighborhood experiment in 
low- tech community trash collection infrastructure. It stood in dramatic 
contradistinction, moreover, to the celebratory representation of such proj-
ects in the ngo literature. In the end, because of its location on the road 
to Dakar’s airport, the clogged station was a politically untenable eyesore. 
When flocks of birds began swarming the pile and interfering with planes’ 
flight paths, the writing was on the wall. The national aviation authority 
stepped in to order the transfer station’s closure, thereby signaling the end 
to one chapter in Yoff’s participatory trash history. For the women who had 
been the central labor force comprising this infrastructure, its abrupt closure 
was bittersweet. On the one hand, it put an end to a contentious initiative 
that had starkly increased their dirty- labor burden and compromised their 
standing in the community. On the other hand, it dashed their hopes for the 
opportunities that might develop from their exemplary acts of “participatory 
citizenship.”
In the mid- to late 1990s, after the city’s municipal trash infrastructure 
had been devolved onto youth participation under Mayor Mamadou Diop’s 
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thumb, a different kind of community- based garbage collection sprang up in 
the city’s periphery.1 While the municipal garbage workers in Dakar were or-
ganizing to resist the devaluation of their labor at the hands of notions of par-
ticipatory citizenship, one of Senegal’s best- known ngos, enda,2 was spear-
heading new participatory experiments that devolved garbage infrastructure 
even more onto communities through disarticulating hard- to- reach neigh-
borhoods from the city’s collection system. Off- grid, neighborhood- based 
liquid- and solid- sanitation systems using small- scale alternative technolo-
gies were installed in place of the networked municipal trash and sanitation 
infrastructure. Consistent with global trends, the shrinking of the state with 
structural adjustment catalyzed an explosion of so- called third- sector ini-
tiatives aiming to fill the space in urban public services. Community- based 
development, led by ngos, was seen not just as more efficient but as more 
democratic and empowering for community members (World Bank 1989). 
This new paradigm governing urban policy interventions emphasized “tap-
ping the knowledge, resources, and capacities among the population within 
each city” toward bringing economic and social gains and reversing envi-
ronmental degradation (unchs 1996, 59). The enda community- based 
waste initiatives were a front- running sector in this wave of nonstate urban- 
management strategies and were widely hailed as “best practices” of partic-
ipatory urban governance in Africa.3
These ngo community waste projects represent a further adaptation of 
the urban labor question through infrastructure politics based on gener-
alizing women’s labor as communal, municipal labor. This chapter looks 
specifically at the material and sociopolitical technologies employed in the 
waste infrastructure built by the enda pilot community- based trash collec-
tion project in the Tonghor neighborhood of Dakar’s Yoff district. The lens 
of infrastructure allows for a nuanced exploration of these projects as com-
plex articulations that assemble multiple technologies differently in specific 
places and moments, paying special attention to material relationships. The 
analysis finds that the Yoff project produced an elitist, ethnicized image of 
community and that women were subjected to dirty- labor burdens as the 
vehicles of these new agendas. Overall, this led to a more disjointed and 
fragmented urban infrastructure in which garbage literally spilled out at 
the joints and the coherence of the local state was compromised. This chap-
ter further examines the social and material components of infrastructure 
while also contributing to critiques in development studies unpacking no-
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tions of community, participation, and empowerment in community- based 
development.
Infrastructures are not isolated material relationships but complex ecol-
ogies of different material, social, and bodily technologies that need to work 
locally to be integrated. The hallmark material scaffolding of community- 
based infrastructural systems is their low- tech, “appropriate” technology 
that is supposed to be more cost effective and attuned to local conditions and 
traditions. Consider enda’s technological vision for its low- tech sanitation 
projects in Dakar: “The new approach places technology at its proper level of 
human affairs; at the service of human beings, as a tool which they master, 
rather than a dominating alien force which they buy from other cultures at 
prices they cannot afford. The new approach seeks to establish a friendly, fa-
miliar technology that even poor people can afford and can control, and that 
can be replicated from community to community, creating new jobs, new 
skills, a new self- confidence and faith in the future” (Gaye and Diallo 1997, 
10). Though scholars of infrastructure are often preoccupied with more ad-
vanced, high technologies, regressive technological innovations that render 
infrastructures more primitive also introduce new forms of subjectification. 
From hand water pumps to bicycles to, in this case, horse- drawn carts, these 
technologies embody a romanticized yearning for a more sustainable devel-
opment path and a conception of developing societies as closer to nature and 
less technologically inclined. They also endeavor to render more “appropri-
ate” the promise of development and assure everything from self- confidence 
to community control to an end to “fatalistic attitude[s] and the mentality 
which expects the state to provide everything” (Gaye and Diallo 1997, 21).
Community- based development builds infrastructures animated, in par-
ticular, by labor and community. Often imagined as unproblematic sites of 
tradition and consensus, communities are produced through systems that 
harness the labor of specific members as participants and mobilize the “glue” 
of communal solidarity. In this way, labor and community can be under-
stood as technologies because they become the primary, innovative instru-
ments essential to infrastructure’s functionality. As a flexible technology 
that stems out of local histories and can adapt to the conditions at hand, 
labor is the key to operationalizing new infrastructures and powering their 
low- tech development visions. Labor, in turn, mobilizes the production of 
specific “images of community” (Li 1996). This chapter examines new con-
figurations of community- based trash collection in Yoff to emphasize how 
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labor is animated differently within distinct infrastructural systems. In com-
parison with chapter 2, we will see how women have come to represent a 
different technology within this system, in relation to the new, more “appro-
priate” material scaffolding of horse carts. As such, they become the vehicles 
driving new political agendas of community and novel political economies 
of development.
Shifting focus from the participatory municipal trash sector to the fully 
community- based waste sector exposes the further splintering of infrastruc-
ture and how it works through gendered bodies. Even more so than Dakar’s 
participatory municipal trash sector, the low- tech, off- grid waste systems in 
the periphery rendered women as infrastructure through extending their 
social- reproductive duties into the neighborhood space. Municipal garbage 
trucks, the material technology of the trash collection infrastructure, were 
replaced by horse- drawn carts and women’s laboring bodies. This anachro-
nistic technology conjured a scaled- down, small- is- beautiful aesthetic deemed 
more appropriate and green than grid- based collection. But appropriate 
to what vision of development, and green by what terms? This chapter is 
concerned with unpacking the new relations between actors implicated in 
these innovative infrastructural visions, namely ngos, “communities,” and 
women participants, while grappling with the implications of rendering 
women’s work and bodies infrastructural.
Like the flexibilization of the municipal trash sector, these new infra-
structural systems produced new visions of community and reconfigured 
“life’s work” by bringing people into the intimate management of their own 
and their neighbors’ waste (Meehan and Strauss 2015; Mitchell, Marston, 
and Katz 2004). Community- based waste- management projects, including 
the Yoff project, further displaced the burdens of neoliberal restructuring 
onto marginalized neighborhoods. Relying on free labor as a replacement for 
municipal garbage services while requiring the participation of local house-
holds via a user fee, the projects converted neighborhood garbage manage-
ment into an exclusively community- held responsibility and detached the 
public service from the local municipal governance structure. Consistent 
with the global rise of gender as a primart focus of development policy 
(R. Pearson 2005), the Yoff project enlisted poor women as its main partic-
ipants, underpinned by a discourse of gender empowerment. But it didn’t 
enlist just any women; some of the women selected had been fired from 
their jobs in Mayor Mamadou Diop’s municipal trash collection system (see 
chapter 2). These women were enlisted to be the neighborhood’s “munic-
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ipal housekeepers” (Miraftab 2004b) through the instrumentalization of 
gendered associations with household waste management and perceptions 
of their diplomatic community- management skills. These new spaces sub-
jected these women to novel forms of material discipline and stigma within 
their communities. This entrenchment into dirty labor and its associated 
violences formed a stark contrast to the project’s empowerment claims.
The osmosis between “formal” and “informal” trash labor introduced 
through participatory management, moreover, solidified existing commu-
nity hierarchies through reinforcing specific divisions and power relations. 
A defining feature of neoliberal rule, discourses of community mobilized by 
“sustainable development” often represent communities as defined by “har-
mony, equality, and tradition” (Li 1996, 502). However, as Michael Watts 
(2005b, 105) reminds us, what gets demarcated as a community is “not al-
ways warm and fuzzy” but may, in fact, comprise a sinister political life. The 
images of community produced in the Yoff trash- collection project turned 
on ethnic difference and, in the end, bolstered an exclusionary understand-
ing of community. Municipal housekeeping was used by the ethnic elite to 
solidify the group’s authority over the neighborhood by performing urban 
service provision. In this way, community- based management allowed local 
customary authorities to deepen their neighborhood power through seizing 
the opportunity to govern through garbage. The project thus reconfigured 
the lines of authority in the municipal district by abstracting the city even 
further from the provision of social- reproductive goods and reinforcing cus-
tomary authority over local development.
Appropriate Technology
The enda community- based trash project in the Yoff district was piloted in 
the Lebou (one of Senegal’s nine ethnic groups) neighborhood of Tonghor. 
Dakar’s Lebou neighborhoods include some of the self- proclaimed “tradi-
tional” Lebou fishing villages that have occupied the Cape Verde Peninsula 
for over five hundred years but which are now absorbed into the rapidly 
growing capital city (Sylla 1992; unesco 2000). Uniquely situated as the 
“original” inhabitants of the area, the Cape Verde Lebou have a long tra-
dition both of incorporation into Dakar municipal politics and of auton-
omy and self- determination in the face of urban development.4 In certain 
areas — of which Yoff is an important example — the Lebou have retained 
an extremely insular and powerful customary authority base, even as their 
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villages have been rapidly absorbed into the urban agglomeration of Dakar. 
This traditional political organization overlaps with the municipal authority 
with important effects.5
Despite being officially incorporated into the greater Dakar municipality, 
these Lebou neighborhoods are disadvantaged in receiving Dakar- based pub-
lic services due to their location on the periphery of the city and their tradi-
tional village plan. Built around the family concession and spatially limited 
in their expansion, the neighborhoods are extremely dense and irregular, 
and many areas have only narrow, sandy pedestrian paths (see figure 3.1). 
Combined with a fierce politics of land and resistance to change by the local 
customary authorities, these features have posed a number of challenges to 
infrastructural upgrading and waste management. Whereas wastes previ-
ously were disposed of in “the bush” surrounding the villages, these neigh-
borhoods are now often plagued with sanitation problems. These challenges 
were part of the justification for choosing Lebou neighborhoods as the main 
sites of the participatory waste- management and sanitation projects spear-
headed by enda in the 1990s and early 2000s in the context of the wider 
turn towards ngo community- based strategies of urban public service pro-
vision (Abdoul 2002; Gaye and Diallo 1997; Simone 2003; Soumaré 2002). 
These projects have been a central thrust of enda’s activities to improve 
Dakar’s urban environment.6
Tonghor is one of the oldest of Yoff’s seven traditional neighborhoods 
and had a population estimated at around 7,000 of Yoff’s 53,200 habitants 
in 2002 (N. B. L. Ndoye 2005, 36). Though the majority of residents are em-
ployed in the fishing industry, declining fish stocks have contributed to wide-
spread insecurity in that economic sector. Most of the residents of Tonghor 
are Lebou, though there have been waves of immigration by poor fisher-
man and a more recent influx of wealthier city folk. A long- term population 
of Geejndar fishermen of the Sereer ethnicity have relocated to Yoff from 
Saint- Louis for the fishing industry.7 Unlike most Lebou, who own their own 
property, most of the Geejndar do not own land, and they often live in even 
more cramped, irregular habitations near the water. They are generally un-
derstood to be the poorest, least- educated members of the population and 
are still often seen as outsiders, despite having been in Yoff for generations 
in many cases.
In 2001, enda launched the pilot community- based trash project in Tong-
hor in collaboration with the neighborhood’s main community- based organi-
zation, le Comité de gestion de Tonghor (Tonghor Management Committee; 
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cgt).8 Seed funding would come from French and Canadian development 
agencies, and the project was to be maintained through a revolving savings 
fund based on household contributions (a user fee). The local district gov-
ernment (commune d’arrondissement de Yoff) and Yoff’s main community 
association — l’Association pour la promotion social, economique et cul-
turelle de Yoff (Association for the Social, Economic and Cultural Promotion 
of Yoff; apecsy) — were official, noncontributing partners. The project in-
volved a door- to- door horse- drawn- cart “precollection” system that targeted 
over six thousand residents and would, in principle, connect up with the 
Dakar- based collection system at the transfer station on the main Airport 
Road (enda 1999).
Tonghor was chosen for the pilot partly because it had long been consid-
ered one of the most garbage- challenged neighborhoods in Yoff (enda 1999; 
N. B. L. Ndoye 2005). Tonghor’s garbage- management challenges were gen-
F I G U R E  3 . 1 .  The narrow pedestrian paths inside Yoff’s traditional neighborhoods. Author’s 
photo, 2007.
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erally attributed to the distance from most houses to the paved road where 
the city’s trash truck passed to collect garbage. The sandy roads in the inte-
rior were often impassable for these vehicles, so most households had to walk 
some distance to the road when they heard the honking of the trash truck. 
Many women disposed of their household garbage through burying it or 
dumping it onto the beach (see figure 3.2).9 During the project’s tenure, the 
municipal garbage trucks that had previously collected the neighborhood’s 
garbage ceased to enter the Tonghor neighborhood. The project ushered in 
a more intimate system in which select women would collect their neigh-
bors’ garbage using what was considered the more appropriate, “traditional” 
method of horse- drawn carts.
The project- feasibility study emphasized the importance of local partic-
ipation (enda 1999). The cgt created a pilot committee and appointed a 
young male member as its coordinator. The most important element of com-
munity participation was the six women chosen as animatrices (activity lead-
F I G U R E  3 . 2 .  Garbage cluttering the Yoff beach. Author’s photo, 2007.
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ers) of the project — liaisons between the households and the three (male) 
horse- cart drivers. Though not originally from Yoff, the horse- cart operators 
were locally based Sereer men who owned their own horse carts. Two an-
imatrices accompanied each horse- cart driver to collect the garbage from 
the homes and load it onto the cart. Originally completely voluntary, these 
women received a small “reward” of 15,000 cfa per month (US$30) for a 
few months until community contributions waned and they received next 
to nothing. The drivers were hired on at 35,000 cfa per month (US$70) for 
their labors and the coordinator received 30,000 cfa per month (US$60) 
for managing the project.10 The animatrices were also charged with educat-
ing neighborhood women on how to properly store, separate, and dispose 
of their garbage (see figure 3.3). A key element of the education campaign 
entailed discouraging women from dumping on the beach or burying their 
garbage. In the face of persistent recourse to the beach, an ordinance was 
eventually enacted which prohibited all beach dumping and fined all per-
F I G U R E  3 . 3 .  An educational mural in Tonghor, Yoff, instructing neighborhood women on 
proper waste- management behavior as part of the enda project. Author’s photo, 2007.
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petrators. This forced residents to use the fee- based horse- cart system and 
placed the animatrices in the role of policing their participation. A guard 
was placed on the beach at night to discourage dumping, but people still 
attempted to surreptitiously hide their garbage in wastewater evacuated at 
the ocean’s edge.
For the daily collection process, each animatrice would complete her house-
hold duties to start the neighborhood rounds in the morning. They walked 
door to door alongside the horse carts, entering their neighbors’ courtyards 
and homes to speak with women, verifying the sorting, retrieving the gar-
bage, and loading it onto the carts. In the beginning, they did the rounds 
every day, but they eventually reduced their labors to four days per week 
to lessen the burden. On certain days, the animatrices had to solicit each 
household’s financial contribution (1,000 cfa per month) — a demand that 
was often disquieting and frequently unanswered. The cart drivers dumped 
the garbage at the transfer station by the main road where it was, theoret-
ically, to be delivered to the city’s dump, Mbeubeuss, by municipal trash 
trucks. For a couple of short months, a young male volunteer separated out 
the organics at the transfer station in a pilot compost project.
Producing Community
In principle, public services provide public goods equally to the whole of 
the city. However, we saw in chapter 1 that, in practice, people and spaces 
in the city are disciplined through the uneven distribution and governance 
of disorder. Completely devolving infrastructure down to the community 
introduces different possibilities for governing- through- garbage as well as 
potential new dangers. In spite of conceptualizations deployed within de-
velopment discourse of communities as undifferentiated “sites of consensus 
and sustainability” (Li 1996, 501), they are as riven with power relations and 
social divisions as any other social body. New infrastructural formulas built 
by and for the “community” interface with these internal political dynamics 
in ways that affect not just project outcomes but also socio- spatial hierar-
chies and agendas.
The images of community produced through the community- based trash 
infrastructures in Yoff reinforced an exclusionary ethnic definition of the Yoff 
community as Lebou. These community discourses, moreover, advanced no-
tions of the Lebou as traditional and inherently ecologically minded while fu-
eling animosity toward the poor, ethnic- minority group through discourses 
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of disorder. Because autochthonous claims in Yoff are defined by ethnicity, 
claims to manage Yoff “traditionally” yoke ethnicity with tradition. In their 
community- management and self- branding activities, the Lebou (and their 
historians alike [see Mbengue 1997]) are quick to emphasize their solidarity 
and traditional ways. The selection of the Lebou neighborhoods rather than 
other sanitation- challenged peri- urban communities was explicitly made 
on these ethnic terms. The promotional literature produced by enda of-
ten highlighted the historical legacy of Dakar’s “traditional neighborhoods” 
and hailed the Lebou as a proud, independent people for whom community- 
driven development is a natural and long- standing truth.
In choosing Yoff and focusing on Lebou values, enda instrumentalized 
a reputation that had been honed by the Lebou in Yoff. The neighborhood 
had been a pioneer in the Set/Setal movement in the early 1990s and in 
the municipal garbage collection system that followed on its heels, and so 
they were no strangers to participatory garbage activities. Moreover, through 
Yoff’s powerful community association, apecsy — which is seen by many 
to be the seat of Lebou power — residents had been working on a series of 
environmental initiatives for years and they were proud to cast themselves 
as deeply invested in urban sustainability. The longtime president of that 
association, Serigne Mbaye Diene, had become influenced by permaculture 
while pursuing his PhD at Cornell University in the early 1990s, and had set 
out to fuse these principles with vernacular notions of sustainability in Yoff 
through a series of green development projects. In an interview, he explained 
his motivations simply: “in Yoff, we had those principles and were losing 
them . . . we were going the other way.”11 Yoff hosted the 3rd International 
Ecocity and Ecovillage Network Conference in 1996, which showcased Yoff’s 
“village wisdom” and explored strategies to foster ecological urbanism.12 In 
founding the horse- cart trash- collection project in Yoff and developing it in 
consultation with apecsy, enda was building on this legacy and crafting a 
narrative that would have charismatic appeal to international funders and 
community- based- development advocates.
Centering the project on Lebou traditions and values and structuring it 
through Lebou leadership worked to sideline participation by the Geejndar 
and fed stereotypes vilifying their role in Yoff’s disorder. The vast majority of 
Lebou household members and implicated local leaders — from the commu-
nity associations to the mayor’s office — were quick to blame the poor com-
portement (behavior) of the Geejndar for Yoff’s garbage problems. The Geejn-
dar neighborhood along the beach was the neighborhood’s most notoriously 
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filthy section and people were quick to invoke pejorative ethnic stereotypes. 
Even a Lebou university professor of Yoff history stated in an interview: “The 
Geejndar do not have the same standards of hygiene and cleanliness. It is a 
behavior issue.” He went on to explain: “They are Muslims and they have 
integrated partially. But, the Lebou are jealous. The fisherman have this idea 
of liberty, of freedom. They don’t respect authority, and this goes for both 
Lebou and Geejndar. This creates a sort of tension between freedom and 
solidarity.” This tension and “jealousy” manifested in the complete elision of 
feedback or participation from the Geejndar. Blaming the Geejndar for the 
filthy conditions of the neighborhood and the beach justified disciplinary ac-
tion toward that already disenfranchised and embattled group of residents. 
In this way, the Lebou elite sought to govern their adversaries through dis-
courses of waste animated by community- based development.
None of the animatrices were Geejndar. They were, however, initially 
encouraged to spend extra time educating this “problem population” and 
endeavoring to rid their trash- clogged corners of the neighborhood of waste. 
The Geejndar residents bore the brunt of the ban on beach dumping since 
they lived next to the beach, had the least amount of available space for stor-
ing garbage, and were often the least willing and able to pay the user fee. 
An older Geejndar woman named Anta who had been in Yoff since 1960 
described her experience as follows:
We have a lot of garbage problems down here but not a lot of options. 
The garbage truck is so far away on the main road that it’s difficult to 
catch. When the animatrices were collecting garbage, they worked 
hard to help out but they didn’t come often enough and we couldn’t af-
ford it! A thousand francs is not nothing for me! These services should 
be free. It’s not the fault of the animatrices — they are just women like 
us, trying to make a living — but really, that project did not have our 
interests at heart. Many of us had no choice but to dump on the beach. 
I used to send my daughter out at midnight to dump in the ocean when 
no one was looking. She would hide the garbage at the bottom of a 
bucket of wastewater. One day, though, she got caught and we had to 
pay a fine. See, I had no options!
A deep feeling of frustration at the lack of options pervaded responses like 
these. Anta was embarrassed to admit that she had strategized to circumvent 
the beach ordinance but her candor revealed the unjust constraints that were 
placed upon Geejndar women.
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After the animatrices faced particular difficulty collecting the user fee 
from the Geejndar families, they were encouraged by the association’s lead-
ership to cease collecting from this part of the neighborhood. Unable to par-
ticipate financially and banned from taking recourse to the beach, the Geejn-
dar found themselves in a progressively more  untenable situation. Though 
my respondents were reluctant to critique the project or the Lebou estab-
lishment, it was clear that the project had exacerbated internal divisions 
between neighborhood households. These divisions and the elision of Geejn-
dar participation stand in direct contrast to enda’s rhetoric of inclusivity 
and their supposed concern with the most marginalized members of society. 
Despite their being the poorest members of Tonghor society, predominantly 
propertyless, and those most saddled with the burdens of living with waste, 
the Geejndar experienced this new waste infrastructure as more a means 
for the Lebou elite to surveil and to denigrate than a form of infrastructure 
“for” and “by” the community.
The low- tech community- based waste project served not just to buttress 
ethnic authority over neighborhood affairs, but also to solidify the Lebou 
elite’s autonomy from the municipal state. The district has a long history 
of fierce independence and autonomy in the face of external threats to its 
authority. In the words of one resident, “Yoff is the one village in Senegal 
never ruled by the French.” Indeed, the Lebou declared their republic in-
dependent of French authority in 1790. The Lebou Republic lasted until 
1857, when the Cape Verde Peninsula was annexed into the French colony; 
however, they still managed to retain their autonomy (Sylla 1992). Legend 
has it that the French actually paid the Lebou taxes during the colonial pe-
riod. In the contemporary moment, the Lebou are acutely preoccupied with 
their decreasing majority in Yoff and Dakar. A unesco report described 
Yoff’s unique history and culture as “besieged” by forces of change and the 
rapidly invading metropolis of Dakar (unesco 2000). At the same time, 
according to the Yoff historian referenced above, they also have a special 
advantage: people fear the Lebou — they have land, pride, and also, report-
edly, renowned mystical powers. They have preserved an intricate, powerful 
customary- authority structure and are constantly working to defend their 
political autonomy. This defense of ethnic claims to belonging resonates 
with wider research on the resurgence of autochthonous identities in the 
face of new political economies in African cities, but centers those claims 
onto the space of infrastructure (see Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Geschiere 
and Jackson 2006; Marshall- Fratani 2006; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998). 
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The Lebou elite involved in governing the trash project welcomed the visibil-
ity it brought but, perhaps even more importantly, they especially embraced 
the opportunity provided by this new infrastructure to assert their authority 
over the neighborhood and their autonomy from the local state, especially 
Dakar- based public services.13
Engaging “their” women in neighborhood trash collection offered a pro-
ductive opportunity for the Lebou to solidify their tenacious hold on their 
district through the symbolic ordering of the neighborhood by these mu-
nicipal housekeepers. Positioning Lebou women as the key technology of 
the new infrastructure entrenched their authority over the neighborhood 
through the performance of self- management. The door- to- door service 
by the animatrices introduced another layer of intimacy and surveillance by 
the impersonal garbage truck and rendered the municipal state even more 
distant and ineffectual in the eyes of local residents. As they squeezed out 
the state from urban public services, the Lebou elite asserted their desire to 
control the destiny of Yoff in the face of urban change. The animatrices were 
the vehicle, in other words, for a power grab by the Lebou community asso-
ciation. Though the municipality was an official partner in the project — due 
to enda’s declared commitment to collaborative, integrative approaches that 
productively interface with local government, or “micro- solutions [that] can 
be integrated into the national action plan” (Gaye and Diallo 1997, 10) — that 
partnership was a key sticking point for the project that led to its eventual 
demise.
Embodying Technology
Much of Xadi’s life had been, in her words, “all about trash.” For as long as 
she could remember, she was responsible for her household’s garbage. When 
Set/Setal exploded onto Yoff’s sandy streets, she was one of the first to dive 
in and get her hands dirty, cleaning up her neighborhood and ridding Yoff’s 
beautiful beach of unsightly piles of accumulating waste. As Set/Setal ma-
tured and captured the interest of Mayor Mamadou Diop, Xadi was keen to 
take her “commitment to Yoff’s cleanliness” to the next level through becom-
ing one of Yoff’s regular garbage collectors. When the position became paid 
and her contract formalized, she was proud to be able to support her family 
and they, in turn, respected her work ethic and dedication to the well- being 
of the neighborhood.
A few years later, Xadi was instructed not to show up at work the next day. 
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She was told to wait for a call that she never received. When she demanded 
to know why she had been let go, she was given no explanation. Finally the 
answer came from her neighbor and colleague, Aminata, who had also lost 
her job: evidently, only the “essential” workers had been retained. All of the 
women working in Yoff had been let go because, supposedly, they could not 
do the same work as men, were not household breadwinners, and were out of 
their element working in the municipal sector. “My husband is out of work,” 
Xadi told me. “Who else is going to take care of our children? Is this my 
reward for these years of serving my community?” Apparently Xadi’s reward 
was to do more service, but this time for free: just a couple of years later she 
was called down to speak with the village elders and the coordinator of a 
new project in the neighborhood. She was asked: “Do you want to do your 
part to support your neighborhood, your country?” When she responded 
“Yes,” she was informed that she had been chosen to participate in an im-
portant new neighborhood initiative.
Xadi and Aminata were two of the six women chosen to be the anima-
trices of the Yoff community- based waste project. Like the restructuring 
of state welfare services ushered in with neoliberal reform in the munici-
pal garbage sector, the flexibilization of Xadi and Aminata’s labor involved 
reconfiguring the fabric of activities comprising “life’s work” through dis-
courses of participatory citizenship. This new formula of participation deep-
ened the deployment of gendered discourses of waste to render women the 
new technology of this “more” appropriate waste infrastructure.
The Yoff project instrumentalized associations of waste work in the home 
as intrinsically women’s work in order to idealize women as participants and 
thereby extend their social- reproductive duties into the neighborhood space. 
In the words of the project coordinator from enda, “as it’s women who do 
the separation at the source, that’s what motivated us to place women as key 
links in the chain” of the project. This exclusive focus on women dovetailed 
with the overall turn in enda’s priorities — and in the wider development 
discourse, for that matter — by the mid- 1990s toward a focus on women’s 
participation.14 Mayor Issa Ndiaye, who had observed the rollout of the proj-
ect in his dual role as mayor of Yoff (from 1996 to 2002) and a member of 
apecsy’s executive board, further explained:
[The participation of women] was good because women can speak to 
other women. . . . It was a question of organization. . . . And so, the 
women, while the others went to the beach for money- making activ-
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ities, they were taking care of the common interest! [They] had the 
capacity to withstand this work. Even if people spoke badly to them, 
they took it in stride! They didn’t create any problems. What interested 
them was the cleanliness of the neighborhood. . . . So, whatever [com-
munity] reaction they received, they were incredibly diplomatic! Truly, 
they withstood lots of grief.
The mayor’s revealing statement echoes many of my interviews with those 
coordinating the project. Women’s “natural” attributes, including diplomacy, 
nonconfrontational style, and intimacy with the community, as well as their 
altruistic choice to work for “the common interest” in lieu of making money, 
were celebrated as their key skills as animatrices. Women were positioned 
as natural community managers who played a “determining role in the ed-
ucation of children, the citizens of the future,”15 and could most effectively 
influence the behavior of other women. This reconfiguration of the space of 
household social- reproductive activities into the community space built on 
the notion that women should be judged according to their skills and capaci-
ties as the managers of order and cleanliness in the home. This resonates with 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (1991, 20) observation in India of how “housekeeping” — 
specifically household trash management — “is meant to express the auspi-
cious qualities of the mistress of the household.” These participatory trash 
projects extended the realm of that responsibility to secure the cleanliness 
of the neighborhood as a reflection of the auspicious qualities of its female 
residents.
The notion that women in Tonghor are natural waste managers and com-
munity educators facilitated the negation of value for neighborhood trash 
collection as work deserving of remuneration, and placed the onus of neigh-
borhood waste work on women’s skills as project participants. This resonates 
with other research on the instrumentalization of gender in cheap waste 
management solutions in neoliberal contexts, defended through a rhetoric 
of voluntarism, responsibility, and skill acquisition. In their research in Cape 
Town and Johannesburg, respectively, Melanie Samson (2003, 2007, 2008) 
and Faranak Miraftab (2004a, 2004b) examine how the privatization of mu-
nicipal waste collection has exploited African women’s vulnerable position 
in the labor market, in effect “creating new divisions between both workers 
and citizens.”16 Samson (2007, 136) illustrates how in certain sectors women 
were given preferential recruitment into street cleaning because of the special 
skills they were assumed to have developed from their domestic duties, and 
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were then offered lower wages, benefits, and employment security than their 
male counterparts. This underlines both the predatory and the disciplinary 
aspects of these forms of participation. The animatrices had no choice but to 
participate, in the interest of preserving their reputations as good wives and 
housekeepers but also out of a sense of obligation to their communities, as 
enforced by the power and authority of community leaders. Behavior is tightly 
conscripted in Tonghor, and the intimacy of community gives the impression 
of neighborly surveillance at all times. The enda project coordinator was 
quite explicit about how he kept the women “motivated”: “We had a number 
of meetings with the women explaining why we were counting on them. We 
told them that we could make them work without paying because they live 
in this neighborhood. . . . They are obliged to go along with all that is in the 
neighborhood’s best interest. We told them: ‘We know the 15,000 [cfa per 
month] that we give you is nothing at all! But as a resident of the neighbor-
hood, the project could bring other projects that could be beneficial for you.’ 
We let them know that this project was their project!” For many of the neigh-
borhood leaders, women’s responsibility was tethered to ideas of tradition. 
One neighborhood leader spoke nostalgically of times past when women took 
better care of the neighborhood, rising before dawn to tidy their homes and 
cleaning the whole village before important events. In this light, women’s role 
in community- based development was rendered not only a historical verity 
but an obligation on which rested their standing in the community.
The village elders explicitly chose the animatrices using “social criteria” 
from respected but poor Lebou households, because these women were seen 
as good representatives of the village who “needed” such an “opportunity.” 
Three of the women were divorced or widowed heads of household, and 
three were over fifty years of age. For their part, the six women seem to have 
been taken by surprise when they were notified of their new roles. They felt 
no choice but to participate out of an obligation to their elders, an honest 
desire to contribute to neighborhood cleanliness, and a desperate hope that 
one day their participation would bear fruit. For their part, Xadi and Ami-
nata knew that their selection was motivated by their experience working in 
municipal garbage collection.
Despite a prevalent rhetoric in enda’s promotional materials claiming 
that its participatory waste projects were community- designed and - driven, 
the animatrices, as well as neighborhood residents in general, were in prac-
tice completely excluded from project design. In direct contrast to enda’s 
emphasis on women’s central roles as project leaders as a key metric of suc-
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cess, the animatrices were emphatic that they had not been consulted prior 
to the project’s rollout and that they would have designed it quite differently. 
The role of the community in designing the project was exclusively chan-
neled through the two implicated community- based organizations — cgt 
and apecsy — and discussions took place between older male village elders 
and community leaders and enda’s project managers. As such, the project 
reinforced existing community power dynamics.
Beyond feeling obligated to participate, these women participated hoping 
that the work might translate into more lucrative opportunities. Because 
they often lack the education and networks needed to land jobs, women in 
Dakar are at a stark disadvantage for finding wage labor. The animatrices 
hoped that this project would be their ticket to paid work. In my interviews 
with all six participants, it was clear that their participation in the project 
had been quite onerous and that they were, in the end, deeply disappointed 
with the lack of compensation or other opportunities gained. One anima-
trice named Mariama described her daily experience as follows:
I’d wake up early to do my duties around the house then go meet the 
horse- cart driver to do our circuit with the other animatrice. We left 
our kids, left our work at the house, to go rid people’s homes of garbage. 
I would follow behind the cart, whistling and letting everyone know 
we were coming so they would bring out their garbage. . . . The work 
was really hard. . . . We continued on because we wanted to work . . .  
we kept working. Then, you find that even before the end of the month, 
you’d have a sore chest and then, finally, that what you’re supposed to 
receive, no one gives it to you. What we wanted was to work and that’s 
the chance that God gave us, so we said we would grab that chance . . .  
but it didn’t help to fulfill any of our needs. You would work all day, go 
home, wash, do the cleaning, do our work, then the next day get back 
up to do it again.
When I asked the project coordinator if the project’s duties interfered with 
women’s duties at home, he said, “Yes, it did! Great question. We analyzed 
all of these angles!” The solution: move the trash collection two hours later 
so women had a chance to get their work done at home.
Central to this new labor- intensive infrastructure was a repudiation of the 
labor these women already performed in the home — or the life’s work that 
the animatrices left behind as they went about their neighborhood trash job. 
In this sense, we can see how the jobs ended up doubling their unpaid activi-
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ties by extending the realm of social reproduction into the public space. This 
extension also came as a fundamental rejection of the value of women’s labor 
in the official trash sector. Fired from municipal trash collection because 
they were not deemed worthy of those jobs, these women were then installed 
into the community- based project as idealized volunteers. Quite in contrast 
to the early experience of women municipal trash workers, whose labors 
were rendered more valuable when they entered public space to collect gar-
bage, the labors of women in the community- based system were devalued. 
This underscores the way that so- called formal and “participatory” labors 
are dialectically constituted and how the categorical distinction between the 
realms of production and reproduction determines the nature and value of 
work. Although the women toiled day in and day out alongside the horse- cart 
drivers, the payment of these men was never in question and was never justi-
fied through a narrative of community responsibility. In this light, the case of 
participatory waste management in Dakar resonates with the growing body 
of research into the way that the crisis of social reproduction has worked by 
differentially disciplining gendered bodies through the devaluation of cer-
tain spheres of work (Bakker and Gill 2003; Fakier and Cock 2009; Meehan 
and Strauss 2015; Mitchell, Marston, and Katz 2004; M. Samson 2010). The 
drivers were clearly seen as workers, whereas the women were seen as par-
ticipants whose neighborhood trash labor was rendered an “empowering” 
duty undeserving of compensation.
As was the case in the municipal system, the insidious power of these 
projects drew from the materiality of trash as it intersected with gendered 
bodies. The arduous physicality of the collection process joined with the 
symbolic violence of being associated with waste. Provisioned only with 
minimal equipment, if any at all, the animatrices did this work with their 
bare hands. By the end of a workday, they were literally filthy, forced to pa-
rade through their neighborhood wearing the smelly remains of other peo-
ple’s waste. In a Muslim society where cleanliness of the body is of utmost 
importance in terms of spiritual and community standing, this was no small 
burden. Neither was the vulnerability to disease that came of this risky ex-
posure for people with little or no access to health care. As with the formal 
trash workers, despite their most fastidious attempts at staying clean, the 
work often led to infection and disease. Even four years after the project 
had ended, Mariama was still suffering from a series of infections that had 
originated with her participation in the project, including a recurring eye 
infection that had caused her eye to permanently swell shut.
116 Chapter Three
The intimate technology of the door- to- door horse- cart system introduced 
an entirely different relationship between collector and garbage, and new 
forms of subjection to waste management’s symbolic and material disci-
pline. The deployment of gender stereotypes and devolving technology in 
these projects entrenched women’s connection to waste, dirt, and disorder 
through literally weighing them down and marking them with the mess of 
waste. In this way, women’s bodies became the embodiment of the new tech-
nology, and their labor the animation of the vibrant force of waste. Long af-
ter the project’s demise, their bodies and reputations still carried with them 
waste’s “toxic vitality” (P. Harvey 2016).
Household Finance
In addition to novel material and social technologies, the infrastructure of 
community- based waste collection also relied on a new financing technology: 
the user fee. The fee for trash collection reconfigured the financial burden 
of waste management for neighborhood women and transformed the value 
and treatment of garbage within the home. The implementation of fees for 
service — or the devolution of the costs of basic services to the community — 
 is one of the hallmark elements of the neoliberal model of urban public ser-
vice reform and its associated reconfiguration of geographies of social repro-
duction.17 Consistent with wider trends, the Tonghor community- based trash 
project was rooted in the principle of the poor paying more for development. 
The project’s feasibility study emphasized that the user fee for the door- to- 
door trash collection was an important part of involving participants in a 
sustainable community- driven model of public service. Ironically, in this 
same document, less than half of Tonghor residents said that they would be 
willing to contribute financially to the project (enda 1999). Despite this, the 
payment scheme was laid out in an appendix section entitled “When the Poor 
Finance Development” (enda 1999, 136). Each household was asked to 
pay 1,000 cfa per month (roughly two U.S. dollars), to be collected at the end 
of the month by the animatrices. A flat rate calculated per household, this 
fee was separate from the municipal household garbage tax (teom), calcu-
lated based on property values (see chapter 1 for more details on the teom).
The animatrices faced intense resistance to paying the user fee. This im-
pinged on the meager “reward” they received and was a key factor in the 
decline of the project. Before the project was launched, residents had re-
ceived their trash collection by the municipality for “free,” given that the vast 
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majority of the residents either did not pay the teom or were unaware that 
they paid it. For those who actually did pay the tax, the new fee represented 
a doubling of their payment for garbage services. The fines imposed on those 
who continued dumping on the beach, moreover, acted to criminalize those 
who attempted to opt out. The user fee and efforts to educate neighborhood 
women on sorting methods transformed the value and treatment of the gar-
bage within the home as well. Charging for the amount of garbage discarded 
in effect brought women deeper into the management of their waste along-
side their neighborly animatrices through incentivizing strategies to reduce 
waste, including storing, burying, and attempting to dump garbage off the 
radar of local officials. Given the controversial nature of these fees and their 
widespread rejection by community members, the animatrices’ role in so-
liciting the user fee was a sticking point, to put it mildly. In effect, it placed 
these women as the taxman, supposedly drawing on their intimacies in the 
community, but, in truth, locating them on difficult terrain with their neigh-
bors. As some of the most marginalized members of the community, being 
asked to solicit money from their neighbors was highly problematic.
The user fee was also a key way that the projects reconfigured the gen-
dered landscape of household waste management and household bargaining 
power. As was to be expected, the gendered division of trash labor informed 
household members’ priorities regarding household expenditures and val-
uation of the service. Because they are in charge of managing household 
cleanliness, women were more willing to pay for the door- to- door service as 
it alleviated their trash burden and obviated their need to risk dumping on 
the beach. However, because few women in Tonghor are financially inde-
pendent, they found it difficult to make this contribution. The user fee inter-
faced with family power dynamics to disproportionately burden women with 
the costs associated with maintaining the household. Women shouldered 
this burden, but often with difficulty.
On the other hand, asking husbands to pay for the service was often prob-
lematic if they did not prioritize the service as much as their wives did, or 
if household finances were already strained. The user fee sometimes pre-
cipitated intense conflicts between husbands and wives and the animatri-
ces found themselves unwittingly caught in the middle of this tension. One 
animatrice described an instance when she was inadvertently ensnarled in 
a marital clash through simply informing a nosy husband of how much his 
wife had paid in trash collection fees over a few months. Shocked to hear 
the difference between what he had given his wife and what she had paid 
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into the project, the husband had asked the animatrice to serve as a witness 
as he confronted his wife, making the animatrice extremely uncomfortable. 
Sometimes this tension made for a challenging research environment. On 
more than one occasion, a joint interview with male and female heads of 
household devolved into an argument over the fees.
In the end, most households refused to pay the user fee. Beyond their 
inability to pay was a resistance to paying out of principle. Most residents 
firmly believed that garbage collection should be a free public service and 
thus took the user fee as just one more symbol of the state’s negligence and 
incapacity to serve the needs of its citizens. The following statement by a 
female head of household sums up many residents’ perspectives on the fee: 
“It’s good and it’s not good! Because we’re citizens, the state is supposed to 
help us . . . the government should be able to pay this money! [The project 
is] a good thing because we get rid of our garbage, but it’s not good because 
it lessens our [buying] power. . . . If you put your trash on the cart, you are 
going to pay! It’s good because it cleans our neighborhood but bad because it 
hurts us.” This sentiment was particularly intense among the Geejndar, who 
not only were the least able to pay but also distrusted the Lebou authorities. 
They viewed the project suspiciously as just one more scheme by the Lebou 
establishment that did not have their best interests at heart. Together with 
other residents, their refusal to pay constituted a key reason why the project 
foundered. The user fee was just one more element in the project’s lack of 
success in actually winning over the community to the idea of individual and 
community responsibility for waste management.
Municipal Dissent
Though it was an official partner, the district government never fully bought 
into the project, and municipal officials were quite candid in expressing se-
rious concerns with the model it represented.18 Issa Ndoye, the official at 
the Yoff mayor’s office charged with coordinating household waste collec-
tion with the municipality of Dakar, admitted that he had been opposed 
to the project from the beginning. When he met with enda and the local 
community group while it was being launched, he warned them that the 
project would “bring Mbeubeuss [the dump] to Dakar.” In response, they 
reproached him, saying: “You only care about the trucks!” After multiple 
requests to stop the trucks from collecting in the Tonghor neighborhood, he 
finally relented and told his guys to skirt the neighborhood. Then, “fifteen 
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days later, it was Mbeubeuss.” The issue of the transfer station was trickier 
than the question of not collecting in the neighborhood. Because the col-
lectors were paid by the ton, the new system, which involved separating 
out the organics for the pilot compost project, further discouraged the city 
from coordinating the collection at the transfer station. The challenges of 
loading the accumulating garbage deposited there made their job even more 
difficult. Within a short time, the municipality stopped transferring garbage 
from Yoff to Mbeubeuss and the station quickly began to overflow.
By 2003, after less than a year of operation, the Tonghor community- 
based trash- collection project was in shambles: many if not most residents 
refused to pay the user fee, the overworked animatrices were exhausted 
from — and no longer rewarded for — their labors, and even the horse- cart 
drivers were fed up as their salaries became increasingly irregular. The dis-
pute between the municipality and the neighborhood authorities over the 
project, furthermore, had precipitated disaster at the point of coordination 
near the airport. The transfer station had become a towering mountain of 
garbage, attracting hundreds of circling birds. When the national aviation 
administration weighed in over the bird problem, the project was definitively 
cancelled. After the literal weight of the garbage had kept the municipality 
away, it was the material force of this trash — its unsightly messiness, insa-
lubrious stench, and the nuisance and danger of the pests it attracted — that 
hastened the project’s abandonment. Precarious labor, moreover, was a weak 
link in the technology chain forming this infrastructure, threatening its very 
coherence and sustainability. Issa summed it up in these words: “We can 
use horse carts in the village, but their place is not here in the city. The 
horse- cart project was not a good idea. Ask the women [animatrices] who 
were involved! We need to stick to our trucks.” Issa is referring here to much 
more than infrastructure’s function; he’s also invoking its affective, mate-
rial, social, and symbolic dimensions. For him, the technologies employed 
in the horse- cart project and the structures of feeling to which they gave rise 
were all wrong. Only investment in the material backbone of the municipal 
system — the trash trucks — would contribute to a more coherent modern 
urban infrastructure.
Soon after the project disappeared, the municipal trash trucks began col-
lecting along their usual circuit in Tonghor, with some changes made in an 
attempt to reach the hard- to- access areas. More recently, the service has im-
proved markedly, tracking gains made to the municipal collectors’ working 
conditions since 2009. Residents currently make do with this service, deploy 
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creative strategies to manage their garbage, and periodically defy the ban 
and use the beach during collection crises. Besides occasional efforts by the 
neighborhood’s youth and women to clean specific areas when they become 
clogged with refuse, no comprehensive community- based project has been 
attempted since 2003.
Conclusions
This chapter has further charted the gendering of splintering urbanism 
(Graham and Marvin 2001) when infrastructure is devolved onto labor 
through community- based development. The scaling back of material trash 
infrastructure and its replacement by coerced voluntary labor of marginal-
ized women fractures this urban public service, leaving women to literally 
pick up the pieces of a degrading infrastructure as the neighborhood’s new 
“housekeepers.” Community — in all of its gendered and ethnicized conno-
tations — is a key technology in processes of governing- through- disposability. 
Autochthonous claims to the city work through gendered labor and its ma-
terial power.
The Yoff community- based trash project reconfigured the value of trash 
work and the image of community, in the name of empowerment and effi-
ciency, with key implications for local politics and state power. Extending 
women’s social- reproductive duties into the public space, it displaced the 
state’s role in managing and sustaining the reproduction of labor power and 
shifted governmental lines of accountability. Just as in Dakar’s municipal trash 
sector, this precipitated competition between governmental authorities — 
 in this case, between the local municipality and local customary leaders. De-
spite being an official partner on the project, the Yoff local government was 
excluded from key project decisions as local customary leaders were seen as 
closer to the population. It retaliated by ceasing to transfer the garbage to 
the dump. Far from a simple “technical problem” as enda contended, the 
transfer station was the broken joint in this new infrastructural system, dis-
rupting the orderly flow of waste and filth out of the city that ensured the 
protection of the city’s residents. The unsightly garbage pile was the mate-
rial manifestation of the disorder wreaked by this increasingly incoherent 
infrastructural system.
Probing the infrastructure built by community- based development proj-
ects and the technologies they instrumentalize illuminates the material 
power of these new relations and raises some key questions for their func-
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tionality and sustainability as public services. If the trucks represented the 
modernist vision of a comprehensive, networked public service, then the 
enormous garbage pile was the residue of the archaic horse- cart fantasy of 
infrastructure’s past. In fostering the autonomy of the neighborhood from 
the local state, the neoliberal vision of ngo- driven development contributed 
to a fragmenting urbanism of disarticulated infrastructures cast as tradi-
tional modes of life. Community- based development introduced here the 
possibility of an urbanism that is increasingly splintered along divisive, elit-
ist community lines and in which infrastructure may gradually be replaced 
with women’s laboring bodies. The precarity that this introduces for women 
and their social relations in turn produces new precarities in the infrastruc-
tural system as a whole.
So- called green, appropriate technologies were the material scaffolding 
of these projects’ infrastructural vision. Far from the orderly aesthetic of the 
bourgeois environmentalism associated with world- city- aspirational proj-
ects, the aesthetic vision conjured was of a messy urbanism romanticizing 
the historical virtues of the “local” and harkening back to a sustainable rural 
past. Not only was the low- tech system assumed to be better suited to this 
particular type of community, but the Lebou were purported to be better 
suited for this green approach because of their historically situated “green” 
lifestyles. What does appropriate technology require and what does it cancel 
out? What possible future does it render appropriate? In the end, the project 
only succeeded in pushing the garbage from inside the neighborhood to a 
festering pile on its periphery. This raises the question of when green be-
comes greenwash in the service of projects that are no more clean, efficient, 
or sustainable than municipal services.
What, moreover, do projects like these mean for the aspirations they in-
spire, or in other words, how do we make sense of their claims for “empower-
ment”? These low- tech material technologies only work in conjunction with 
the social technology of labor- intensive participation. But participation has 
been revealed to marshal discourses of identity to devalue certain spheres of 
work. In contrast to the women municipal trash workers who benefited from 
the progressive formalization and thus valuation of their jobs, the animatri-
ces saw no significant benefits to their standing and the project eroded their 
ability to care for their families. Attention to the vital materiality of infra-
structural labor and associated discourses of disposability draws into sharp 
relief the limitations of amaterial conceptions of empowerment that do not 
look at the content of the work inspired by participatory infrastructures and 
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their implications for social relations. Conceptions of empowerment that 
erode the material conditions of everyday life and threaten the stability of 
the social community are clearly disabling.
An analysis of empowerment must take on, furthermore, the expecta-
tions and experiences of those participating. The animatrices often articu-
lated their motivation for participating in these projects as a hope for future 
“opportunities” that might be made available. Instead, the animatrices wit-
nessed a devaluation of their standing in the community because of the ne-
gation of their labor value, the nefarious implications of working with waste, 
and the uncomfortable tasks they were charged with as the new taxman. 
This experience stands in sharp contrast to the claims of empowerment that 
live on in the best- practices literature, and highlights the way that the crisis 
of social reproduction works through material discipline enacted on wom-
en’s bodies. The end of the project was bittersweet for the animatrices be-
cause of all of the sweat, hope, and pride they had poured into their work. 
If we understand development to be “the management of a promise” then 
“what if the promise does not deliver?” (J. N. Pieterse 2000, 176). The mis-
management of hope is perhaps the most disempowering element of these 
reconfigurations of value at Dakar’s margins.
four.  The Piety of Refusal
At 11 a.m. on Friday, April 27, 2007, in a large, bare- bones meeting room, a 
crowd of trash workers waited anxiously for their union’s general assembly 
to begin on “Senegalese time.” I had arrived with my research assistant when 
the meeting was officially convened at 10 a.m. and was excited to witness 
the gears behind the movement’s strike campaign. This was just the begin-
ning of my being brought into the fold of the union’s inner workings and I 
was impressed by the energy in the room. Some of the workers had come 
straight from work and still wore the tattered remains of old uniforms from 
a company long since disappeared and plastic sandals that offered mini-
mal protection on the job. The union’s leaders sat at one end of the room’s 
huge table, mostly dressed in respectable boubous (traditional West African 
sleeved robes) or button- up shirts. The anticipation was palpable and the 
temperature continued to rise as more and more workers filled the poorly 
ventilated room.
The crowd hushed as the union’s secretary general, Madany Sy, entered 
the room. An attractive man in his early forties, he wore smart glasses and 
a commanding presence. Sy’s demeanor demanded respect, yet he appeared 
humble and approachable. A gifted public speaker, he spoke to a rapt audi-
ence that occasionally erupted into applause. The following excerpt from his 
speech is translated from the Wolof:
All of you are incited to march on May 1 because this is the day for 
workers. Even if [the event] is a celebration, it’s a celebration without 
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joy. It’s a chance for us to show our discontent and our disagreement. . . .  
Despite the fact of our great difficulties, we are muted, we work in the 
shadows. . . . Comrades: the authorities of this country do not respect 
the cleaning workers. They do not take us into account. We have really 
been deceived. . . . We are the left out, the forgotten of the republic. 
They treat us like garbage. This must stop today! We must take re-
sponsibility for ourselves. . . . The most important thing is that we go 
together to the end. That we are united. . . . We have worked in this 
sector for years without being hired on because it was a passage we 
were obliged to make. This is why, I tell you, we keep working. Each 
one of us does his job. This is all we’ve got, and it’s a way of living our 
religion. But if our work is oppressing us, of course we have the right 
to rise up within the rules of the game. We have addressed ourselves to 
everyone, and none of them have met with us. We thank the religious 
leaders because they pray for us. . . . The problem we have is with the 
politicians. A politician never says where he is going. . . . They have 
been fooling us for years. That should push each and every one of us 
to take up our responsibilities. . . .
If they arrest me during the week, I call for you to keep fighting! 
[The crowd erupts into murmurs and noise, then applause.] My father 
used to say: “When I am in front, follow me; when I move back, kill 
me; when I die, avenge me.” [Rowdy applause.] I want that to be our 
slogan because we are doing the most dangerous work that there is. 
[Someone interjects: “We are all dead.”] We are no longer living. We 
are stressed. Before you receive your salary, you have to fight for it. 
This needs to stop. Now, we have taken all the other paths we could, 
without a response. The mayor of Dakar asked me to warn him before 
I spoke on the radio. He didn’t want to hear his name, so I accepted. I 
waited a year, then I called him. He ignored me. I write to him, with-
out response. He says bad things about me. . . . I don’t have much, but I 
have my dignity. He has more money than me but he is not more digni-
fied. We all have the same dignity, my friends. We are the same as the 
mayor. We are all human beings. A man has the right to rise up when 
he feels oppressed by another man. We have the right to speak the 
truth. If people are afraid to tell the truth to his face, we will do it. . . .
In view of this critical situation, today we launch the second plan 
of action. We have decided to radicalize the movement from Dakar to 
Yène [the farthest periphery of the Dakar region]. [Applause.] Com-
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rades, please understand that when I speak of radicalization, that does 
not mean acts of vandalism, destruction, or fights. Don’t forget that we 
are republicans. . . . The people will support us. . . . The state needs to 
fulfill its responsibilities and solve the problem of the trash sector. . . .  
It’s thanks to you that Dakar is a nice city to visit, that the people don’t 
fall ill. Do you know this? Do you know that, thanks to you, develop-
ment is possible in this country? You play a major role in the [protec-
tion of the] environment. . . . We, my friends, are strong, thanks to 
God. We believe in our profession. It’s a passion. We are dignified and 
we do this work for God. We have been sacrificing for this work for 
fifteen years. . . . God willing, we will be victorious in the end.
Sy’s speech was perfectly calibrated to the mood of the moment. It gave voice 
to the suffering of the workers and praised them for the efficacy and spir-
itual value of their work, while conjuring the sense of injustice that would 
be required to wage an audacious strike that would paralyze the city’s waste 
infrastructure — and, by extension, the city as a whole. By taking on the 
“politicians” who had ignored them for so long, he made it clear that they 
had exhausted all avenues for a negotiated solution to the crisis. After a few 
more short speeches and then responses from the crowd, the meeting was 
adjourned with a short blessing from a religious leader. The workers gradu-
ally filed out. The crowd was riled up, but serious; they knew what they had 
to do and were ready. After the May 1 march, Sy called for a general strike 
and most of Dakar’s sixteen hundred trash workers did not collect the city’s 
trash for two weeks. In solidarity, whole neighborhoods coordinated “trash 
revolts” of their own, dumping their accumulated household waste into pub-
lic squares and streets to compel the state to respond to the workers’ griev-
ances. As the city choked on its own refuse, the union received its first meet-
ing with Dakar’s then mayor, Pape Diop. Within a short while, the union had 
received two months of back pay and a number of significant concessions. 
After more than seven grueling years of mobilizing and negotiating, they fi-
nally signed their collective bargaining agreement in 2014. Winning formal 
contracts, medical care, and other benefits, the trash sector pioneered the 
reversal of austerity management trends, heralding the possibility of a new 
era of urban governance in Dakar.
Previous chapters have examined the devolution of infrastructure onto 
labor in Dakar’s garbage sector through different formulas of participation 
as a mode of governing through disposability. This chapter examines how 
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the people who constitute these vital infrastructures refuse their conditions 
of precarity. Since 2006, the trash-workers union has catapulted trash man-
agement and the plight of the city’s trash workers to the center of the munic-
ipal and national political stage, despite an environment strongly prejudiced 
against those working with garbage and a political climate generally hostile 
to labor. I trace here the trash-workers union movement as it gained steam 
in the 2000s, in order to explain the dynamism of the workers’ tactics of 
refusal and illuminate the intimate communities of affect that forge infra-
structures. Through examining their identities as workers and strategies as a 
union, I show how the particular resonance of their cleaning labor and their 
refusal to clean through striking have validated garbage work, earned them 
widespread public support, and, in turn, allowed them to stem the tide of 
labor flexibilization.
The material and symbolic resonance of waste sculpts the meaning of 
cleaning labor and, in turn, prefigures the power of trash as a political force. 
Waste’s powers to disrupt and the salience of its opposite — cleanliness — as a 
symbol of faith and piety are key features of the political valence of trash in 
Dakar. The counterhegemonic force of trash rebellion in Dakar was forged 
out of the specific subjectivities conditioned by the corporeal practice of 
cleaning and manifested in the creative animation of the material itself in 
rebellion. This chapter begins with an examination of the workers’ main le-
ver, the general trash strike, as a powerful disruption of the proper function 
of disposal infrastructure in organizing the orderly flow of waste out of the 
city. It then considers the communicative channels that enabled the neigh-
borhood trash revolts to scale up workers’ critiques and bestowed meaning 
onto trash work and protest. Finally, it explores the architectures of faith 
undergirding the workers’ movement, built on the conviction that the labor 
of cleaning the city is an act of piety. Waste and spirituality are powerfully 
connected and Islam is central to sculpting the moral geographies surround-
ing waste work in Dakar. Rooted in the value of purity in Islam and the 
embodied practice of cleaning, associations between cleaning and virtue 
evoked a shared moral compass which motivated workers to persevere, won 
over ordinary residents to their cause, and validated this vital infrastructure 
on an ethical level.
Chapter 1 explored the representational logic of trash infrastructure, or 
the political address of different infrastructural assemblages in the perfor-
mance of governing- through- garbage. This chapter unpacks the values and 
vernacular moralities through which these infrastructures are felt and un-
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derstood by the people comprising the social systems they are built upon. In 
doing so, the chapter expands the definition of what is usually taken into ac-
count in studying infrastructure to further demonstrate how the social and 
affective components of infrastructure matter. Infrastructures are complex 
ecological arrangements that include feelings and modes of understanding, 
ritual practices, and spiritual systems of order. The structures of feeling that 
waste infrastructures evoke emerge out of the material practice of cleaning 
work. The bricolage labors involved in caring for broken- down machines 
and a degrading city are bound up, in other words, with bricolage modes of 
meaning making — a sort of art of conservation of the self in a landscape of 
disrepair.1 I describe this art as a piety of refusal that operates as a personal 
resource as well as a strategic platform for union organizing.
Spirituality is not usually seen as the purview of conventional urban stud-
ies nor of studies of infrastructure. However, new materialist scholars and 
ethnographers of infrastructure are increasingly paying attention to the rele-
vance of spirituality for fully grappling with the force of matter and the wide 
gamut of relationships embodied in infrastructure. Maria Puig de la Bellacasa 
draws on Susan Leigh Star in her development of an approach to studying 
infrastructure that “is not only about materials but also about meanings that 
are neither separable from, nor reducible to, what we usually conceive as 
materiality.”2 She argues for spirituality to be taken into account as a key but 
often overlooked element adhering between the socio- natural communities 
that make up infrastructures. This conception of “material spirituality” is 
useful for thinking about Dakar’s trash infrastructures because it empha-
sizes that spirituality is intertwined with material practice but is also some-
thing that inspires a “spirit” of community.
Within the growing field of ethnographies of infrastructure, there is an 
emerging literature on ritual practices animated by infrastructures and the 
spectral modes through which they are understood and valued. Though this 
work is important for investigating the vernacular valuations of infrastruc-
ture, much of the Africanist literature interprets spiritual understandings 
(particularly occult imaginings) of infrastructure as reactionary critiques 
of capitalism, globalization, neoliberalism, and other elements of contem-
porary modernity.3 However, as Miho Ishii (2016, 4) points out, reducing 
spiritual understandings of infrastructure to modes of venting anxieties 
about modernity is inadequate for fully grappling with the rich “ways in 
which [people] are entangled with, or encompassed by, nature and divini-
ties.” Much more than simple moral panic at neoliberalism’s violences, the 
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piety of refusal represents a constructive striving to align moral and mate-
rial economies in the wake of the failures of the secular nationalist project.
The significance of spirituality in Dakar’s waste infrastructures is consis-
tent with the well- documented role of spirituality in making urban publics 
across diverse African contexts. There is a long tradition of scholarship ex-
amining the historical relationship between religious identity and the public 
sphere in Africa, and it is well recognized that the widespread failures of sec-
ular development and patterns of millennial capitalism have catalyzed the 
rising influence of Christian and Islamic networks in urban areas. A growing 
literature takes up the shifting role of religion in anchoring urban popu-
lations and mediating contests of urban citizenship in the contemporary 
era.4 The intensification of religious identification, visibility, and associa-
tions in urban areas calls into question normative models of the secular pub-
lic sphere and long- held associations between secularism, modernity, and 
democracy.5 Scholars of Islamic modernities emphasize the increasing role 
of Muslim civil societies in furnishing a forum for the development of the 
public sphere and sparking reasoned discourse on modern problems such as 
labor rights, gender, and democracy.6 This is a far cry from a view of religious 
movements as mere self- help initiatives that act to buffer or channel the 
radicalization of the discontented,7 or of spiritual conceptions of neoliberal 
infrastructures as simple modes of venting anxieties about modernity, and 
offers an important critique of the assumed incompatibility between Islam 
and forms of public life. Most of the research on Islam and politics, however, 
focuses on reformist or radical Islamic movements or heightening divisions 
between communities of faith. Less attention has been paid to movements 
conjuring a more expansive Muslim identity that aim to reform the state, or, 
moreover, to how Islam may provide the language for constructively contest-
ing neoliberal austerity.
In the Senegalese context, there is an extensive tradition of scholarship 
examining the interpenetration of Islam and the political sphere. The thrust 
of Senegalese Islamic studies, however, has been dominated by perspectives 
focused on the role of the Sufi brotherhoods and the power of the marabouts. 
The main current of this research has been concerned with explaining Sene-
galese “exceptionalism” through rooting the Socialist Party state’s hegemony 
from Independence in 1960 to 2000 within its mutualistic links with the 
Mouride brotherhood. Instead of privileging the historical social contract 
between the state and the brotherhoods, the economic utility of Islamic or-
ganizations, or the direct involvement of religious leaders in political con-
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tests, this chapter joins with other recent interventions that move beyond a 
preoccupation with the functional aspects of Islamic institutions to a con-
cern with quotidian experiences of religious identity.8 Building on the work 
of Mamadou Diouf, Mara Leichtman, and others, I am interested in the 
way that modes of religiosity craft new communities, political cultures, and 
moral geographies.9 In this way, I prioritize deeper investigation into Muslim 
disciples’ identities and experiences of religiosity to foreground the impor-
tance of the cultural roots of political consciousness and citizenship prac-
tices. The piety of refusal is a lived, embodied, and material mode through 
which spiritual practice becomes civic virtue.
Striking Disorder in Dakar
Madany Sy and his fellow workers founded their union, le Syndicat National 
des travailleurs du nettoiement (National Cleaning Workers Union; sntn), 
in 2000 in anticipation of the changes under way with the election of Pres-
ident Abdoulaye Wade (known as Alternance).10 The head of his local youth 
group in a central Dakar neighborhood, Sy had been intensely involved in 
the Set/Setal movement, and then had emerged as a tireless advocate and 
leader among the trash workers starting in the mid- 1990s. The passion and 
time that Sy put into the trenches of dirty work as a trash collector was 
a major element of his popularity. After languishing in informality during 
Mamadou Diop’s participatory sector, the unionists’ goal was to reverse the 
flexibilization of trash labor. In the words of Sy’s longtime comrade and 
union cofounder, Noumou Ndiaye: “The workers were treated more or less 
like slaves! It was necessary to fight to eradicate all of that!”
One of their key goals in forming the union was to avoid the politiciza-
tion that had soured their experience of working for Mayor Mamadou Diop. 
Though many of the union’s members and founders (including Sy) were 
originally active in the Socialist Party during the 1990s, in forming their 
union they made the important choice to affiliate with an autonome (inde-
pendent) union federation in order to retain their independence from polit-
ical parties.11 Their choice of la Confédération des syndicats autonomes du 
Sénégal (Federation of Independent Unions of Senegal; csa) was a decision 
taken explicitly to avoid the influence of political parties. It did not, how-
ever, immunize the union from government intervention, which continued 
in different form under President Wade (Ndiaye 2010). Overall, the 2000s 
was a period exhibiting what labor scholar Alfred Inis Ndiaye (2008, 2010, 
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2013) described as a blocked negotiation process and the intensification of 
conflict between labor and the state. As political parties and government 
officials continued to try to meddle in unionized labor, and unions had no 
recourse but to use “hot” strategies (strikes) to resist these and make their 
voices heard, new labor relations were being forged with difficulty.
After an initially hopeful period in the first half of the decade, with the 
institutional reconfiguration in 2006 the workers found themselves thrown 
into another intense period of job insecurity and difficult working conditions.12 
In the otherwise grueling period from 2006 to 2009, they waged a series of 
strike- based campaigns that maneuvered the question of trash labor to the 
center of the political stage in Dakar. Waging periodic general strikes that held 
the city captive to its own garbage, tirelessly educating and agitating over the 
radio waves, and even reaching out to international observers and activists 
for their cause,13 the union won the support of the Dakarois they served and 
gained the attention of the local and national state. By 2009, they had emerged 
as one of the most visible and dynamic unions active in contemporary Senegal 
and had won some key concessions. For the Dakarois, this period was experi-
enced as a full- on trash “crisis” characterized by frequent service disruptions, 
the accumulation of garbage in the public space, and government inaction.
A series of strikes in 2007 just after President Wade was reelected were 
particularly important toward crystalizing the union’s visibility and public 
support. Wade was reelected that year to little fanfare as his popularity faded 
in step with a series of controversies and growing disappointment in his 
vision for running the country. When the contract with the private waste- 
management company ama had been revoked months before, the workers 
had hoped for a new institutional arrangement for garbage that would put 
an end to their insecurity once and for all. As months passed and their labor 
conditions continued to deteriorate, however, they called for a series of trash 
strikes that wreaked havoc on the city to bring attention to their plight and 
force the government’s hand. In many cases, strikes were called at union 
general assemblies like that described at the beginning of the chapter, but at 
other times they were announced by the leadership and radiated out to the 
workers by word of mouth. The usual directive was simply to refrain from 
collecting the trash the next day. Often, workers still gathered together at 
their normal workplace hangouts to discuss the events as they transpired. 
From the most central Dakar district to the farthest reach into the city’s pe-
riphery, workers stayed home for as many as two weeks in a row. Garbage 
accumulated everywhere — in homes, yards, roadsides, drainage canals, con-
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struction sites, and empty lots. Neighborhood women went to great lengths 
to carefully manage their accumulating garbage to avoid dangerous insalu-
brious conditions, but — as we’ll see in the next section — many became fed 
up and were driven to take drastic action.
Star (1999) describes infrastructure as most visible when it breaks down; 
similarly, Dakar’s labor- intensive infrastructure was most visible during a 
strike. Given the propensity for quick putrefaction, to maintain urban order 
the proper functioning of a solid- waste system requires unrelenting daily 
evacuation out of homes, into the waste grid, and finally to the city’s dump 
in the outskirts of the city. The modern city is a clean, sanitized space where 
waste is carted out of sight, out of mind, allowing production and consump-
tion to continue. The blockage of that disposal process and the accumula-
tion of urban waste in public spaces is the ultimate indicator of crisis and 
dysfunction. As Sarah A. Moore (2009, 428) reflected on waste strikes in 
Oaxaca, “because garbage is inherently misplaced, waste represents a risk 
to modern urban societies,” and a politics of “manifestation” — or render-
ing garbage visible through striking — becomes an effective political tool be-
cause of its potential to destabilize institutions of modernity.
Striking, moreover, is not just an ordinary technical breakdown of in-
frastructure; it is the purposeful sabotaging of the proper functioning of 
infrastructure. Trash strikes render infrastructure the “political terrain for 
the negotiation of moral- political questions” and garbage itself a vibrant 
“protagonist” of protests (von Schnitzler 2013, 671, italics in original). Much 
in the same way that prepaid water meters in Soweto (von Schnitzler 2013, 
2016) and water pipes in Mumbai (Anand 2011) became the material tools 
of rebellion, so did garbage infrastructures take center stage in wider modes 
of critiquing logics of governing the city. Such disruption was particularly 
resonant in Dakar because it exposed the laboring bodies onto which the 
infrastructure had been devolved. Strikes are the flip side of the performa-
tive mode of infrastructure; they are the way that the living components of 
these socio- technical systems invert the representational logic of governing 
through garbage by withdrawing their labor. Workers’ refusal to be the cast-
aways of society was embodied in their refusal to labor. As the primary tech-
nology of the infrastructure, in other words, the laboring body itself became 
the political terrain of refusal. For those few workers who went so far as to 
wage hunger strikes in protest, the withdrawal of their labor went even fur-
ther in manifesting the violences of an infrastructure devolved onto labor.
These were not, furthermore, just any strikes. The material and symbolic 
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force of waste made it a particularly potent matter of rebellion. Those who 
are associated with garbage are keenly situated for disruption, as not only the 
most impure in society but also the bridge connecting the outside — which 
can be “rubbished” — to the clean inside (see Chakrabarty 1991; Furniss 2012; 
Scanlan 2005; Searle- Chatterjee 1979). Following Mary Searle- Chatterjee’s 
(1979) study of the Benares street sweepers in India, this can be seen as the 
“power of the polluted,” or the capacity of abjected waste workers to trou-
ble the divides between order and disorder.14 In Dakar, trash workers mani-
fested their power through their strategic alliances with natural processes of 
decomposition. Festering piles of decomposing garbage amplified workers’ 
grievances, producing a kind of lively, unofficial infrastructure that com-
peted with public rights of way, obstructed other public goods, and obliged 
new ways of living in the city.15 The stench and filth of rotting garbage, com-
bined with its resonance as impurity, rendered the city dangerous and called 
for the resolution of associated risks with urgency. The longer the trash was 
left to fester, the more hazardous it became. As described in the next section, 
trash strikes in Dakar exerted particular force because they were multiplied 
and made manifest by the supportive action of neighborhoods across the city.
Manifesting the Public Secret of Waste
On a warm morning in May 2007, the central Dakar neighborhood of hlm 
Fass was far too quiet. As household women went about their usual morning 
cleaning activities, they were well aware of the eerie absence of a sound that 
usually hastened them along: the incessant honking of their neighborhood 
trash truck as it did the rounds, emptying this dense neighborhood of its 
most dangerous product. It was day ten of the trash workers strike, and while 
most of the Fassois were aware of the conflict between the union and govern-
ment from the frequent radio coverage of the drama, this was no consolation 
as they tried to keep their homes clean and their children safe. The smelly 
remains of the week — including fish guts and goat entrails, plastic bags, 
and vegetable matter — were building up in the piles, rice sacks, and buckets 
used as trashcans in the working- class Dakar neighborhood. Although hlm 
Fass was originally planned to accommodate functionaries in Dakar, with 
the collapse of state employment in the 1970s and 1980s it came to house 
a diverse set of mostly working- class families. By 2007, the ill- maintained 
multistory buildings were home to a mix of renters and owners who made 
do with the cramped three- room apartments (see figure 4.1). Though they 
F I G U R E  4 . 1 .  One of the main high- rise buildings in hlm Fass, before the trash strikes  
of 2007. Author’s photo, 2007.
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added ash to the garbage to mitigate the stench and tied it up in multiple 
plastic grocery bags, the waste overflowed, cluttering courtyards, balconies, 
soccer fields, and the local sewage canal (Canal IV) and stinking up homes 
and public meeting areas.
By sundown, a few neighborhood residents were inspired to tell the gov-
ernment that the problem had continued long enough. After the evening 
prayer, they gathered more residents together and discussed the idea of a re-
volt. As midnight approached, the idea spread like wildfire. Mothers, daugh-
ters, sons, and fathers alike left their homes that balmy night and went about 
their task quickly and quietly, piling their week’s refuse high in the middle 
of the boulevard on which they knew the politicians would be traveling the 
next morning on their way downtown. As a targeted message to the local 
district mayor, they also sculpted a special tower of detritus directly in front 
of his dilapidated office in the heart of hlm Fass, a short walk away from 
the capital’s Independence obelisk. Across the city, other neighborhoods 
did the same, ridding their homes of their dirt and decay and depositing 
it into the public space. In Tonghor, Yoff, where the pilot participatory gar-
bage  collection project had long since disappeared, women and girls’ only 
recourse was to defy a community ordinance and dump their garbage on 
the beach, where it would inevitably wash into the ocean and tangle their 
fishermen’s nets.
An older female resident, Demba, who was an active participant in the 
dumping in hlm Fass, explained her motivation for mounting the trash revolt:
We realized that the trash trucks hadn’t come for two weeks. Fass 
is not very spacious; there was a nauseating smell throughout the 
neighborhood. People couldn’t even breathe normally. What’s more, 
there were children who were playing next to the trash where worms 
were starting to come out of the ground. They could have gone back 
home to eat without washing their hands. . . . There was a risk of 
disease! [Dumping] was the only solution that we had since the mayor 
refused to resolve the problem. It was our way of letting him know that 
we were not happy with the situation, of forcing him to react.
Demba’s explanation marshaled her authority over household matters and 
family well- being in order to justify her rebellion through dumping. It was a 
last resort, she explained, one that any upstanding citizen would take. One 
of the key organizers, Samba — a young law student born and raised in hlm 
Fass — described his experience as follows:
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One day my older sister said “Don’t you smell that odor?” I decided to 
do something about it. . . . Around 11 p.m., I couldn’t wait any longer. . . .  
I grabbed brooms and sacks [of garbage]. At the beginning, we were 
two or three people, but then other people passed and saw us and 
then, all of a sudden, everyone came out. We did it right here [by the 
mayor’s office] and there was also an enormous pile there on the road. 
[The dumping] was hard work and we finished at the earliest around 
3 a.m. . . . But, it worked! 
As Samba notes, the trash revolts that day did work: the mayor of Dakar 
intervened immediately to clean up the trash blocking the streets by noon 
(see figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Only after the trash workers continued their strike with a second plan of 
action, however, did the mayor finally meet with the union to resolve the 
dispute. A few days later, the workers were finally paid two months’ back pay 
and went directly back to work, until the next round of strikes held a couple 
of months later for other grievances. The media coverage of the neighbor-
hood revolts was extensive (e.g., M. Fall 2007; Nettali 2007; Sud Quotidien 
2007). The following passage from an article entitled “Insalubrité: Dakar 
(ré)envahie!” (Insalubrity: Dakar [Re]invaded!) characterizes much of the 
reporting:
Insalubrity has again taken over the neighborhoods. The Senegalese 
capital is invaded by heaps of rubbish dumped by angry populations. . . .  
Colobane, Fass, Gueule Tapée, Médina, hlm Fass are under the yoke 
of the garbage. Outraged by the inaction of the authorities, the resi-
dents have reacted. The week- long strike [by workers,] who claim two 
months of back pay for a total of 24 million [cfa], seems to be at the 
source of this situation. . . . We are attacked by the nauseating odors 
of Dirtiness, queen of the capital. The residents, discontented to see 
the waste continue to pile up in front of their homes, before our eyes, 
dump their trash onto the road.16
The trash crisis was a lens through which many residents registered their 
disenchantment with the state of Alternance, the new political era ushered 
in with the election of President Abdoulaye Wade in 2000. April 2007 was 
just one month after the recent presidential elections, in which Wade won 
again with an overwhelming majority but this time little jubilation from the 
Dakarois. It was generally accepted that these elections signaled not a vote 
F I G U R E S  4 . 2  A N D  4 . 3 .  The 
remains of a 2007 
trash revolt in hlm 
Fass, a few hours 
after the mayor 
sent in a special 
collection force to 
remove the garbage 
directly blocking  
the roads. Author’s 
photos, 2007.
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of support for Wade, but rather a vote of no confidence in his rivals, and were 
a consequence of having many candidates in the final rounds.17 Support for 
Wade was dwindling, as Alternance had brought little opportunity to most 
Dakarois while the cost of living skyrocketed.
The only signs that Wade was “working” were the massive infrastructure 
projects that had transformed Dakar into a messy construction site. The 
extensive road- network project in the capital was a central part of Wade’s 
preparations to show off for the international community at the 11th oic 
summit to be held in Dakar in spring 2008. “We cannot eat overpasses!” was 
a common response of residents asked to comment on these investments. 
Offering up a litany of critiques of Alternance, many jokingly referred to it 
as “Alternoos” — a play on words disparaging government officials’ reputation 
for partying (noos), instead of working. Wade’s acceleration of neoliberal re-
forms in many sectors was further dismantling welfare services, enabling 
unprecedented wealth accumulation, and exacerbating social inequalities. 
Urban infrastructure was the material manifestation of these disparities and 
the object and symbol of urban protest.
Two of the organizers of the neighborhood trash revolts in hlm Fass — Bab-
acar and Ibrahima — were especially outspoken about their disillusionment 
with Alternance. Having worked for part of the year in Spain, they were back 
for a few months to spend time with their families. Becoming embroiled in 
the trash crisis was far from how they had planned to spend their vacations. 
Both had been active organizers for Wade’s party in 2000, but they admit-
ted that the last seven years had been overwhelmingly disappointing. Inter-
viewed together, they gave an uncensored critique of Alternance: “This prob-
lem [the garbage crisis] is the result of a lack of political will. During all of 
this, they are bypassing the media, buying the presidential airplane, placing 
government officials in the most optimal working conditions. Really, those 
people [government officials] are Europeans over there — in an underdevel-
oped country!” Similarly, the head of the hlm Fass neighborhood associa-
tion described Alternance in these terms: “What is going on? While [the pol-
iticians’] lifestyles improve, the people are dying of hunger! We are talking 
about [people making] billions! The Senegalese people are still hungry! And 
what do we have to show for it? A few roads?” These perspectives highlight 
the injustices of neoliberal accumulation through describing the excesses 
that came to characterize the ruling regime. President Wade’s performative 
investments in infrastructure had become the signals of uneven develop-
ment, and garbage in the public space the symbol of political dysfunction. 
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Though the hlm Fass neighborhood is far from the most disadvantaged dis-
trict in greater Dakar, accumulating garbage represented for residents their 
marginalization with regard to urban public services and, more broadly, the 
landscape of political patronage in the city. For many, it fueled their disen-
chantment with politics in general. As one hlm Fass resident summed it 
up, “La politique est poubelle [politics are trash].” Samba (the young law stu-
dent), for his part, reflected on the garbage crisis by saying he would never, 
ever, get involved in politics. “All I do in this neighborhood is for God. It’s to 
have grace, never profit.”
Like the trash strikes, public dumping by residents deploys the power of 
waste to contest ordering paradigms. Through a politics of manifestation, 
residents reveal the public secret of waste, relocate the blame for polluted liv-
ing conditions, and repudiate their abjection. In the words of one neighbor-
hood revolt organizer who had piled his garbage in the street, “They think 
we’re dirty because we live here. But, we are not dirty! This is the mayor’s 
trash, so we gave it back to him.” The act of externalizing the garbage that 
they had struggled to manage in the home was a refusal to be sullied by the 
state’s negligence. If the proper flow of waste is out of sight, out of mind, then 
the dumping worked to disrupt the privilege that comes with forgetting and 
thus the division between those who can discard and forget and those who 
cannot. Trash strikes and dumping gain their creative power through ren-
dering trash — as dirt — “matter out of place” (Douglas 1966).
Beyond their power as a creative lever of contestation, the trash revolts 
also reveal the social infrastructure binding the workers and the residents 
they served. Participants in the hlm Fass revolts were strikingly unified in 
their support of the trash workers. In aiming their action precisely at “the 
politicians” (the local district mayor, the mayor of Dakar, and the other polit-
ical figures who drive along the boulevard to get to their offices downtown), 
their goals were twofold: to convey their larger discontent with being ne-
glected and to force the government to resolve the dispute with the garbage 
workers. The following statement by the two main trash- revolt organizers, 
Babacar and Ibrahima, is illustrative:
What we did was a total revolt. Because we are revolted by the attitude 
of the state! It’s the state that should fix this problem. We noticed that 
this was a recurring problem that had returned again. These workers 
are not well paid. They are the heads of households who live a pitiable 
existence facing three months without pay. We think that is terrible. . . .  
The Piety of Refusal 139
It’s revolting [revoltant]. Revolting. Revolting. This is a fundamental 
public service. . . . It’s the state’s responsibility. It’s the state that pays 
the workers, that pushed them to go on strike. Here in Africa, a fa-
ther can’t go three months without receiving his salary. That’s totally 
impossible! We think that the state is responsible. When we did the 
“dumping” of the trash on the main road, we knew that was exactly 
where the [government] authorities passed. The next morning, they 
went and got people to collect that trash. That goes to show that the 
only language those people understand is, in the end, violence. When 
the people don’t revolt, [the politicians] don’t even think about the 
people. Before we dumped the garbage on those roads, they had stayed 
more than two weeks without doing anything. . . . We are not savages, 
we are citizens. We are educated.
Viewing poor garbage services as a demeaning personal affront, these resi-
dents summoned their civility and education to emphasize the irresponsibil-
ity of the ruling elite. Invoking their citizenship, moreover, as a right to fair 
public services and, for the workers, fair wages, rendered Wade’s approach 
to government illiberal and undemocratic.
These statements also illuminate how the union’s campaigns to validate 
their labor had worked to gain the support of many Dakarois. One trash 
worker’s perspective on the revolts echoes many of his colleagues’ views to-
ward the neighborhood action:
The people were with us. God made it so that we live in the same zones 
as we work. They knew us; they were our neighbors. They asked us 
why the truck no longer came to do the collection. We informed them 
that we had gone two months without being paid. They felt that wasn’t 
just and that if it had been them, they also wouldn’t have accepted it. 
They pay their garbage tax and are not going to accept to live with gar-
bage in their homes. So, they threw it all in the main arteries where 
the authorities drive. Therefore, we can say that the people supported 
us 100 percent.
Beyond striking, the trash workers union had set out from its inception to 
transform the stigma entailed in working with garbage and to inform ordi-
nary Dakarois of their poor working conditions through a savvy public rela-
tions campaign. In an effort to valorize the profession, the union launched 
a campaign to promote a new language within the sector, insisting that the 
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regular collectors and sweepers who make up the bulk of the sector’s workers 
be called techniciens de surface (surface technicians) in lieu of the negatively 
associated terms éboueur (rubbish collector) and balayeur (street sweeper) 
or even the extremely derogatory term buujumaan (see chapter 2). Through 
tireless radio shows, press conferences, and newspaper interviews, the union 
and its leader, Madany Sy, became household names (see figure 4.4).
Because the activists from the Set/Setal movement were employed as the 
trash collectors in their own neighborhoods and these relations still per-
sisted in many areas, workers were intimately connected to the neighbor-
hoods they served. Many still collected the garbage of their own families, 
neighbors, and friends. Even for those who did not serve people they actu-
ally knew, the interactive system, which involves direct contact between 
the workers and residents at the moment of collection in the street, forged 
communicative channels and spaces of intimacy between workers and the 
communities they served. As a result, though many respondents admitted 
to having been prejudiced against the workers before they became familiar 
F I G U R E  4 . 4 .  An sntn press conference in March 2008. The union’s secretary general, 
Madany Sy (middle), is shown here reciting the union’s grievances and threatening  
a general strike. Author’s photo, 2008.
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with their plight, by 2007 many residents frequently described the workers’ 
labor as “noble” and “dignified” and regularly prayed for them. Although 
some examples of disrespect persisted, workers equally recounted stories 
of special consideration they received from their communities. One worker 
from Yoff recounted this story: “I was collecting the trash with my bare 
hands. An old man who was teaching the Qur’an nearby to some children 
stopped what he was doing and came to help me. Afterward, he said, ‘My 
son, you underestimate the importance of the work you are doing.’ He knew 
we knew it, but this was his way of encouraging us to persevere.” Many resi-
dents were also remarkably informed about the details of the union’s griev-
ances and negotiations with the state, and explicitly intended their trash 
revolts to be an expression of solidarity.
The communicative channels mobilized by participatory waste manage-
ment provided the basis for the effective mobilization of popular protest 
and refusal of neoliberal logics. Like roads, bridges, or telephone lines, the 
practices of sociality encompassing quotidian trash disposal thus served as a 
social infrastructure that functioned as an affective and symbolic commons 
that could be “formatted as a public good” (Elyachar 2010, 452). The trash 
strikes and revolts were the creative product of the flows of “reputation, 
information, and emotion” (Elyachar 2010, 459) that such infrastructures 
enabled and, in turn, would serve as the catalyst for new agendas in the 
garbage sector. The next section will explore the architectures of faith that 
underpinned these intimate infrastructural relations.
The Piety of Refusal
I sat down with the young, charismatic leader of the trash workers union, 
Madany Sy, during the heart of the garbage crisis in 2007. Beneath the 
roar of the only fan in the tiny windowless office at the back of the union 
headquarters, Sy explained with emotion why he — an articulate, educated 
Dakarois — was so committed to cleaning the city. He said:
If I’m here [in the trash sector] to this day, it’s because of my beliefs. 
Because they say that to be a true believer, a true Muslim, one must 
be clean. One must not be sullied; cleanliness is essential. Thus those 
who collect the trash of the markets, hospitals, the households, they 
have a surplus with regard to God. They are like a priesthood. . . . I 
sacrifice myself today so that people don’t have to be contaminated 
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by illnesses. . . . So, it’s a very strong gauge of beliefs. If it weren’t for 
the faith, if it weren’t this religion, well, we would have quit long ago.  
But . . . sooner or later, God will pay us for our efforts. . . . It’s God that 
wanted this.
This statement captures Sy’s usual passion but it also illuminates a key 
shared value that has deeply shaped the trash workers’ movement. Despite 
the lamentable circumstances under which they have labored since the early 
1990s, the trash workers of Dakar have maintained an intense unity and ca-
maraderie (see figure 4.5). In addition to the shared history and bonds from 
Set/Setal, the trash workers’ solidarity is buttressed by their common faith 
and conviction that the labor of cleaning the city is a pious act. This archi-
tecture of faith undergirds their shared infrastructures of bricolage, serves 
as an important personal and collective resource, and gives the trash work-
F I G U R E  4 . 5 .  Two trash workers in Niari Tali, taking a break from collection on a hot day in 
July 2007. Author’s photo, 2007. 
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ers’ movement its moral authority. Sy and his workers frequently articulated 
this credo of trash work as God’s work and used the idea as a platform from 
which to demand better conditions. If cleanliness is godliness, they argued, 
then those who work day in and day out to purge Dakar of its impurities 
should be rewarded in the here and now. The reward due is simple: respect, 
job stability, and fair pay. In this way, the workers articulated a refusal to be 
refuse which inverts the stigma of trash work.
Purity in body and spirit is an indispensable element of Islamic faith. 
The ablutions performed before praying, including the washing of one’s face, 
hands, and feet, are just one of the myriad ways that cleanliness is essential 
to Islamic faith and ritual practice. Because a state of purity is a precondition 
for worship, Muslims cannot offer their prayers with an unclean body, with 
unclean clothes, or on premises that are seen as polluted. The emphasis on 
physical cleanliness as a signifier of spiritual cleanliness thus does not stop at 
the body but is also implicated in the domestic and public space. One’s home 
should be kept clean as a symbol of one’s purity and there is an emphasis in 
specific passages of the Qur’an on the cleanliness of the streets and public 
spaces.18 Beyond the cleanliness of the body and environment, moreover, 
notions of purity in Islam ascribe particular importance to the act of clean-
ing. The cleansing of holy Muslim sites, for instance, can be understood as 
an act of deep worship, as demonstrated in the biannual ritual washing cer-
emony of the Kaaba (inner navel) of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Saudi 
dignitaries and similar washing rituals in mosques throughout Senegal. And 
yet, the act of purging everyday public spaces of their dirt and garbage often 
comes with immensely negative associations in Islamic settings, as in other 
contexts.
Perhaps the most well known example of the social stigma of waste work 
as degraded labor is the connection between sanitation and caste in India. 
Dalits (lower- caste groups) in traditional Hindu society have historically 
been assigned sanitary work deemed polluting by other castes, “enabl[ing] 
the higher castes to be free of bodily impurities” (Douglas 1966, 152 – 53; see 
also Prashad 2000). In Mary Douglas’s formulation, caste was a key exam-
ple of ritual pollution through which discourses of dirt and danger main-
tained social categories. In Muslim societies, waste workers can be particu-
larly stigmatized because of the religious associations between waste work 
and impurity. As a result, in certain places, Christians dominate the waste 
sector. In her research in Pakistan, for instance, Jo Beall (2006) shows how 
minority Christians retain a monopoly over sanitation work because of its 
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undesirability to Muslims. Similarly, as marginalized Coptic Christians in a 
majority Muslim culture, Zabaleen trash collectors have retained an almost 
exclusive monopoly over Cairo’s garbage collection for decades.19 The cull of 
all of the Zabaleen’s pigs during the h1n1 virus outbreak in 2009 dramat-
ically illuminated the “purity and danger” (Douglas 1966) implications of 
their waste work.20
In Dakar, trash workers are almost exclusively Muslim, mirroring the 
population at large. Before Set/Setal, however, the majority were workers 
who came from outside of the city and were considered low- status by Da-
karois (see chapter 2). These workers migrated to take positions that, in bet-
ter times, Dakarois would not deign to consider. When the vast majority of 
workers were replaced by Set/Setal activists in the early 1990s, the demo-
graphics of the sector changed dramatically. With this development, Da-
kar’s garbage sector came to comprise a fairly representative cross section of 
Dakar society. Women entered into official trash work for the first time and 
represent a significant minority of trash workers to this day.21 As mentioned 
earlier, it took some time for many of these urban — and, in some cases, ed-
ucated and otherwise privileged — workers to come to terms with the stig-
matization of their new professions, particularly for men. However, facing 
the evisceration of the public sector accompanying structural adjustment 
and, with it, the prospects for regular work in Dakar, they had little recourse 
but to persevere in these low- paid but increasingly rare jobs. Many of these 
workers turned the stigma of trash work on its head through describing their 
job in terms of its value as religious service.
Trash workers in Dakar have made connections between their work and 
its spiritual value since they began cleaning in the Set/Setal movement in 
the late 1980s. Reflecting back, some of the trash workers cite the impor-
tance of cleanliness in Islam as a key personal reason why they originally 
became involved in Set/Setal. As they continued on as workers in the new 
municipal trash system, the work’s religious value served as an inspirational 
resource in the face of difficult working conditions. For example, Babacar 
from Médina proudly explained that he had stopped wearing protective gris- 
gris when he started in the profession in the early 1990s because he knew 
that he was already blessed for his work. Gris- gris are talismans often worn 
on the body to ward off evil spirits and bring good luck. Although originally 
derived from African religious practice, gris- gris are commonly incorporated 
into Senegalese Muslims’ spiritual practice. His words sum up the senti-
ments of many trash workers:
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I often say that it’s no longer necessary for me to wear gris- gris to pro-
tect me. . . . God preaches cleanliness and thus we who make places 
clean are blessed by God. . . . This is one of my principal motivations 
in this work and I’m not the only one to think that this is a manner of 
practicing his religion. In the same way that people pray, we are also 
endeavoring along the Islamic pathway that preaches cleanliness, one 
of the precepts of the Islamic religion. Places of worship are ubiquitous 
in the street, so cleaning the street is a way of reinforcing one’s faith. 
And even if we miss some prayers, we know that God blesses us for the 
work that we’re doing because nothing is more noble and commend-
able than to clean.
Babacar’s practice of piety  through cleaning broadens the definition and 
geography of worship beyond conventional worship practices (e.g., praying, 
fasting). More provisional and subversive than conventional conceptions of 
piety, piety  through  cleaning is the everyday work of bricolage. As a mode of 
piety, cleaning labor becomes a way of living one’s religion, developing per-
sonal capacities to endure suffering, and persevering in the face of difficult 
conditions. Brought to life in the vibrant spaces of the everyday, it involves 
a moral geography that is centered on the body and deeply rooted in the 
corporeal practice of laboring. Framed as a collective resource, it becomes 
a performative practice to lobby for fair labor and better state protections.
Though the spiritual value of cleaning was frequently emphasized in my 
interviews with trash workers across Dakar as well as in compelling state-
ments made by the union in its work to nurture public support, these re-
sponses clearly divided along gendered lines. None of my women respondents 
volunteered an articulation of the value of their labor in religious terms. 
When asked directly about the religious value of cleaning, most female re-
spondents did insist that cleanliness was a key element of their spiritual prac-
tice and that this was part of why their work was so valuable. However, the 
key difference was in the force with which men versus women insisted on 
this value in a public forum. This raises some important questions regarding 
the gendered space of spirituality and expressions of faith, as well as the gen-
dering of stigma associated with the profession. Because the labor of cleaning 
in the home is exclusively considered women’s work in Senegal, trash work 
out of the home was not only considered dirty (and thus polluting) but femi-
nized (see chapter 2). Male workers wore masks and tried to hide from their 
families and girlfriends out of embarrassment. For women, who had always 
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been cleaning in the home, on the other hand, entering the profession was 
not stigmatizing in the same way. Public articulations by male workers of the 
value of their labor in religious terms served to at least partly offset some of 
the stigma of becoming garbage men.
Since the mid- 2000s, the trash-workers union has begun publicly artic-
ulating religious service through cleaning as a key part of its platform for 
improved conditions. It centers this positioning on a generic, unifying idea 
of a common “Muslim” identity that is explicitly not framed in terms of Sufi 
brotherhoods, specific marabouts, or any other divisions. In fact, when I 
tried to inquire as to individual workers’ affiliations with particular broth-
erhoods, they went to great lengths to avoid answering the question, insist-
ing instead that they were “all just Muslims” and that which mosque they 
frequented didn’t matter. Conjuring a generic Muslim identity worked to 
cement solidarity between workers and their communities through down-
playing their differences and emphasizing common values. In this way, it 
inspired a cosmopolitan ethics calling for just treatment to be accorded to all 
workers, regardless of other divisions. It also conferred moral authority on an 
otherwise abject population in order to justify claims made on the state. Sy 
often asked government officials to allow their moral commitments of fra-
ternity with their Muslim brothers to guide their management of the sector.
Forging an understanding of trash work as a service of purification vali-
dates trash workers’ labor and creates a platform for voicing their grievances. 
In an era when politicians are strongly distrusted and party values rendered 
almost meaningless, but where faith and communal religious identity re-
mains an enormous personal and collective resource, they appeal instead 
to commonly held Senegalese moral values. This renders their grievances 
difficult to refute and apparently apolitical. Appealing to Islamic morality 
thus casts a sharp ethical critique of the state’s role in the flexibilization of 
labor and provides a new language through which to understand the value 
of infrastructure.
Conclusions
Through disrupting the orderly flow of waste out of the city and intentionally 
externalizing private trash into public spaces, workers and residents mani-
fest disorder to contest the governing prerogatives of government planners 
and officials and all of the associated dimensions of stigma and abjection 
implied by living and working in filth. The effectiveness of the trash work-
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ers’ campaign is evident in the public support the workers have garnered 
since their campaign ramped up in the mid- 2000s and the attention they 
have finally received from the government over the last few years. Framing 
their work in religious terms not only acts to validate otherwise stigmatized 
labor and laborers, but also serves as a platform for making claims on the 
state. Since that time, the workers have won some important battles, and, as 
detailed in chapter 1, the sector has figured into important political contests 
between the mayor of Dakar and the president. During this time, the union 
was received many times by the mayor and representatives of the national 
government. From 2006 to 2009, they received a number of concessions, 
including back pay and indemnities, and then in 2009 their conditions im-
proved markedly when the mayor officially hired on the workers, conferring 
on them formal contracts, medical coverage, and access to banking services. 
After more years of hard lobbying, they finally earned the objective of much 
of their campaigning in 2014 with the signature of their collective bargain-
ing agreement. Although the sector continues to be politicized and workers 
continue to battle to further improve their working conditions, their griev-
ances have been significantly attenuated over the last few years. The sector 
represents a pioneer in reversing austerity logics. In the context of continued 
liberalization of the economy and flexibilization of labor in diverse sectors, 
this is no small feat.
This chapter has traced the moral geographies of citizenship that emerge 
from the piety of refusal and that have enabled these transformations. If 
infrastructure is composed of people, then central to grappling with infra-
structural politics is contending with the meanings and values that peo-
ple place on those infrastructural systems. For systems devolved onto labor, 
the value of infrastructure derives from the value placed in that labor. The 
analysis has focused on modes of self- valuation through the embodied cul-
tivation of piety- through- cleaning and the deployment of those values in a 
public forum. At the same time, it has explored the power of striking, or the 
withdrawal of infrastructural labors in intentional acts of dirtying. Because 
waste can be dangerous, trash work has a specific power. The intimate vi-
tality of Dakar’s participatory trash collection system and the vibrancy of 
the material relations of garbage gives the critique its force through ren-
dering politically salient not just the discard process, but also, importantly, 
its interruption. The natural forces of decomposition take on new meaning 
as they intersect with the vibrant actions of persons. The spiritual value of 
trash work is grounded in both the meaning of cleanliness in Islam and the 
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embodied practice of cleaning. As a practice of purification, the labor of 
cleaning provides a powerful ground on which to contest relations of dispos-
ability and lay bare the ethics of infrastructure. In this way, the labor union 
movement levels a powerful critique of the erosion of the rights and rewards 
of the city and lays claim to dignity through insisting on the value of labor as 
an essential infrastructural ingredient.
The piety of refusal raises important questions for the horizon of politics 
in urban Africa. This study moves away from an exclusive emphasis on reli-
gious institutions to emphasize the ways that religious identity shapes indi-
vidual consciousness and collective organizing. The story of trash workers’ 
religious convictions is not one of marabouts, brotherhoods, Islamism, or 
instructions from on high about how to wage politics. Instead, the research 
raises some questions for the critical understandings that may be mobilized 
through religious identity or the “dialectics of political and spiritual agency” 
(Diouf and Leichtman 2009, 12). The role of faith and communal religious 
identity in providing the political consciousness that undergirds oppositional 
movements is of course not new. Workers’ faith has been shown to be cru-
cial in building a strong oppositional culture, both in helping workers to 
critically reflect on their situations and in legitimizing popular struggles in 
diverse settings (e.g., Billings 1990; Lubeck 1986). But the piety of refusal 
offers a novel and significant language for contesting neoliberal austerity 
and reframing the value of infrastructure.
Given the rising importance of religious movements in African settings, 
particularly in urban spaces, it has become even more important to ask about 
the possibilities for critical understandings to emerge through spiritual prac-
tices in that context. In Dakar, religious convictions have incited trash work-
ers and their communities to stand up for fair treatment and better jobs. 
Insisting on the spiritual import of cleaning allowed these workers to find 
some salvation in a “trashy” job as well as to fight for a measure of respect 
from the state and populations they serve. The piety of refusal constitutes a 
mode of bricolage of the self that buttresses the practices of salvage bricolage 
through which workers forge, maintain, and, sometimes, break down the 
city’s infrastructure. The associations between cleaning and virtue shape 
the value of the infrastructure and allow citizenship claims to be persua-
sively staked on a moral- ethical level. Architectures of faith, then, become 
the scaffolding through which politics and piety are enmeshed and through 
which new, more ethical infrastructures can be crafted.
conclusion.  Garbage Citizenship
Digging beneath Dakar’s garbage piles reveals a very different story from the 
dysfunction and disorder often associated with African cities. Behind the 
ebb and flow of decay in Dakar’s public space lies a rich, dynamic history of 
political contestation that offers important insights about citizenship and the 
urban condition in Senegal and beyond. This history make clear the key role 
of infrastructural politics in shaping access to the rights and rewards of the 
city while pushing beyond conventional understandings of infrastructure. 
Dakar’s bricolage garbage collection system demands a broader definition 
of infrastructure that includes labor, materiality, and affective modes of val-
uation. Urban infrastructures are thus revealed to be ecologies vitally alive 
with bodies, communities, materials, and ritual practices. Though this live-
liness may be more easily discerned in an ordinary Southern city like Dakar, 
these are potentially essential infrastructural elements anywhere. African 
cities like Dakar are key sources of theory for urban and infrastructure stud-
ies of ordinary cities around the world.
The garbage lining Dakar’s city streets, canals, and empty lots is both the 
stain left by a difficult history of disinvestment in the era of austerity, and the 
key ingredient in a series of dynamic eruptions by poor and disenfranchised 
citizens rejecting conditions of precarity. On the one hand, garbage in Dakar 
bears witness to the vicissitudes of neoliberal development. African cities 
have been key experimental testing grounds for harsh structural adjustment 
and urban reform measures that have wreaked havoc on urban livelihoods, 
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labor and environmental conditions, welfare services, and public infrastruc-
tures. The tumultuous politics of garbage over the last twenty- five years are 
the outcome of the starving of the urban public sector with structural ad-
justment and the wily political maneuvering required to reform within a vi-
brant democratic context. Urban austerity precipitated intense jockeying for 
control of this important public sector, especially manifested in a turbulent 
history of institutional politicking and battles between the mayor of Dakar 
and the president of the republic. Most generally, these forces accelerated a 
mode of governing- through- disposability premised upon performative, frag-
mented infrastructure investments and strategies to flexibilize urban labor. 
For laborers caught up in these processes, especially women and youth, work 
was degraded in highly differential ways through discourses of participation. 
The severe neoliberal experiments that African cities have undergone at the 
hands of international development loans operate through wasting spaces 
and bodies in the pursuit of economic growth that rarely materializes.
At the same time, the history of Dakar’s garbage reveals that modes of 
rendering people disposable are met with strategies of refusal that validate 
labor that has been stigmatized and degraded. Neoliberal experiments spark 
a host of creative, experimental citizenship practices rooted in the grimy 
everyday spaces of the city that act to reorder patterns of disposability and 
insist on different logics for governing the city. Over the last decade in par-
ticular, trash workers and the neighborhoods they serve have fostered a cri-
tique of the neoliberal logics that have dominated Senegal’s political econ-
omy. Through their strikes and trash revolts, they have forced a collective 
reckoning with labor insecurity and uneven urban services. This is just part 
of a wave of battles that different citizen groups have been waging against 
the infrastructural elitism, erosion of public services, and degradation of 
life’s work that has taken hold over this period in Dakar. The garbage work-
ers join a chorus of strikers in other municipal sectors, as well as diverse 
citizens’ groups including youth rappers and street vendors, who are reclaim-
ing a more inclusive citizenship and city through often below- the- radar, ev-
eryday negotiations and transgressions (Fredericks 2014; Ndiaye 2013; Tan-
dian 2013). Whether dissatisfaction at the current state of affairs will result 
in long- term political economic change in Senegal remains to be seen. But 
these events speak to a wider trend across the continent of reckoning with 
structural adjustment and struggling to chart alternative modes of urban 
governance. They are consistent, moreover, with the way that urban public 
infrastructures are the stage for citizenship battles all over the world. Sub-
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stantive citizenship in Dakar is enacted and contested in the gritty spaces of 
the city and through the materiality of everyday life.
This book has examined questions of urban citizenship in the neoliberal 
era through bringing together a materialist understanding of infrastructure 
and an emphasis on the cultural politics of labor. This has allowed for an 
innovative approach to both infrastructure and labor that bridges old and 
new materialist debates. New materialist insights help us to see the ways 
that the trash itself — its hard- to- manage elements, stench, and processes 
of decomposition — and the material technologies used to collect it (bodies, 
trucks, horse carts) shape the trash politics that have seized the capital city. 
Attention to the cultural politics animating these labor struggles — especially 
the roles of gender and youth identities as well as the spiritual imaginaries 
shaping the value of cleaning work — fleshes out these infrastructures as vital 
systems activated by the differentiated materiality of bodies and the systems 
of meaning that connect them. Through expert labors of salvage bricolage, 
Dakar’s trash workers piece together complex socio- technical infrastructural 
systems embedded in communities of affect and vernacular values.
A focus on infrastructural labors thus offers an important corrective to 
infrastructure studies that elide the bodies, social systems, and affective 
registers that infrastructures are built upon. Emphasizing materiality reveals 
the material burdens that exacerbate conditions of precarity and the ways 
that systems of meaning making may stem from the object of management 
(here, waste) and its particular properties. An ethnographic perspective al-
lows for an investigation into the strategic alliances that may form between 
human and nonhuman actants, and into the actual political work that non-
human actants do in specific settings in order to move beyond the abstract 
theorizing associated with much new materialist thinking (see, for example, 
Bennett 2010). This pushes us to ask some questions about how objects have 
a force, are consequential, and play a role in politics, while retaining a cen-
tral focus on urban lives, subjectivities, and questions of citizenship.
Considering Dakar’s garbage system as political infrastructure illumi-
nates the values that get coded in infrastructural arrangements. A quote 
from one of my respondents makes this clear. At the end of my last interview 
with Issa Ndoye, the official in the Yoff mayor’s office charged with coordi-
nating household waste collection, he admonished me to be responsible with 
my analysis of Dakar’s trash infrastructure by telling me: “You have to make 
sure that you are careful in writing up your research on our garbage system. 
Ideas get quickly taken up and replicated, especially by ngos. Infrastructure 
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is power. Yes, infrastructure is power, and what matters most is choosing the 
right infrastructure.” Issa had been highly critical of the horse- drawn- cart 
system implemented in Yoff and felt strongly that the municipal garbage 
infrastructure just needed to be reinforced. Others dismissed him as “ob-
sessed” with garbage trucks because he firmly believed that more  advanced 
technologies like garbage trucks were essential for a more functional, coher-
ent, and just municipal garbage system. I have strived to take Issa’s advice 
to heart in this book. Like Langdon Winner, in his foundational piece “Do 
Artifacts Have Politics?,” Issa was keenly aware that infrastructural choices 
matter because they codify social- power relations in the city and “establish a 
framework for public order. . . . The issues that divide or unite people in soci-
ety are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but 
also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires 
and transistors, nuts and bolts” (Winner 1980, 128). Unjust social relations 
become entrenched in the material structures of the city through regressive 
technologies like horse- drawn carts and labor- intensive collection systems. 
In this light, garbage infrastructures of postadjustment Senegal manifest 
the moral economies of that political economic conjuncture and highlight 
questions of distributive justice.
Infrastructures matter in their intersection with human bodies. Though 
Issa was committed to garbage trucks, he was most concerned with the so-
cial technologies employed alongside physical technologies through disin-
genuous discourses of appropriate technology and empowerment. By placing 
at the center of this analysis the laboring bodies that serve as the connective 
tissue tying together steel technologies and waste flows, I hope to crystalize 
the power relations embedded in different socio- technical systems. Exam-
ining the way that human labor and community dynamics serve as tech-
nologies in specific infrastructural arrangements reveals who gets access to 
public welfare benefits, which spaces are slated for decay and pollution, and 
the corporeal burdens of the crisis of social reproduction.
Human labor is a key, underrecognized ingredient of infrastructures ev-
erywhere, but grappling with the burdens of people’s infrastructural labors is 
especially pertinent in bricolage systems that dominate in the Global South. 
Labor is key to the conditions of the working poor and, as such, forms an 
important foundation of urban citizenship. Innovative bodily technologies 
of salvage bricolage may be ingenious tools for navigating austerity but they 
may also entail violent bodily burdens. Moreover, labor is a key infrastruc-
tural technology but it is not equivalent to other technologies. This analysis 
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has endeavored to trace the ways that labor and infrastructure intersect but 
also the ways that they are in tension and often incommensurate.1 Suturing 
labor and infrastructure together produces intersecting precarities that can 
threaten not just laboring bodies but the integrity of the infrastructure as 
a whole. Precarious, decaying machines make infrastructural labors riskier 
while precarious, bricolage labor may, in turn, threaten the integrity of the 
infrastructural system and the livelihoods it supports. The implications of 
the relationship between devolving infrastructure and labor are thus unpre-
dictable and potentially perilous.
It is no accident that garbage infrastructure, in particular, became a key 
battleground for urban citizenship in this dynamic conjuncture in Dakar. 
As former mayor Mamadou Diop realized, trash is the essence of quotidian 
life — it is the present, past, and future of the city. As the unavoidable byprod-
uct of consumption and production, garbage represents both an ultimate 
challenge to and a foundational requirement of development and moderniza-
tion. Following Mary Douglas, the practice of managing wastes, moreover, 
is centrally implicated in ordering processes, structuring societies through 
fears of contagion and risks of impurity. As matter out of place, trash renders 
places and people impure through threats of contagion (Douglas 1966). It is 
through the risk of impurity that garbage has been a key mode of governing 
and rendering abject. At the same time, garbage is universally available and 
thus a potentially powerful ingredient of creative practices of citizenship by 
degraded members of society. The symbolic register of trash as waste helps 
to explain both the power of governing through garbage and the creative 
possibilities for people to trouble the divides coded by dirt and disorder.
Moreover, the materiality of waste — its messy thingyness and “toxic vital-
ity” (P. Harvey 2016) — is inextricable from its symbolic register and is at the 
root of its power in both governing and claiming citizenship. Though Doug-
las’s foundational insights on the role of dirt in structuring social- power hi-
erarchies are useful to explain the dynamism of trash in Dakar, I have shown 
here how the force of trash goes far beyond the symbolic. Garbage must be 
reckoned with not as an abstract concept structuring symbolic oppositions, 
but as matter oozing with physical, spatial, and affective properties that in-
tersect with bodies in profoundly political ways. Governing and rebelling 
through garbage are material practices of power. A close materialist read-
ing of discard labor draws our attention to all of the ways that social- power 
dynamics can be disrupted through reconfiguring the power of waste in 
a material politics of refusal. Degraded subjects have critiqued the expert 
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knowledge complicit in rendering them disposable through vibrant, messy 
struggles around garbage. Through strikes and trash revolts, Dakarois engi-
neer “crises” that make plain the inner workings of infrastructure and the 
inequities it contains. Through the social and communicative investment in 
their communities, grounded in architectures of faith, moreover, the trash 
workers resist the negative associations of waste and forge wider communi-
ties of affect united around the injustices of uneven urban public services. As 
they render waste infrastructures “problems of collective existence” (Lakoff 
and Collier 2010, 244), they politicize the materiality of urban life itself. 
Given waste’s ubiquitous presence in all urban societies and the wide array 
of contexts that have recently seen trash strikes and crises — from Paris to 
Beirut to Buenos Aires — it is clear that trash is not just a feature of Senegal’s 
contemporary political landscape. Garbage is a powerful matter of urban 
citizenship anywhere.
Trash in Dakar makes clear how, as James Ferguson (2012, 562) notes, 
“the insistence on materiality . . . is at the same time an insistence on moral-
ity.” Perhaps the most important lesson to learn from Dakar’s trash workers 
comes from their battle to revalorize their labor through sculpting material 
moralities. At the core of the trash workers’ movement is an effort to align 
their material labors with vernacular moralities. Their citizenship practices 
refuse moral economies of austerity and their associated infrastructures and 
call for arrangements of people, objects, and technologies that are more just. 
Through their conviction that trash work is God’s work, and their practical 
efforts to order the city, the workers demand a remoralization of work and 
stake claims for a more ethical infrastructure. Trash collection as religious 
purity, and fair wages and equal public services as Muslim fraternity, enable 
a very different approach to building this emergent African city. These are 
the vernacular understandings that mobilize everyday life in Dakar and that 
could form the basis of a more “ordinary” (see Robinson 2006), more ethical 
infrastructure. Garbage citizenship, then, draws attention to the injustices 
of uneven urban infrastructures while charting a new vision for the city that 
is grounded in the mundane matter, values, and practices of the everyday. 
notes
introduction. Trash Matters
1. See Sharad Chari’s (2013, 133) similar notion of “refusal to be detritus.” 
2. I’m drawing on and reconfiguring AbdouMaliq Simone’s (2004b) notion of people 
as infrastructure. 
3. For some notable exceptions, see Blundo and Meur (2009) and Chalfin (2010) as 
well as the political infrastructures literatures discussed later in the chapter. 
4. The city is a major financial center, home to a dozen national and regional banks 
(including la Banque Centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest [Central Bank of the 
West African States] which manages the unified West African franc [cfa] currency) 
and numerous international organizations, ngos, and international research centers, 
and it is the center of the country’s tourist economy.
5. Among other interventions, these literatures have contributed pathbreaking in-
sight toward understanding gendered and generational access to resources, migration 
and rural- urban connection, and the persistence of “custom” (e.g., Berry 1993; Carney 
and Watts 1990; Ferguson 1994; Isaacman 1996).
6. Africanist research has been foundational in political ecology (e.g., Bassett and 
Crummey 1993; Fairhead and Leach 1996; Ribot 1998; Schroeder 1999; Tiffen, Mor-
timore, and Gichuki 1994; Watts 1983). Though most of the early political ecology 
scholarship was focused on the rural sphere, there is a growing literature refracting 
urban political- ecological questions through the lens of African cities (e.g., Lawhon, 
Ernstson, and Silver 2014; Loftus 2012; McFarlane and Silver 2017; Myers 2005;  
Njeru 2006).
7. See footnote 12 for a brief discussion of Africanist urban political ecology (upe).
8. There is a long, important tradition of Africanist urban historiography and 
ethnography that shifted the rural focus of labor studies to grapple with the transfor-
mation of work and labor organizing in the city. For instance, Luise White’s ground-
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breaking Comforts of Home explored the role of prostitution as a means of capital 
accumulation in colonial Nairobi (1990). Research on urbanism in the Copperbelt, a 
copper- mining region in Central Africa mostly centered in Zambia’s Copperbelt Prov-
ince, moreover, was central to a new paradigm in urban studies emerging in the middle 
of the century (see early research coming out of the Rhodes- Livingston Institute [e.g., 
Gluckman 1961; J. C. Mitchell 1961] and the discussion by J. Robinson [2006]). More 
recent scholarship on the urban labor question has recalibrated understandings of 
urban informality (K. Hart 1973), the challenges of economic decline (Ferguson 1999), 
new patterns of migration (Buggenhagen 2001; Cooper 1983; M. Diouf 2000), the gen-
dered politics of work (Clark 1994; G. Hart 2002), and questions of labor mobilization 
and unionization (Cooper 1996; Lubeck 1986; Parpart 1983) — to name a few central 
contributions.
9. For instance, Gillian Hart’s (2002) important monograph examines the cultural 
politics of labor fomented by industrial globalization in black townships in KwaZulu- 
Natal faced with ongoing legacies of racial dispossession. 
10. For instance, my edited volumes with Mamadou Diouf (2013, 2014) brought 
together a range of established and emerging scholars wrestling ethnographically with 
the forms of experimentation, adaptation, and negotiation through which African ur-
ban dwellers stake claims to the rights and rewards of the city. Other relevant overview 
pieces include: De Boeck and Plissart (2005), Mbembe and Nuttall (2004b), Murray 
(2011), Murray and Myers (2011), Myers (2005, 2011), E. Pieterse (2008), J. Robinson 
(2006), Simone (2004a, 2010), and the debate between Watts (2005a) and Nuttall and 
Mbembe (2005). 
11. For instance, Brenda Chalfin, Daniel Mains, and Antina von Schnitzler have been 
at the forefront of ethnographic discussions of infrastructural change in the neoliberal 
era for their work in Ghana, Ethiopia, and South Africa, respectively (Chalfin 2016; 
Mains 2012; von Schnitzler 2016).
12. These concerns have animated broad swathes of urban geographical debate for 
some time. Some key foundational texts include Castells (1979), D. Harvey (1996), and 
Smith (1984). Urban political ecology (upe) research has made especially important 
contributions toward emphasizing the socio- power geometries surrounding human- 
environment relations, the materiality of urban nature, and the key role of urban 
infrastructures in uneven environment- development relations (e.g., the collection by 
Heynen et al. [2007]). However, I join with Lawhon, Ernstson, and Silver (2014) in 
arguing for a provincialization of upe. African urbanisms offer new insights for upe, 
which, to date, has been narrow in theoretical scope and dominated by Global North 
perspectives. This book shares in Lawhon et al.’s call for a more situated upe that draws 
on more heterogeneous theoretical influences (especially feminist and postcolonial), 
particularly through exploring how notions of people as infrastructure, embodied ex-
periences, and situated knowledges are central to urban political ecologies. For some 
examples of urban political- ecological scholarship that may fall outside the purview 
of conventional upe, see Loftus (2012), Myers (2011, 2014), Rademacher and Sivara-
makrishnan (2013), and Truelove (2011).
13. The research on political infrastructures has exploded over the last few years. For 
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some key overview pieces and special issues, see Appel, Anand, and Gupta (2015),  
Calhoun, Sennett, and Shapira (2013), Collier, Mizes, and von Schnitzler (2016),  
S. Graham and C. McFarlane (2015), Jensen and Morita (2016), Larkin (2013), Lugo 
and Lockrem (2012), McFarlane and Rutherford (2008), T. Mitchell (2014), O’Neill 
and Rodgers (2012), and Star (1999). Water infrastructure has been an especially fertile 
area of research. See Anand (2017), Björkman (2014), Gandy (2014), Kooy and Bakker 
(2008), Ranganathan (2014, 2015), and Truelove (2011).
14. There is a wide and established body of urban scholarship, much of which is 
focused on Global South cities, that emphasizes the rising importance of the city as the 
key locus of citizenship accompanying the decline of nation- state – based citizenship. 
The shift to the urban scale is associated with the fading relevance of classic notions of 
citizenship focused on formal membership and participation in the national polity, and 
the rising importance of rights- based approaches which focus on access to substantive 
urban public goods like housing, sanitation, and employment. See the concise sum-
mary by Miraftab and Kudva (2015) as well as foundational texts including Holston and 
Appadurai (1999), J. Robinson (2006), and Roy (2009).
15. Von Schnitzler (2013, 689). See also Appel (2014), Brownell (2014), Chalfin 
(2014, 2016), Chari (2013), De Boeck (2014), De Boeck and Plissart (2005), De Boeck 
and Baloji (2016), Doherty (2018), Gandy (2006), Larkin (2008), Loftus and Lumsden 
(2008), Mains (2012), Masquelier (2002), Mavhunga (2013a), McFarlane and Silver 
(2017), Mizes (2017), Omezi (2014), Simone (2004b, 2012), and von Schnitzler (2016).
16. Geography has long made its mark on the academy through grappling with the 
relationship between human activity and material environments (Braun 2007). There 
has been a resurgence of interest in the last few years, influenced by wider new mate-
rialist debates and the rising influence of science studies and the “ontological turn” in 
anthropology, to bring materiality more fully back into the fold of cultural and political 
geographical inquiry.
17. See Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin’s influential Splintering Urbanism (2001). 
The implied progression in Graham and Marvin’s book from networked to individual-
ized and privatized systems is less relevant in African cities. As Matthew Gandy (2006, 
389) points out about Lagos, episodic aspirations by colonial and then postcolonial 
governments to modernize urban space have in reality been “little more than a chimera 
that characterized sketches, plans and isolated developments, but never constituted 
the majority experience.” 
18. See Michael Watts’s (2005a) critique of Simone’s notion of people as infrastructure 
in the special issue of Public Culture on Johannesburg.
19. For some key texts in discard studies examining the culture and materiality 
of waste, see Alexander and Reno (2012), Gregson and Crang (2010), Hawkins and 
Muecke (2003), Moore (2012), O’Brien (1999), Reno (2015), and Scanlan (2005).
20. This study joins with a wider body of work in discard studies that pushes  
beyond Douglas’s structural- symbolic approach to foreground waste’s materiality  
(see Reno 2015). 
21. Though the examples elaborated here are mostly in the postcolonial world, waste 
management has also been deeply implicated in city- planning policy and practice in 
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the West. For example, discourses of cleanliness and indiscipline resonate with a num-
ber of other long- running debates including the historic question of pollution and class 
that can be seen in the progressive era in the United States (Riis 1890).
22. Anand (2012), drawing on Kristeva (1982). Similarly, Michelle Kooy and Karen 
Bakker (2008) explore how the constitution of modern citizenship is entangled with 
the provision of water infrastructure in Jakarta through its role in disciplining corpo-
real subjects.
23. Chakrabarty (1991, 18). D. Asher Ghertner (2010a) argues that such techniques 
undergird the function of what he terms aesthetic governmentality in the service of 
elite “world- city” aspirations in Delhi. As Ghertner and other scholars of India have 
observed, bourgeois environmental discourses are frequently invoked in elite projects 
for urban development, often through mobilizing discourses of order, nuisance, or 
contamination (Doshi 2013; Ghertner 2010b; McFarlane 2008). It is in this sense that 
Vinay Gidwani and Rajyashree N. Reddy (2011, 1425) describe contemporary metropol-
itan governance in India through zones of exclusion, enclosure, and neglect as an “evis-
cerating urbanism” which operates as a regime of disengagement “for managing bodies 
and spaces designated as ‘wasteful.’ ” 
24. Mbembe (2001). For his part, Esty (1999) argues that the excremental is a gov-
erning trope in African and other postcolonial literature, but draws on African satires 
to emphasize the way that satirists’ scatological language fosters an incisive critique of 
the failures of colonial development and the corruptions of neocolonial politics. See 
also Lincoln (2008) on excremental allegory in postcolonial African literature. 
25. I’m drawing here on Chakrabarty (1991, 19 – 20).
26. This builds on a focus within critical development studies and urban geography 
as to how “life’s work” is restructured through the instrumentalization of participation 
in the interest of cheaper urban- development strategies, which roll back the provision 
of public goods (e.g., Katz 2001; Roberts 2008). 
27. For other research looking at the particular burdens of waste work, see Crang 
(2010), Gidwani (2013), Gidwani and Reddy (2011), Gregson and Crang (2010), 
Miraftab (2004b), Parizeau (2015), M. Samson (2007, 2009, 2015), Nagle (2013), Reno 
(2016), and Whitson (2011). For broader explorations of disposability and labor, see 
Bauman (2003), Butler and Athanasiou (2013), Gilmore (2007), Hecht (2012), Mee-
han and Strauss (2015), Voyles (2015), Wright (2006), and M. Yates (2011). 
28. The discard process is only the beginning of the second life of garbage. A vil-
lage of people lives at the city’s dump, Mbeubeuss, carving lives and value out of the 
remains left by their better- off neighbors. Although this research did not consider the 
politics of picking, my new research examines the social life of the dump.
29. Kaplan’s article, “The Coming Anarchy,” became one of the best- selling issues in 
The Atlantic Monthly’s history, was cited far and wide, and is considered an influential 
intervention on the current state of world affairs. In his dramatic account of his ride to 
the airport in Conakry, he described the city as “a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle . . . 
The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage” (1994, 54).
30. See also Diouf and Fredericks (2013, 2014), Myers (2011), and Roy and Ong (2011) 
for extended discussion and ethnographic research that resist these two tendencies. 
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one. Governing Disposability
1. Comprising fifty- seven nations, the oic was formed in 1969 and aims at protect-
ing Muslim interests worldwide.
2. The monument and many of the road projects were not completed for the event 
but a few key thoroughfares and exchanges were finished in the nick of time. 
3. On infrastructure and modernist development, see Gandy (2003), Mrázek (2002), 
and Scott (1998). On breakdowns, see S. Graham (2010), Lakoff and Collier (2010), 
Mains (2012), and Star (1999). On abjection, disconnection, and disrepair, see Anand 
(2012), Appel (2014), Björkman (2014), Chu (2014), Ferguson (1999), Gidwani and 
Reddy (2011), and Rodgers (2012).
4. Larkin (2013). See also Bazenguissa- Ganga (2014), Ferguson (1999), Harvey and 
Knox (2012), Ishii (2016), Larkin (2008), Mains (2012), Masquelier (2002), and Trov-
alla and Trovalla (2015). 
5. On international events, see Cavalcanti (2015) and Omezi (2014). On world- class 
city making and bourgeois environmentalisms, see Ghertner (2010b) and Roy and 
Ong (2011). Also relevant is research on how infrastructural crisis can be produced 
for political ends (Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008), the production of anticipatory 
security events (Lakoff and Collier 2010), and infrastructural performances for an 
international- development gaze (Appadurai 2002). 
6. Performative practices around infrastructure have not been limited to the state. 
As we’ll see in chapter 4, garbage infrastructure is also the space through which rebel-
lion has been performed by striking workers and ordinary residents through staging 
breakdowns and exteriorizing waste.
7. Dakar was originally founded by the French as a military base in 1857 at the Lebou 
village of Ndakarou on the tip of the Cape Verde Peninsula. The Cape Verde Peninsula 
was originally settled by Lebou — one of Senegal’s nine ethnic groups — fishermen no 
later than the fifteenth century (Sylla 1992). The Portuguese first landed on Gorée (a 
small island off the peninsula) in 1444, where they founded a settlement that was to 
become part of the slave trade network. The island, just off the mainland, changed 
hands between the Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French many times before the 
French finally took control of it near the end of the seventeenth century. First settling 
on the African coast in Saint- Louis in 1659, the French took definitive control of the 
colony of Senegal in 1817 after losing it to English occupation during the French Revo-
lution and Napoleonic Wars. 
8. Assimilation was the ideological basis for French colonial policy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, premised on the idea that colonial subjects could become 
French by adopting French language and culture. 
9. Although sometimes used to include people of mixed African European descent, 
the term originaire generally referenced Africans living in the Quatre Communes. 
Demonstrating the required proof of at least five years’ residency in one of the com-
munes was often quite complicated.
10. Substantial legal and social barriers prevented the full exercise of “citizens’ ” 
rights. These struggles lend significant insight into the contradictions intrinsic to 
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the ideals and practices of the French mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission), at once 
rooted in republican egalitarianism and premised on authoritarian violence and racism 
(Conklin 1997). 
11. The concentration of investment and power in the coastal administrative cities 
and the hierarchies of citizenship established in the colonial period have had lasting 
impacts for the postcolony. A core legacy of colonial administration is the bifurcation 
between urban “citizens” and rural “subjects” (Mamdani 1996). Compared with rural 
areas and secondary cities, Dakar has long dominated planning and infrastructure 
development.
12. Swanson (1977) coined the term in describing how colonial policy surrounding 
the bubonic plague acted as an instrument of racial segregation in some South African 
cities. Some other notable examples of the interlocking politics of difference and san-
itation in the colonial era include Warwick Anderson’s (1995) study of “excremental 
colonialism” in the Philippines, Sidney Chalhoub’s (1993) inquiry into yellow fever in 
Rio de Janeiro, Vijay Prashad’s (1994) study of “native dirt/imperial ordure” in India, 
Brenda S. A. Yeoh’s (2003) research in Singapore, and, of particular relevance to my 
study setting, Myron Echenberg’s (2002) analysis of the bubonic plague in Senegal.
13. The Socialist Party was originally named the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise 
(Senegalese Progressive Union) until 1976.
14. After considerable growth in the 1960s, the public sector exploded in the 1970s, 
with thirty- three new public and state- owned enterprises created from 1973 to 1975 
(Bellitto 2001, 79). The water sector was nationalized in 1971, followed by electricity 
two years later (Bellitto 2001, 94). The trash sector did not follow until 1985 with the 
creation of the parastatal corporation, la Société Industrielle d’aménagement urbain du 
Sénégal (Industrial Urban Planning Company of Senegal; sias). By the 1980s the gov-
ernment was the sole or majority entity of eighty- six public and parastatal companies, 
representing 20 percent of gdp and employing thirty- five thousand workers (Somer-
ville 1991, 153). Dakar’s graduates were particularly well placed for government jobs 
during this period (Zeilig and Ansell 2008).
15. Collignon (1984) discusses the déguerpissements (displacement) of urban res-
idents seen as “overpopulating” the area, as well as specific marginalized members 
of the urban landscape, including talibé children (young boys, who in an extremely 
controversial practice, beg for money for their marabouts), handicapped people, and 
the mentally ill. 
16. Cohen (2007, 148). The World Bank’s first urban  development loan was us$8 
million to Senegal for the Sites and Services Project, approved in 1972, to construct the 
Parcelles Assainies district in Dakar. Despite the fanfare, the project was inadequate 
and failed to make much of a dent in Dakar’s housing crisis.
17. The management of household garbage was specified by the Code de l’admin-
istration communale (Municipal Administration Code, Law 66 – 64 of June 30, 1966, 
modified in 1969, 1970, and 1972). The financing of household waste management 
is covered by the Taxe d’enlèvement des ordures ménagères (Tax on the Removal of 
Household Waste; teom), which dates back to the law of August 13, 1926, and an 
amendment from February 3, 1958, which required that all properties be subjected to 
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the teom, calculated based on the built property values. Household waste is collected 
by the Treasury Service of the Ministry of Finance. The recovery rates are infamously 
low and inadequate for covering service costs. For instance, in 1995, 18 percent of the 
total trash budget was covered by the teom, and in 2001, only 15 percent was covered 
(Chagnon 1996, 109; Direction des collectivités locales, personal communication, 
2007).
18. In Diouf’s (1997, 308) words, the protection of the economy by the state had 
contributed to the “development of an attitude of total irresponsibility on the parts of 
those associated with power. In fact, political protection that guaranteed impunity gen-
eralized bad management, clientelism, corruption, and the total absence of sanctions, 
positive or negative.”
19. Whether continued economic decline in Africa was the result of the reforms 
themselves or the poor implementation of them is an extremely complicated question 
that has been the subject of vast debate over the last few decades (e.g., Mkandawire 
and Soludo 1999). 
20. The cud was created in 1983 as a governing structure over the greater Région 
de Dakar (region of Dakar) (joining the three départements [departments] of Dakar, 
Rufisque, and Pikine). As stipulated in Decree 83 – 1131 (October 1983), the cud was 
responsible for household waste management in the region of Dakar. 
21. At the onset of structural adjustment, the wage bill had reached 60 percent of 
government spending (B. Fall 2002, 52). Reform of the civil service was centered on 
several major strategies aimed at controlling recruitment practices and minimizing 
new hires (B. Fall 2002). The formal jobs that did remain became more flexible with 
the passage of more liberal labor regulations and policies that made it easier for em-
ployers to fire workers and use contract labor (Somerville 1991). Reform of the public 
sector was slow and sectoral at first, and some public and parastatal (“mixed econ-
omy”) companies continued to be created up until 1988.
22. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to explore in detail the origins of the in-
dustrial crisis in Senegal. For one particularly illuminating case, see Catherine Boone’s 
(1992) thorough and persuasive examination of the rise and fall of the Dakar textile 
industry.
23. Political reforms had begun in 1976 when President Senghor adopted a new 
constitution that transformed the one- party state into a tripartite political system. 
Although some scholars emphasize that the democratic gains in the 1980s only made 
Senegal a “quasi- democracy” that was really more about political consensus (Vengroff 
and Creevey 1997), real gains were made in opening up the political playing field. 
Robert Fatton (1986) argues that through deftly ushering in unlimited pluralism, Diouf 
was able to neutralize threats from the left opposition in order to retain popularity in 
the early 1980s. This popularity was, however, to be short lived. While political liberal-
ization was to ensure the survival of the Socialist government into the late 1980s, this 
was to prove temporary in the face of the diminishing capacity of the state to shape and 
benefit from the economy.
24. Though first associated with Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, the Senegalese social 
contract theory has gained the attention of, and been revised by, a significant scholarly 
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field (see, for instance, Creevey 1985; Cruise O’Brien and Coulon 1988; Diop and Diouf 
1990; Fatton 1987; D. Robinson 2000; Villalon 1995). For important recent interven-
tions and revisions, see M. Diouf (2013), especially the chapter by Babou (2013).
25. See Cruise O’Brien (2003) on these factors, including the challenges to brother-
hood authority stemming from generational differences, quarrels over succession, and 
competition between marabouts over shrinking resources. 
26. Ironically, the evidence that this compulsion was fading first showed up in the 
1983 elections even though the Socialist Party fared quite well. In those presidential 
elections, despite the Mouride leader’s preelection ndigal to vote for the Socialist Party, 
a significant number of Mouride voters appear to have defied these instructions and 
voted for the opposition party, even in the Mouride heartland (Cruise O’Brien 2003).
27. Diplomatic ties between the neighboring countries were severed, and several 
hundred people (estimates vary between a hundred and a thousand) were killed in 
April and May 1989 in a spate of looting, rioting, and reprisals in both Dakar and the 
Mauritanian capital Nouakchott, as well as in other towns on both sides of the border. 
The ethnic violence was allegedly sparked by a dispute over grazing rights along the 
Senegal River (Parker 1991).
28. Diop and Diouf (1992) describe mayors as “prisoners” dependent upon “merce-
nary support” from the central state. Despite new policies and agendas for decentral-
ization stretching back to 1972, in practice these reforms were maneuvered to reinforce 
power in the central state and keep the municipalities hemmed in. A key restriction 
on the mayor of Dakar’s power is his lack of control over financial resources sufficient 
to the responsibilities of the post. Even local taxes (including the teom) are not auto-
matically at the mayor’s disposal, but must, rather, be collected by the central treasury 
and sent back to the municipality, which is rarely assured. Poor recovery rates on local 
taxes and the politicization of their dispersal are just two of the financial challenges 
facing the mayor of Dakar. 
29. Diop had served multiple posts as minister under Senghor. He served as mayor 
of Dakar from 1984 to 2002. 
30. The devaluation precipitated widespread social dislocation, protests, and further 
economic inequality in the country (Creevey, Vengroff, and Gaye 1995).
31. Senegal received a comprehensive debt- reduction package from the World Bank 
and imf under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (hipc) Initiative from 
2000 to 2006 (World Bank 2000).
32. At first named the Haute Autorité pour la propreté de Dakar (High Authority 
for the Cleanliness of Dakar; hapd), transformed shortly after to Propreté de Dakar 
(Cleanliness of Dakar; prodak), the agency then became Agence pour la propreté de 
Dakar (Agency for the Cleanliness of Dakar; aprodak) in 2001.
33. The Swiss company Alcyon was selected for the exclusive market of Dakar’s gar-
bage collection in 2001 and the twenty- five- year contract was eventually ceded on No-
vember 11, 2003, to Alcyon’s main subcontractor, ama. The company ama- Senegal was 
created as a private subsidiary of the Italian ama- Rome (République du Sénégal 2002). 
The story behind the choice of these contracting companies was the subject of enor-
mous controversy, stemming from allegations of direct personal links discovered with 
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the president or his family. The conditions under which ama, which had no previous 
experience in the developing world, was selected are extremely muddy. 
34. Oumar Cissé and Salimata Seck Wone (2013) detail some of the troubling as-
pects of ama’s shady equipment and managerial practices.
35. The government first broke the contract with ama in October 2005, citing 
widespread corruption, mismanagement, and devastating public health consequences. 
Under pressure from the World Bank, the state quickly reinstated its contract with 
ama, building in some new checks and balances. The World Bank pressured for the 
contract to be reinstated because ama’s investments were insured by the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (miga) (Project no. 5498). Although most trash workers 
were retained, the administrative and mechanical staff were fired with the rupture of 
the contract. 
36. Officially titled the Entente cadak- car, the acronym stands for Communauté 
d’agglomérations de Dakar – Communauté d’agglomérations de Rufisque (the agree-
ment of the urban agglomerations of Dakar and Rufisque). 
37. Remarkably, the expertise of the cud did not form the basis for the creation of 
cadak- car, as most of the staff, reports, etc., had been expunged in the shake- up after 
2000. Symbolizing this erasure, only vestiges of cud publications were found scattered 
across administrative offices and homes of former employees. In terms of leadership 
and charge, the mayor of Dakar served as the president of the cadak- car, and its 
official mission revolved around the management of household garbage, the roadway 
network, and public street lighting.
38. The Code des collectivités locales (Decentralization Law) is Law 96 – 06 (March 
22, 1996) and the addendum is Law 2002 – 16 (April 15, 2002).
39. See Cissé and Wone (2013) for critiques of Veolia’s contract. 
40. They were hired and managed through a temping agency, did not receive bene-
fits or formal contracts, and were paid the same salaries as those in the rest of the 
sector.
41. For media coverage of the trash strikes, see Dieng (2009) and Le Quotidien 
(2009).
42. The newly created Mutuelle de santé des travailleurs du nettoiement (Health 
Insurance for Cleaning Workers; mstn) counted close to three thousand members in 
2016 (trash workers and their families).
43. Monthly salaries for the average trash worker had stagnated between 65,000 and 
80,000 cfa per month for some time. From 2009 to 2012, the base salary was gradu-
ally raised to between 90,000 and 95,000 cfa per month. In 2012, the union leader, 
Madany Sy, indicated that the union still did not consider this a liveable wage, and that 
they advocated for a minimum base salary of 150,000 cfa per month.
44. Banque Internationale pour le commerce et l’industrie du Sénégal (International 
Bank for Trade and Industry of Senegal).
45. The new agency, la Société pour la propreté du Sénégal (Company for the  
Cleanliness of Senegal; soprosen), was voted on by the National Assembly on August 
16, 2011. 
46. In removing this foundational element of the urban economy, he made it clear 
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that access to work was about one’s ability to conform to specific aesthetic regimes. 
The forced removal of the vendors precipitated a major riot in November 2007 and 
proved a vexing and highly politicized issue for years to come (Tandian 2013). 
47. The monument was despised because the family it portrays is viewed as cultur-
ally inappropriate, the cost of its production was exorbitant and did not rely on local 
labor, and all visitation proceeds went directly into the president’s pocket (see Roberts 
2013).
48. On December 17, 2012, the National Assembly unanimously voted to dissolve 
soprosen and officially return the management of garbage to the Ministry of Local 
Governments.
49. The unit was created in 2011 under President Wade but was charged only with 
garbage management outside of Dakar. 
50. Like its preceding organizations, the ucg has organized cleanup events with vol-
untaires (day laborers), instead of recruiting more permanent workers into the sector. 
The union insists that new recruitment and increased salaries are necessary to keep up 
with increasing workloads and the rising cost of living in Dakar. 
two. Vital Infrastructures of Labor
1. Associations sportives et culturelles (Sporting and Cultural Associations), Grou-
pements d’intérêt economique (Economic Interest Groups), and Groupements promo-
tion féminine (Women’s Interest Groups). 
2. This phenomenon varied by neighborhood and by flavor of the association. In 
more affluent neighborhoods, the youth tended to be more educated, for example, 
but because of the level of unemployment, often even these educated youth were very 
active in their youth groups. The implications of this phenomenon — and the strong 
presence of young intellectuals in Set/Setal — for the trash union battle are considered 
in chapter 4. In terms of ethnicity and other divisions, youth associations are quite 
representative of local demographics, so in some neighborhoods specific ethnic groups 
dominated (e.g., the Lebou in Yoff).
3. This quotation, and all other uncited quotations throughout this book, are from 
my own interviews with trash workers, residents, government officials, and waste ex-
perts in Dakar, conducted between 2006 and 2016. The majority of the more than two 
hundred fifty interviews I conducted took place in the course of my dissertation field-
work, in 2007 – 8. The interviews were originally conducted in French and Wolof, some 
with the assistance of my Senegalese research assistant. She and two other assistants 
transcribed the interviews into French and, unless otherwise noted, I translated them 
into English. With the exception of government officials or those who explicitly asked 
that I use their real names, I have withheld the names of my respondents in the inter-
est of confidentiality. The ethnographic research was centered in the department of 
Dakar although research into the institutional history of the sector covered the greater 
Dakar region. Trash workers at multiple sites across Dakar were interviewed, mainly 
on their collection routes or, most commonly, at the workers’ hangout spots where 
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they took their breaks. Two neighborhood ethnographies were conducted in hlm Fass 
and Tonghor, Yoff. These interviews were conducted in fifty households in each neigh-
borhood, with a mixture of household members. The large majority took place within 
these respondents’ homes.
4. Women’s connection to ritual impurity through Islamic custom may reinforce 
their association with cleaning duties, but I did not explore this connection directly in 
the present research. For a discussion of the South Asian context, see Beall (1997).
5. Single women are of lower status than married women, and older wives are con-
sidered higher in social rank than younger wives.
6. Better- off families in Senegal have bonnes (household maids) who help with the 
domestic duties of cleaning, cooking, and child care.
7. Based in Dakar and intervening in areas related to urban livelihoods across the 
Global South, enda is one of the best- known ngos in West Africa. The book’s full title 
is Set Setal, Des Murs Qui Parlent: Nouvelle Culture Urbaine à Dakar (enda 1991).
8. N’Dour and Le Super Étoile (1990). N’Dour is the father of the popular music 
genre mbalax, and is Senegal’s most famous musician. The original lyrics are in Wolof 
and the translation is provided by the author with the assistance of Sophie Coly. 
9. The integration of the sias workers into the new system was not an easy one and 
those involved remember deep disagreement at the time between the older “profes-
sionals” from sias and the Set/Setal youth. 
10. This project was actually the second of two major attempts in Senegal at quelling 
the social discontent unleashed by structural adjustment in the late 1980s. The first, 
Délégation à l’insertion à la réinsertion et à l’emploi (Delegation for Inclusion, Reinte-
gration, and Employment; dire), though established in 1987, received more attention 
after the events of 1988. Funded by the state and international donors, dire was aimed 
at the people who were least happy with the economic reforms: parastatal workers who 
were laid off, civil servants who voluntarily retired, and university graduates. Designed 
primarily as an expensive “sweetener” for buying off these groups, dire was, for a vari-
ety of reasons, considered a failure (C. L. Graham 1994).
11. For the first phase of the agetip project (1989 – 92), the World Bank dispersed 
a us$20 million loan, and there was additional cofinancing from the African Develop-
ment Bank, other funders, and the Senegalese national and municipal governments. 
In the second phase (1993 – 97), the World Bank distributed $38 billion, and there was 
additional cofunding from other sources (World Bank 1997).
12. sias was officially dissolved on September 27, 1995, and the Nouveau Système 
de nettoiement (New Cleaning System; nsn) was codified in October (République du 
Sénégal, n.d.). It consisted of 109 gies and their 1,542 members (Doucouré 2002).  
The camcud was created to federate these associations as a new arm of Mayor Diop’s 
municipal organization, the cud. The principal objectives of the new system were 
stated as follows: “1) the rationalization of the collection and transport system for 
solid municipal wastes; 2) the involvement of the population in the improvement and 
management of their quality of life; 3) the mastery of the collection and evacuation 
systems; 4) the reduction of the costs of collection and disposal” (République du Séné-
gal 1998, 27). 
166 Notes to Chapter 2
13. For a general document on the forum, see Whittaker (1995).
14. The term was originally used to describe the young oyster collectors of Mbour 
(buuj means “oyster” in Wolof) (Diop and Faye 2002, 698), but in present- day parlance 
is used to derogatorily describe informal recyclers and trash pickers and, at times, for-
mal trash workers.
15. Sweeping (balayer in French and balé in Wolof) is a term used in Senegal to de-
scribe general cleaning activities.
16. Women represented over 25 percent of national candidates for most political 
parties, with the number of women elected to political office increasing at all levels of 
government (Beck 2003, 158). Amy S. Patterson (2002), however, demonstrates that 
despite the growing mobilization of women and some of the possibilities opened up 
by decentralization reforms, there were many blockages to women being equal partici-
pants in the political system in Senegal during this time.
17. This resonates with research in South Africa that found gendered discourses 
of waste to be instrumentalized in the service of cheap, exploitative labor (Miraftab 
2004a; M. Samson 2008). See also chapter 3. 
18. The social category youth (les jeunes) in Senegal is often coded male and sepa-
rated from the category women (les femmes), in both official and popular discourse, as 
well as scholarly writing. 
19. The French verb bricoler means to tinker, “do it yourself” (diy), or cobble to-
gether. Bricolage, or the act of piecing something together from diverse elements, is 
usually seen as an informal activity associated with diy or hacking systems and related 
to the art form of collage. 
20. These are two common homemade juices in Senegal. Bissap is made as a tea 
from hibiscus leaves and bouye is made from the fruit of the baobab tree. 
21. For instance, a cholera outbreak in 2005 was directly connected to a crisis in 
garbage collection. See N. Diouf (2005 ).
22. This is not an unusual predicament for African youth in the postcolonial period. 
Best understood as a relational, social category of persons, not a biological one, Afri-
can youth’s passage into adulthood can be complicated and frustrated by their social, 
political, and/or economic situations. For a useful discussion of youth as a category of 
analysis, see Durham (2000). For a collection of essays on contemporary youth politics 
in Africa, see Honwana and De Boeck (2005).
23. A key element of the problem is that the trucks were (and still are) provided by a 
number of unregulated private contractors and employed at all levels of disrepair. Even 
the large international companies with whom the state has contracted at various mo-
ments to provide the collection materials have often failed to provide quality hardware. 
24. See Chu (2014) and Mains (2007) for two other ethnographic perspectives on 
the lived effects of disrepair in very different settings. 
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three. Technologies of Community
1. As the city sprawls outward into its banlieue, Yoff represents a sort of inner pe-
riphery that is increasingly incorporated into central Dakar. Other similar projects 
were implemented in Pikine and Rufisque, outer departments within the region of 
Dakar. 
2. Most of the community- based sanitation projects (including Tonghor) were coor-
dinated by enda’s program Relais pour le développement urbain participé (Relay for 
Participatory Urban Development; rup).
3. For instance: in the Best Practices for Human Settlements report by the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco), as a case study for 
the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex (unesco, n.d.); and 
in the widely circulated article written by enda in Environment and Urbanization (Gaye 
and Diallo 1997).
4. Because of their claim to land on the peninsula, the Lebou constituted a large 
percentage of the originaires of the first four urban areas of Senegal, the Quatres Com-
munes (M. Diouf 1998). Land has been a key element of their political influence and 
independence in the postcolonial era. 
5. I use tradition not to denote a static, unchanging nature, but, rather, to engage the 
discourse of tradition employed by the Lebou and the historical roots of their contem-
porary neighborhood governance structures.
6. The Tonghor project was patterned after a model developed by the same rup pro-
gram at enda in the district of Rufisque on the far outskirts of Dakar (Gaye and Diallo 
1997).
7. Waa Geejndar or Geejndar translates directly from the Wolof as “people from the 
Saint- Louis sea.” The Geejndar are the largest ethnic minority in Tonghor, and a rough 
estimate would put them at 10 percent of the population at least.
8. The pilot in Tonghor also had a liquid- sanitation element that was aimed at treat-
ing wastewater with small- scale (off- grid) “eco- sanitation stations.” Though this was 
not the subject of this research, it should be noted that the liquid- waste project also 
experienced enormous problems and did not come to fruition. The mural in figure 3.3 
is painted on the wall of one of the stations. 
9. A study conducted in 1997 as a baseline for the community- based trash project 
estimated that 60 percent of Tonghor households disposed of their garbage on the 
ground or by burying it; over half of these discarded their garbage on the beach or in 
the ocean (Zeitlin and Diouf 1998, 4).
10. Horse- cart owners come in from the countryside to offer their services in the 
city on a seasonal basis. This rate was a regular rate for such a service. The drivers com-
bined this work with other odd collection jobs in the city. 
11. August 2003.
12. The conference was held from January 8 to 12, 1996. Over a hundred foreign 
participants attended from thirty countries, and local attendance topped two thousand 
at the opening ceremony. See Register and Peeks (1997) for a detailed report from the 
conference.
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13. In practice, there is some overlap between customary authority and the Yoff 
district mayor’s office, which was founded in 1996 with the decentralization law. Many 
of the district’s municipal leaders are also members of Yoff’s powerful community 
association, apecsy. Tension still arises between the district government and the Yoff 
community associations. Disagreements and competition for authority are even more 
pronounced between the community authorities and Dakar- based local government 
and public services. 
14. For a concise overview of the history of “mainstreaming” gender in development 
discourse, see R. Pearson (2005). 
15. This quote is taken from the “Forum on Household Waste Collection Using 
Carts: Resolutions and Action Plans” for Rufisque, dated December 22, 1994, as re-
printed in Gaye (1996, 122). 
16. M. Samson (2007, 121). Other research by Ali, Olley, and Cotton (1998) and 
Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell (2000) shows how cheap waste- management solutions 
disproportionately subject marginalized populations to dirty- labor burdens.
17. User fees, especially in health care and education, have been extremely contro-
versial in low- and middle- income countries and communities for their lackluster reve-
nue generation and disproportionate impact on the poor. By the mid- 2000s, a number 
of development agencies and countries had begun to move away from user fees, espe-
cially in the health sector. See Nyanator and Kutzin (1999), M. Pearson (2004), who 
(2005), and R. Yates (2009).
18. The district mayor quoted earlier, Issa Ndiaye, had been involved in the rollout of 
the project in his capacity with apecsy and agreed with the idea of enlisting neighbor-
hood women in neighborhood cleaning activities, but he too saw problems with this 
model of public service provision. 
four.  The Piety of Refusal
1. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for some thoughts on this idea. 
2. Puig de la Bellacasa (2016), drawing on Star’s (1995) introduction to Ecologies of 
Knowledge and also Barad (2007). 
3. See for example Masquelier (2002). This is part of a broader Africanist literature 
(much of which is not reactionary in the same way) exploring the “modernity of witch-
craft” (Geschiere 1997). See also Comaroff and Comaroff (1999).
4. For just a few selections from a growing literature: on Christianity, see Bornstein 
(2003), Comaroff and Comaroff (2000), Gifford (2004), Marshall (2009, 2013), Meyer 
(1995), and Osinulu (2013); and on Islam, see Brenner (1993), Gueye (2002), Lubeck 
(1986), Lubeck and Britts (2002), Simone (1994), Soares and Otayek (2007), and 
Watts (1996). 
5. See Hirschkind (2001) and Hoexter, Eisenstadt, and Levtzion (2002) for a chal-
lenge to notions, most famously associated with Habermas ([1962] 1991), that Islamic 
societies are bereft of a public sphere. 
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6. See, for instance, Watts (1996), Hirschkind (2001), Lubeck and Britts (2002), 
Kane (2003), and Soares and Otayek (2007).
7. For instance, Mike Davis (2004, 33 – 34), in his widely read “Planet of Slums,” 
suggests that religious movements in the “slums” of Africa represent the apocalyptic 
visions of what has been rendered “a surplus humanity” and not the possible building 
blocks for an alternative future.
8. For instance, see the important collection of essays edited by Diouf and Leicht-
man (2009). See also Babou (2007) and M. Diouf (2013). 
9. Diouf and Leichtman (2009). For work in geography, see McGuire (2008) on “lived 
religion” and Tse (2014) on “grounded theologies.” For geographical scholarship on new 
moral geographies, see Kong’s very useful literature surveys (1990, 2001, 2010). 
10. Although a few smaller unions did form over the next few years, my research 
focuses on sntn, as it represented the majority of workers (around thirteen hundred 
in 2008) and was to lead the other unions in a number of mobilizations.
11. The Socialist Party state had long tried to rein in organized labor through its doc-
trine of state- affiliated unionism or “responsible participation,” but as this lost steam, 
two major poles of autonomous unions emerged in 1989. During the 1990s, although 
a certain level of unity and compromise was reached between the unions through 
federations as they rallied against the common cause of structural adjustment and its 
devastating impacts, labor was weakened by the state’s attempt to infiltrate autono-
mous unions (Ndiaye 2002, 2010). In the face of de- unionization and the weakening 
of unions in the 1990s due to their internal fragmentation, politicization, and the in-
formalization of labor, the unions attempted to regroup into federations after 1990 as a 
survival strategy (Diallo 2002). Two major trends were under way: (1) the formation of 
intersyndicales (union federations or umbrella organizations grouping together existing 
unions); and (2) the growing number and power of syndicats autonomes (independent 
or “autonomous” unions). This period ushered in more conflictual mobilization: two 
general strikes were held in the 1990s (1993 and 1999), whereas there had not been 
any in the 1970s or 1980s. With the election of opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade 
in 2000, “responsible participation” was officially rendered meaningless, and the main 
union — la Confédération Nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal (National Confedera-
tion of Trade Unions of Senegal; cnts) — finally officially disaffiliated itself from the 
Socialist Party. In spite of this, political tendencies and party connections persisted 
within the major union federations (including the officially “independent” unions) 
during the Wade era. The 2000s were an even more conflictual period with frequent 
strikes taking place, especially in the health and education sectors (Ndiaye 2013). 
12. For more details on the institutional reconfigurations, see chapter 1. For more 
details on the workers’ labor conditions in the mid- 2000s, see chapter 2. 
13. Their relationship with labor activists in Italy, for instance, led to widespread Ital-
ian press coverage in 2007 and even protests in Rome — the home base of the company 
ama, which had left Dakar trash workers in limbo when it lost its contract with the 
state of Senegal in 2006. These connections eventually led to the trash- workers union 
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going on a diplomatic mission to Rome in the summer of 2007, where the leaders were 
warmly received by Italian unionists and government officials.
14. See also Prashad (2000) on the Balmiki sanitation workers of Delhi. 
15. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for development of this point. 
16. Excerpt from an article in the newspaper Sud Quotidien (2007); my translation.
17. There were thirteen candidates for president in the final round, which greatly 
diminished any chance for the opposition to get enough support to rival Wade. 
18. Kuscular (2007). A growing body of scholarship and philosophy explores Islamic 
views on nature and the roots of environmental ethics and justice in Islamic thought. 
Scholars of ecology and Islam point to a number of injunctions against pollution, 
wasteful consumption, and the general abuse of nature to highlight foundational guide-
lines within Islam for the faithful stewardship of the environment. For a collection of 
essays aimed at both a scholarly and lay audience, see Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed 
Trust (Foltz, Frederick, and Baharuddin 2003). Some other resources include Haleem 
(1998), Khalid and O’Brien (1992), and Nasr (1996).
19. See Fahmi and Sutton (2010) and Kuppinger (2014) for a description of the 
Zabaleen’s waste- management system and some of the challenges it faces with neolib-
eral privatization. 
20. The Zabaleen traditionally fed organic material that they collected to pigs, which 
were then later sold for meat. However, in the fear surrounding the so- called swine flu 
or h1n1 virus, the pigs were all killed in a massive cull in 2009. Bound up with asso-
ciations of impurity and contagion, the slaughter appears to have represented more 
discrimination against the Copts than a rational policy (see Leach and Tadros 2014). 
21. In 2016 it was estimated that about one- fifth of garbage workers were women. 
The numbers have been slowly declining since Set/Setal. 
conclusion. Garbage Citizenship
1. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point. 
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